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Abstract
Beginning in 1989, Argentina committed itself to a wide-ranging program of utility 
privatization and the establishment of new regulatory regimes. Following the 
international best practice, the design of these regimes involved the creation of 
independent regulatory agencies and the delegation o f important regulatory powers to 
these agencies.
At the time these reforms were introduced, there was a reasonable amount of 
consensus that both privatization and the change in the locus of regulatory power 
were policy changes that had arrived to stay. Moreover, the expectation was that 
utility regulation would become more stable than in the past.
In this thesis, however, it is demonstrated that these expectations were unfounded. 
Using deductive reasoning, it is proposed that although delegation to independent 
regulatory agencies is an important condition for developing stable regulatory 
policies, equally important for that purpose is ensuring that governments cannot easily 
reverse that delegation or manipulate its terms. It is also hypothesized that, in the case 
of Argentina, whether or not this second requirement can be satisfied depends on the 
legal instrument policy-makers use to define the key features of a regulatory regime. 
The final claim is that, given the country’s institutional endowment, the way 
regulatory policy is defined has an important consequence. It is less likely to be 
reversed, and therefore be stable and predictable, if  key features of the policy are 
defined in a statute, than if  they are contained within other legal instruments that can 
be passed -  and changed -  unilaterally by the executive.
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To test these hypotheses, the thesis uses three case studies: telecommunications 
regulation between 1990 and 2001; electricity regulation between 1992 and 2001; and 
utility regulation -  across sectors -  between the passage of the Economic Emergency 
Law in January 2002 and April 2003.
I declare that this thesis consists of 76,969 words (excluding references).
Paolo Franco Benedetti
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I dedicate this thesis to the memory o f my dearest father Franco Benedetti.
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Chapter I
Introduction
12
1. The core elements of this thesis: puzzle, research questions, and hypotheses.
Beginning in 1989, Argentina committed itself to a wide-ranging program of market- 
oriented reforms to open up the economy and reduce government intervention. A key 
element of this program was privatization of all the utilities under the national 
government’s authority, including telecommunications, gas, electricity, and water. 
The program aroused interest all over the world. In fact, it was referred to as one of 
the broadest and most rapid in the Western Hemisphere, as well as one of the most 
ambitious and quickly undertaken by the economies that implemented structural 
reform programs from the end of the sixties.
As in other countries, privatization of utilities in Argentina coincided with the design 
and establishment of new, sector-specific regulatory regimes. This encompassed 
defining, on one hand, new formal rules governing prices, subsidies, entry, 
interconnection, etc. -  that is, the structure of regulatory incentives. On the other 
hand, and perhaps more important, it also involved defining new frameworks within 
which regulatory decisions would be made.
The design of these new frameworks -  or the sectors’ regulatory governance in Levy 
and Spiller’s (1996) terms - was a choice variable in the hand of the Argentine policy­
makers. The choice, however, was a constrained one. It should be noted in this regard, 
that some sort o f utility regulation existed before privatization. Specific ministries, or 
offices within the ministries, regulated the public companies, and government 
officials enjoyed a great deal of discretion in this respect. One of the problems with 
this scheme, nevertheless, was that its capacity to develop time consistent -  and hence
13
credible -  regulatory policies was seriously limited. Indeed, given the fact that in 
Argentina government officials usually had very short time horizons, they had strong 
incentives to use their discretion and change the policies over time in order to adapt 
them to new contingencies. This, in turn, resulted in the government being unable to 
refrain from reneging on explicit or implicit agreements.
Reformers in Argentina acknowledged that this was a significant problem. They were 
aware of the fact that, when the success of a policy relies ultimately on the response 
of rational actors -  who act on the basis of what they think the government will do 
tomorrow - ,  and where governments do not have a binding commitment holding them 
to an original plan, even adaptations made with the collective good in mind can hinder 
policy-makers from reaching their objectives. And the reason for this is no mystery: 
actors anticipate their future moves and act accordingly.
At the beginning of the nineties, thus, if the government wanted to guarantee a 
successful privatization program, it needed more than to put in place regulatory 
incentive structures that promoted welfare, facilitated investment, encouraged 
efficient pricing, and assisted the introduction of new services and technologies. 
There was also a need for new governance structures that made regulatory policy 
much less changeable than in the past.
Faced with these challenges, the reformers in Argentina decided to take a close look 
at the international best practice in the field. And the latter, it is important to note, was 
strongly shaped by the experience in the United Kingdom. In that country, when the 
Conservatives arrived to power in 1979 there was a generalised dissatisfaction with
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the performance of the utilities, there were pressures over public sector borrowing 
requirements targets, and desires to extend competition and share ownership. In this 
context, the government embarked on a programme of privatisation o f utility 
suppliers. The dates on which at least a majority of shares in the suppliers was sold 
were, among others: BT, 1984; British Gas, 1986; the water and sewerage companies, 
1989; the twelve Regional Electricity Companies, 1990.
With privatisation came the establishment of new regulatory regimes, which had 
many elements in common, and hence, as argued by Thatcher (1998), it can be said to 
be one regime. Many o f these elements, moreover, were based on provisions in 
statutes, beginning with the privatisation legislation. The main statutes were, among 
others: the Telecommunications Act, 1984, the Gas Act 1986, the Electricity Act 
1989, the Water Act 1989, and the Water Resources Act 1991.
Under the new regime, it was established that public suppliers (including the former 
monopolists) were to operate under licences that set out the conditions and obligations 
governing their operation. It was established, moreover, that the enforcement o f these 
licenses would not be direct responsibility of ministers -  as it used to be before 
privatisation -  but mostly of newly created industry regulators, or Director Generals 
(DGs). To this purpose, industry specific regulatory agencies were created. They 
were: Oftel (the Office of Telecommunications), Ofgas (the Office of Gas Supply), 
Offer (the Office o f Electricity Regulation) and Ofwat (the Office of Water Services).
In all four industries, the statutes placed relatively the same duties on the DGs. There 
were two primary duties that related to securing supply and some form of “universal
15
service” to ensure: that supply of the service met “all reasonable demand” or all 
demand “as far as practicable”, or, in water, that water and sewerage functions were 
“properly carried out”; and that suppliers were able to finance the provision of such 
services. In electricity and gas there was a third primary duty: to promote/secure 
competition in generation and supply of electricity, and in the supply and shipping of 
gas.
The statutory duties provided industry DGS with wide discretion over the economic 
regulation of the industries under their supervision. Three reasons accounted for this. 
First, it was established that each regulator should exercise his/her powers “in the 
manner that he considers is best calculated”. Second, the duties themselves were very 
broadly defined: there were few guidelines as to how the regulators were to interpret 
the statutory wording and few specific examples. Third, the duties were liable to 
conflict, leaving the regulators the choice o f which duty to give priority.
The discretion of the industry DGs was increased by their considerable institutional 
autonomy in making “general” decisions. In this sense, it should be noted that few 
controls were established regarding DGs overall approach to regulation: the 
legislation stipulated that the ministers could only issue “general directions” as to the 
priorities and considerations the DGs should use in reviewing their sectors and in 
collecting data; more specific directions were limited to well defined situations, such 
as national security and foreign relations in telecommunications. During their term of 
appointment, moreover, the DGs were granted considerable security of tenure: 
dismissal by the Secretary of State required evidence of “incapacity or misbehaviour”.
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Complementing these provisions, DGs were also granted the power to appoint the 
staff of their offices, number o f staff, and terms o f employment.
Finally, in order to secure that DGs made a good use of their discretion, it was 
established, among other things, that: they should submit an annual report to the 
minister and that he/she would it submit to Parliament; they could be called to give 
evidence by select committees of Parliament; their work would be subject to scrutiny 
by the national Audit Office; they would submit annual Appropriations Accounts that 
could be subject to a “value for money” audit by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General; and their decisions fell within the competence of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. Adding to this, in telecommunications, water and electricity the statutes 
require the DGs to establish bodies to represent consumers1.
The design of these institutional arrangements discussed above did not go unnoticed 
for policymakers in Argentina and their advisors in multilateral organisations2. Proof 
of this is that privatisation in Argentina not only involved the change in the ownership 
of the utilities but also a radical shift in the locus o f utility regulation. Like in the UK, 
and in some cases through statutes (e.g., gas and electricity) and in some others 
through a presidential decree (e.g., telecommunications and water), this shift involved 
the creation of industry specific regulatory agencies and the delegation to them of key 
regulatory powers that previously were in the hands of government officials. Also like 
in the UK, the creation of these agencies involved the establishment of other relevant
1 This description o f  the British experience draws, mainly, on Thatcher (1998a, b). For a more in depth 
one, see, in addition to this works, those by Helm (1996), Amstrong et al. (1994), Corry et al. (1994), 
Prosser (1997), Veljanovski (1993).
2 Thatcher (2005; 2004), Jordana and Levi-Lafour (2005) and Gilardi et al. (2006) show that in the late 
eighties, and particularly during the nineties, the British model became the state-of-the-art in the design 
o f the governance features o f  utility regulatory regimes not only for policymakers in Argentina but also 
for their counterparts in Western Europe as w ell as in other parts o f  the world.
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provisions also aimed at developing regulatory commitment. Although they are 
discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, it is worth reviewing them briefly.
First, and in order to guarantee that regulatory agencies would operate at an arm’s 
length relationship with political authorities, it was established that regulators would 
be appointed to fixed terms, that they would be required to possess relevant technical 
expertise and professional experience in the field, and that their terms would be 
staggered. These provisions were complemented by setting up institutional 
arrangements to ensure that regulators also operated at arm’s length from private 
interests. It was established, in this regard, that the regulatory agencies would not only 
be separated from regulated firms but also that regulators would be prohibited from 
holding a position or an interest in a firm subject to their control.
Regulators, furthermore, were also granted attributes of institutional autonomy to 
underpin the arm’s length relationships discussed above, as well as to foster and retain 
technical expertise. Among other things, this involved providing the regulators with 
reliable sources of funding and endowing them with enough managerial flexibility to 
carry out their duties. Regulators had the right to require information from operators, 
and to impose sanctions on them for not complying with their obligations. Finally, in 
order to guarantee that regulators did not stray from their mandates and remained 
accountable for their actions, policy-makers established more or less specific 
rulemaking procedures, mechanisms for appealing regulatory decisions, and 
arrangements for securing that regulators provide relevant information and advice to 
interested parties.
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At the time these reforms were introduced, there was a general agreement among both 
international and domestic observers that the delegation of important regulatory 
powers to independent agencies had arrived to Argentina to stay and, equally 
importantly, that it was a move in the right direction. According to them, these 
policies would finally free utility regulation from the short-term interests and volatile 
preferences of Argentine politicians. Utility regulation there, the argument followed, 
would then be less likely to suffer from the problems that characterized it before 
privatization, notably routine and often arbitrary changes in the rules of the game.
But were these expectations realistic? Would the setting up o f new regulatory regimes 
in line with the best international practice allow the government in Argentina to break 
with the past and create an environment of regulatory policy stability and, hence, 
credibility? That is, would delegation of important regulatory powers to independent 
experts prevent politicians in that country from interfering with utility regulation 
affairs? Was delegation a policy commitment that, contrary to many others in the 
country’s history, Argentine politicians would maintain?
In answer to these questions, in this thesis I first hypothesise, and then demonstrate, 
that while delegation is an important, perhaps even necessary, condition for sustaining 
commitments over time and developing stable regulatory policies, it is not by itself 
sufficient. I show that delegation increases the credibility of regulatory commitments 
only if it is nested in political institutions that make it durable, and that when 
designing the utility regulatory frameworks in Argentina, policy makers in that 
country sometimes seemed to ignore -  or underestimate -  this crucial aspect of 
regulatory policy. That is, in some sectors they did little to protect the delegation of
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regulatory authority to independent agencies from reversal. I argue, moreover, that 
particularly relevant in this regard was the legal instrument used to define the key 
features of the newly created regulatory frameworks. I contend that politicians were 
able to refrain from messing with delegation only in those sectors where the key 
features of the newly created regulatory regimes were defined in a statute. In those 
sectors where the new rules of the game were defined in a presidential decree or 
resolutions, in contrast, politicians faced little constraints to renege on their previous 
policy commitments. And the reason for this, I show, is no mystery: given 
Argentina’s institutional endowment, policy defined in statutes is likely to be far more 
stable than policy that can be introduced and changed unilaterally by the executive.
2. Methodological considerations.
Having briefly presented the problem, prime research questions and hypotheses of this 
thesis, in what follows I address the issue o f how these hypotheses are generated and, 
equally important, tested. In subsequent pages, thus, my aim is to make explicit the 
main features of the research design that frames this investigation.
The first matter to note is that the object of this thesis is not to provide a complete 
explanation for why a specific outcome occurred at a particular time and place -  the 
type of explanations that historians typically seek -  but to provide what Hall (2006)
3 Hall (2006:25) notes that the events historians seek to explain are typically the product o f  a long chain 
o f  causal factors in which one development conditions another. Thus, the explanations that they 
typically advance are distinguished by the ambition to identify the full set o f  causal factors important to 
an outcome, establishing not only why the outcome was likely but why it happened at a particular time 
and place. Hall points out, however, that historians are unusually attentive to the importance o f  context 
-  namely to how factors interact to generate an outcome and to the spatial or temporal specificities 
affecting the value o f  each factor. In the causal chains cited in their explanations, moreover, contingent 
events that do not themselves seem predictable often figure prominently. Based on a similar 
observation, and in line with Eckstein (1975), Levy (2001:13) argues that historians’ work is normally
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calls a “theory oriented explanation”. Therefore, my aim is to identify the causal 
factors conducive to a broad class of events. That is, what I seek is to identify the 
relevant variables that can be said to cause such outcomes in a general class o f times 
and places, independently of the other factors that might contribute to the relevant 
causal chain in any one case.
2.1. Theory Building
Faced with the task of providing a theory-oriented explanation, some scholars would 
argue that the best way is by adopting an inductive approach to theory building and, in 
particular, to hypothesis formation. In their view, the hypotheses posited in this thesis 
should not be developed prior to the analysis of the empirical material but in the 
course of interpreting it4. In my view, however, this approach is not well suited for the 
purpose of my work. I agree with those who contend that building theory in a pure 
inductive fashion often leads to the development of ad hoc hypotheses and 
explanations that, to make things worse, can hardly be falsified (King et al. 1994, 
Geddes, 2003).
In this thesis, therefore, I address the issue of theory building and hypothesis 
formation using an approach that, in my view, minimises this sort of problem. 
Therefore, before going to the empirical material, I begin by formulating a theory or
idiographic. That is, in contrast to political scientists -  who are normally nomothetic -  historians are 
not interested in discovering generalisable theories but they are concerned with particular and discrete 
events. Unlike political scientists, thus, historians are more interested in a case rather than in cases that 
enable them to test theories, discover the links between variables, and rule out competing theories o f  
explanation.
4 A s noted by Steinmo et al. (1992) and Thelen (1999), this approach to theory building and hypothesis 
development is often adopted by historical institutionalists and, in particular, by those who adhere to 
what Hall and Taylor (1996:939) term the “cultural approach” to institutions.
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model that, drawing on specified assumptions and using deductive reasoning, 
identifies the principal causal variables said to have an important impact on the 
phenomena I seek to explain. From this theory or model, I then derive logically sound 
and clear predictions about the patterns that will appear in the observations of the 
world if the theory is valid. The most important of these predictions are specified as 
hypotheses.
From the discussion above, someone could assume that theory building in this thesis 
follows a rational choice approach. And to a certain extent, he would be right. Indeed, 
not only do I use deductive reasoning to generate the predictions and hypotheses in 
this work -  the hallmark of rational choice -  but also, as it becomes apparent in the 
next chapter, I assume that the relevant actors have a relatively fixed set of 
preferences or tastes, and behave instrumentally so as to maximise the attainment of 
these preferences.
I emphasise, moreover, the role of strategic interaction in the determination of 
political outcomes. That is to say, I postulate that an actor’s behaviour is likely to be 
driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus. This calculus is 
deeply affected by the actor’s expectations about how others are likely to behave as 
well. In my view, institutions structure such interactions by effecting the range and 
sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information and 
enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behaviour 
of others.
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It is important to note, however, that although my approach to theory building draws 
on rational choice, it is quite different to the strongest versions o f it. First, although 
my interest is to find some general law-like statements, I work at the level of mid­
range theory that the strongest versions of rational choice often hold in contempt5. 
Second, I do not treat an actor’s preferences as entirely exogenous. That is, where 
feasible, I relax the traditional “instrumental rationality” assumptions, and try to 
figure out, within a given context, what would make sense for an individual to seek6. 
This strategy of contextualising preference formation, naturally, leads me to the 
incorporation o f something that the stronger versions o f rational choice often lack: 
detailed and fine-grained knowledge of the precise features of the political and social 
environment within which individuals make choices and devise political strategies.
The third difference between my approach to theory building and the strongest 
versions of rational choice is related to the issue of microfimdations. As noted by 
Thelen (1999), for the more radical rational choice analysts “micro-foundational” 
precludes dealing with collectivities. In my work, however, I deal with them. And 
this, I believe, does not mean that my work is not micro-foundational. In line with 
Scharpf (1997), I believe that to stand on microfoundations -  whether dealing with 
individuals or a composite actor -  entails two key requisites. First, the analysis must 
be actor-centred in the sense that the players are assumed to be capable of making 
purposeful choices among alternative courses of action. Second, it has to empirically
5 As noted by Thelen (1999:373), the strongest versions o f  rational choice often avoid focusing on a 
limited range o f  cases that are unified in space and/or time and aspire to produce more general (even 
universal) theoretical claims. Scholars working with this approach consequently use historical 
examples not so much for their intrinsic importance but to demonstrate how widely applicable their 
theoretical claims are. Thelen argues, however, that this has begun to change. In her view , more and 
more rational choice scholars now formulate their hypotheses and conclusions at the same, mid-range 
level as other school o f  thoughts in political science -  notably, historical institutionalism.
6 This strategy has been advanced by some rational choice scholars, such as Bates et al. (1998),
Ferejohn (1991) and Levi (1994), who have recognised the difficulties o f  defining the preferences in 
general, ex ante to a particular application.
23
demonstrate that the actors to whom certain strategic behaviour is attributed are in 
fact players in the first place. In other words, and particularly when dealing with 
aggregations, the analyst needs to do more than impute (actor-centred) motives and 
strategies to them; he has to show that these actors were cohesive and strategic. 
Finally, in this thesis I am not interested in producing an elegant theory at the expense 
of explaining real observed events in detail -  as it is common among rational choice 
scholars (Thelen, 1999:374). That is, I attach particular importance to contextualizing 
the theory (assumptions and propositions) and providing empirical evidence that the 
effects predicated by the hypotheses are in fact being produced.
2.2. Theory testing
For many years, when faced with the challenge of testing their theories, and when the 
number of cases to work with was relatively small, most political scientists favoured 
the adoption of the comparative method as defined by Lijphart (1971, 1975) and a 
succession of other scholars (see Collier, 1991). As noted by Hall (2003, 2006), in its 
conventional form this is essentially the statistical method writ small. That is, most of 
the scholars that adhered to this method assumed that the basis for causal inference 
lies in the correlation to be found across the cases, between a few causal variables and 
the relevant outcomes7. Bennett and Elman (2006:457) argue, in this sense, that users 
of this method commonly direct their investigations to inferring systematically how 
much a cause contributes on average to an outcome within a given population.
7 According to Collier et al. (2004: 94-95) causal inference in the conventional form o f  the comparative 
method is established through ‘intuitive regression’.
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But is this the most appropriate method for testing the predictions and hypotheses 
posited in this thesis? To answer this question, it is important to bear in mind that the 
choice of a methodology is conditioned by the state of the world as we perceive it,
Q
and notably by the character of the causal relations in the cases to be investigated . As 
Hall (2003, 2006) notes, although the object of enquiry is to propose and test some 
specific inferences about causal relations, every methodology produces valid 
inferences only when certain assumptions about the general structure of those causal 
relations are met.
In this regard, and as pointed out by this author, Wallerstein (2000) and Ragin (2000), 
if the conventional comparative method is to produce valid causal inferences, we need 
to make several assumptions. The first is unit homogeneity. This is to say that, other 
things being equal, a change in the level of a causal variable, x, will produce the same 
change in the level of the outcome variable, y, across cases. Second, that there is no 
systematic correlation between the independent variables included in the analysis and 
other explanatory variables omitted from it. Third, that all the relevant interaction 
effects among independent variables have been captured by interaction terms and, in 
most cases in which is used, that the value of an independent variable in one case is 
unaffected by the values that these other variables take in the other cases. Finally, 
although there are techniques available for coping with reciprocal causation between 
the dependent and independent variables, it is common simply to assume that the 
latter are unaffected by the former.
8 Bennett and Elman (2006:456) argue, in this respect, that “scholars have beliefs about what the social 
world is made o f  and how it operates, and these beliefs influence their choices about how to construct 
and verify knowledge statements about the world.”
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Today, however, there is a certain degree of agreement among social scientists that 
our ontologies have changed. Indeed, our conceptions o f how the world works now 
acknowledge that in most issues/areas of the social and political world -  including 
that studied in this thesis -  causal structures generating the relevant developments 
contain more causal variables that we used to believe. Few would question, moreover, 
that in these issues/areas the interaction effects among causal variables are often very 
complex and multiple9. Equally important, everybody seems to accept that sequence 
now looms so large as a component of the causal impact of a variable that is has 
become difficult even to think in terms of a world in which variables have a 
homogeneous impact regardless of when they occur in relation to other sets of 
developments10.
This is not to say, of course, that the conventional comparative method is inadequate 
for establishing valid causal inferences. As Hall (2003, 2006) notes, there are still 
some areas/issues of the political world where we can get some leverage from the 
conventional comparative method -  notably, those where the interaction effects are 
manageable or where it is thought that an outcome is determined by a small set of 
structural variables operating with great force, and with analogous effects across 
cases. What the discussion above suggests, however, is that there are others 
issues/areas of the political world where our new ontologies do challenge this method 
and the adoption of alternative types of enquiry better-suited to these new ontologies 
is needed11.
9 For an in depth discussion on this issue, see Ragin (1987).
10 As Hall (2003 ,2006) notes, in political science most o f  these findings have been advanced by the 
rational choice and the path dependence literature.
11 Hall (2003, 2006) is not alone in pointing out that causal complexity poses serious challenges to the 
comparative method in the conventional form and, more generally, to a statistical world view. See 
among others: McKeown (1999), Ragin, (1987 ,2000 , 2004), Gerring (2001), and Collier et al. (2004).
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In recent years, fortunately, many political scientists have taken note of this problem
and, more importantly, have begun to propose methods of hypothesis testing aimed at
solving it. Within the camp of small-n research designs, the most appealing of these
methods -  and, hence, the method I adopt in this thesis -  is what Hall (2003, 2006)
12terms “systematic process analysis” . Briefly, advocates of this approach argue that 
political outcomes are invariably the result of an unfolding process. Good theory, their 
argument follows, often generates many other hypotheses about what we should see 
in the province o f the world of our interest that go well beyond simple correlations 
between a given set o f independent variables and a given set of outcomes. Most of the 
time, good theory also generates predictions about the processes whereby the 
independent variables operate on the world so as to lead to those outcomes. Therefore, 
capture of the causal complexity of the phenomena needs both an assessment of the 
correlation between explanatory and dependent variables and a demonstration of the 
presence of the processes specified by the theory. As Hall (2003) notes, this is not 
simply a search for “intermediate” variables. The point is to see if  the multiple actions 
and statements of the actors at the relevant stages of the process whereby one set of 
developments lead to another are consistent with the image o f the process implied by 
the theory under scrutiny.
Since this method requires a detailed analysis of each of the cases used to assess the
validity of a theory, its adoption naturally limits the number o f cases I can work with.
And I am aware, in this regard, that this can be problematic for some of my
colleagues. Indeed, for some political scientists the only way to effectively test the
12 This type o f  enquiry, Hall (2006) notices, is similar in key respects to George and Bennett’s (2005) 
process-tracing. In my view , it also closely resembles Collier et al.’s (2004: 252-56) causal process 
observations.
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adequacy of a theory is to analyse the universe of cases to which this theory is meant 
to apply or, at least, a large sample of those cases. Working with a few cases is widely 
regarded to be useful for generating new hypotheses or providing detail that others 
can use to inform statistical analyses, but provide too limited amount of data to 
test/confirm causal theory (Achen and Snidal, 1989; Njolstad, 1990; King et al., 1994; 
Liberson, 1992, 1994; Geddes, 2003; Beck, 2006a,b)13.
To a certain extent, this view on case studies does have a point when referring to 
works that address the issue of hypothesis testing in the correlational terms of the 
conventional comparative method. As it has already been discussed, those works use 
the cases they work with simply to establish the correspondence between ultimate 
“causes” and eventual outcomes. The observations they use to asses the adequacy of 
their hypothesis, as a result, are often less numerous and informative than those that 
can be mustered from a large number of cases. Recall, however, that in this thesis I do 
not assess the validity of a theory in the terms of the conventional comparative 
method. That is, 1 regard case studies not only as a terrain where I can inspect the 
correspondence between the variables reflecting ultimate ‘causes’ and those 
representing final outcomes, but also the process whereby those causal factors operate 
on the world so as to lead ultimately to those outcomes. As a result, my cases contain 
far more numerous and diverse observations against which to test theory than if  1 used 
case studies just to search for correspondence between a small set o f variables. And 
this is far from irrelevant for establishing the validity o f my theory. It is widely known
13 This view is often advocated by those scholars who prefer the use o f  statistical methods applied to a 
large number o f  cases. From their perspective, small-n designs lack, among other things, the degrees o f  
freedom that large-n designs provide for considering a substantial number o f  causal variables, and the 
interaction effects among them.
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that we gain confidence in a theory not only when it conforms to increasing numbers 
o f observations, but to increasingly diverse kind of observations.
This takes us to the issue of the number of cases and the criteria used to select them. It 
should be noted in this regard that according to some authors, much can be learned 
from establishing whether the process is present in a single case -  provided that the 
theory being tested is formulated in terms that apply to a wide range of cases and spell 
out the relevant causal process in detail (Becker, 1992; Mahoney, 2000). In their 
view, even when applied to a single case, systematic process analysis would offer 
grounds for drawing valid causal inferences14.
I believe, however, that we can never consider all the factors that might provide 
explanations beyond the reach of the theory we are using in a particular study. So, if 
we apply this method to a single case, there is always the danger that the outcomes we 
explain may actually attributable to a different set o f variables. Thus, I agree with Hall 
(2003) that if we intend to generalise from the case analysis, and if we want to 
increase our confidence that the causal process observed is not idiosyncratic to one of 
our cases, it is desirable to apply systematic process analysis to more than one case, 
even if the number examined must be small to accommodate the gathering of an 
extensive set o f observations, and to draw comparisons across cases15.
In this thesis, therefore, the validity of hypotheses is assessed not just in one but in 
three cases. In selecting these cases I put particular attention on ensuring that they
14 Bennett and Elman (2006: 459) argue that for some scholars “a single ‘smoking gun’ piece o f  
evidence may strongly validate one explanation and rule out many others”.
15 A similar argument can be found in Bennett and Elman (2006), Gerring (2004), and Kaarbo and 
Beasley (1999: 387).
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show some variation in the value of the dependent variable. And the reason for this is 
obvious. Without variation in the values of the dependent variable, one cannot make 
any causal inferences about the phenomenon because the same explanatory variables 
may be present in cases in which the phenomenon is absent (King et al., 1994).
Allowing for the possibility of variation in the dependent variable, however, does not 
imply that I picked the cases on the value of the dependent variable. Although I agree 
with Collier et al. (2004) that investigating cases where an outcome is known can 
sometimes provide a good opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about the 
phenomenon under investigation -  notably when the cases are used to test claims of 
necessity and/or sufficiency16- 1  also agree with those who claim that this strategy can 
sometimes lead to “wrong answers”. In this sense, I join authors such as Achen and 
Snidal (1989), Geddes (1990), and King et al. (1994) in noting that picking cases on 
the basis o f outcomes often opens the door to selection bias problems. That is, there is 
always the risk of selecting cases with any variety of unusual causal paths for 
reaching a high (or low) value on the outcome. Then, the probability of coming out 
with a distorted picture -  one that artificially diminishes the evidence for a theory or
17exaggerates the evidence for it -  is increased .
In this thesis, thus, I selected the cases on the values o f ultimate independent variable 
postulated by my theory. As a result, it is only during the research that I discover the 
values o f the dependent variable and then make my initial causal inference by 
examining the differences in the distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable
16 On this issue, see also Dion (1998), Braumoller and Goertz (2000), Goertz and Starr (2003), and 
Bennett and Elman (2006).
17 Even some o f  those who advocate picking cases on the dependent variable do not entirely dismiss the 
selection bias critique. In their view, however, this critique is often overstated. See Collier and 
Mahoney (1996), Collier et al. (2004), George and Bennett (2005), and Bennett and Elman (2006).
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for given values of the explanatory variables. As noted by King et al. (1994) the great 
advantage of this selection procedure is that it causes no inference problems. This is 
because this procedure does not predetermine the outcome of our study, since it does 
not restrict the degree of possible variation in the independent variable.
Finally, and before turning to the structure o f this thesis, it should be noted that the 
empirical information in the three cases is presented in the form of narratives. The 
preference for narratives is due not to the unavailability of other forms of presenting 
my results, but to particular strengths of the narrative form. As pointed out by Blithe 
(2002: 486), the most important of these strengths is that narratives, in addition to 
presenting correlations at every step of the causal process, can contextualise these 
steps in ways that make the entire process visible rather than fragmented into 
analytical stages. Moreover, this author argues, narratives allow for the incorporation 
of nuanced detail and sensitivity to unique events, which are sometimes necessary to 
understand the particular manifestation of an element of the theory, but which is 
beyond it18.
The narratives here presented, of course, simplify ’’reality” by designating some 
elements as important and omitting many more as not significant. And, to this 
purpose, the theory from which 1 derived my hypotheses resulted extremely useful. 
Indeed, it not only provided me with a framework that organises what to expect in the 
province o f the world of my interest, but also emphasises the questions that are 
worthwhile asking, the factors that are likely to have high explanatory potential and, 
equally important, the type of data that would generally be useful in supporting or
18 On the merits o f  narratives for testing theory and establishing causal inferences see, among others, 
Levi (1997), Bates et al. (1998), Kiser and Hechter (1998), and Goldstone (1998).
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invalidating specific explanations. The theory, then, provided me with the criteria for
what could be considered salient to write narratives that are useful as a test of my
arguments19. It allowed me, moreover, to ensure equivalence, in the sense that each
20narrative contains the same (or at least functionally equivalent) elements .
To conclude, I should also make clear a couple of points. First, against Hall’s (2006) 
advice, the narratives in this thesis are not used to asses an alternative or competing 
theory -  which would entail providing a second set of narratives, similarly structured 
by the underlying theory of an alternative explanation of the same phenomenon21. In 
my view, however, this is not a serious problem. As noted by Buthe, alternative 
narratives are often a rhetorical device in support of the primary, favoured 
explanation22. Moreover, as Fiorina (1995:92) argues, meaningful alternative 
explanations are much more likely to be advanced by others whose “perspectives and 
commitments” allow them to argue as strongly as possible in support of those 
alternatives.
Second, to build the narratives my main sources of information were basically three. 
Since this is a study about the stability of regulatory policy in Argentina, the first 
source was the legislation that politicians used defined the policies in question as well
19 As suggested by Buthe (2002:487), in the narratives I only provide information that is extraneous to 
the model insofar as it affects salient elements and is needed to understand the relationship between 
these elements or to appreciate contingencies o f  a particular process.
20 For a more in depth discussion on this issue, see Kiser (1996), Buthe (2002) and Pedriana (2004).
21 In Hall’s (2006:30) view, if  the investigator’s principal theory is not tested against other theories, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to falsify the theory using the observations drawn from the narratives, 
and the risk o f  affirming a false theory increases. Equally important, there is always the chance that the 
use and assessment o f  just one theory will advance a research program at the cost o f  neglecting others 
that may offer more purchase over some issues. In line with Elster (2000), Hall argues that this is one 
o f the drawbacks o f  the analytic narrative approach advanced by Bates et al. (1998).
22 As Biithe (2002:489) notes, the interpretative freedom o f  the author makes it unlikely that less 
convincing alternative narratives would be accepted as sound evidence o f  the failure o f  alternative 
explanations.
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as the legal and institutional framework within which regulatory decisions were made. 
As it is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, this included not only laws passed 
by Congress but also different types of presidential decrees as well as resolutions 
passed by ministers or other relevant authorities such as secretaries of state and 
regulators. The second source of information was the work by other scholars and 
practitioners that have studied utility regulation in Argentina. Although most o f this 
work does not cover the specific issue of the political economy of regulatory stability, 
it provided me with a great deal of detail on regulatory policy in that country. Finally, 
I also made intensive use o f press articles. In particular, I used press articles that 
appeared in four different daily newspapers: Clarin, La Nation, Cronista Comercial 
and Ambito Financiero. The first two of them are, reportedly, the most read 
newspapers in the country. The second and the third, meanwhile, are specialized 
newspapers that mostly cover economic and financial news.
Having said that, it is important to note that although during the course of my research 
I conducted several interviews, the information I acquired through them had serious 
reliability problems. Although I do not deny the possibility that these problems 
resulted from errors in the way I conducted the interviews, I believe that at root of this 
problems were three elements that, according to Berry (2002), are quite common in 
elite interviews. First, in many cases interviewees told me stories that were impossible 
to confirm. Second, they were often talking about their work and, as a result, they had 
a tendency to tell me stories that contained excessive personal bias or, even worse, 
that were built with the clear purpose of justifying their actions. Third, many of my 
interviewees also exaggerated their role in the events they were telling me about. For
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building the narratives in this thesis, therefore, I decided not to use the information I 
acquired following this data-collection methodology.
3. The structure of the thesis
The structure of this thesis, naturally, is strongly determined by the research design 
discussed above. It should not be surprising, then, that the next chapter is exclusively 
devoted to the presentation of the theory from which I generate the predictions and 
hypotheses that in subsequent chapters are brought to bear on the empirical material. 
Among other things, there I discuss the reasons why, given Argentina’s institutional 
endowment, the legal instrument used by policy-makers to define regulatory policy 
makes all the difference for the stability of that policy and, as an extension, for the 
durability of the policy reforms introduced in the beginning o f the 90s.
Chapters 3 and 4, present the first of three case studies analysed in this work. They 
comprise an in depth study of telecommunications regulation in Argentina between 
privatisation of the industry in 1990 and the last days o f Fernando de la Rua’s 
government in December 2001. As discussed in the previous section, the main reason 
for picking this case was that in this sector the key features of the regulatory regime 
were defined in a presidential decree -  one of the two possible values of the ultimate 
explicatory variable identified by my theory. If the hypotheses and predictions posited 
in this thesis are valid, thus, the narratives in these chapters should show that 
delegation of important regulatory powers to independent experts in this sector was an 
easily reversed arrangement and, as a result, that telecommunications regulatory
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policy continued to be a domain where policy-makers introduced changes whenever 
their preferences dictated it.
In chapter 5, I analyse the case of the electricity industry between its privatisation in 
1992 and December 2001. As it will be shown in this chapter, the design o f the 
regulatory regime in this sector showed important similarities with the design 
originally put in place in the telecommunications sector. In contrast to the latter, 
however, the legal instrument used to define its key features was not a presidential 
decree but a statute -  the other possible value of the ultimate explicatory variable 
identified by my theory. If the hypotheses and predictions offered in the theoretical 
chapter of this thesis are valid, then, the analysis of this case should reveal that, in 
contrast to what happened in the telecommunications sector, policy-makers in the 
electricity sector had more incentives to maintain its original policy commitments. Put 
differently, the analysis of this case should reveal that the reforms introduced in the 
Argentine electricity sector in the beginning of the 90s not only were more difficult to 
be reversed but also that they were considerably more stable.
Chapter 6 is the last o f the empirical chapters. In it I analyse the case of two key 
regulatory policies that the Argentine government simultaneously introduced in 
January 2002 as a reaction to the major economic crisis o f the time. The first o f these 
policies, which were defined in the so-called Economic Emergency Law, established 
that the tariffs of all the utilities and infrastructure services in the country would 
remain frozen for as long as the crisis situation lasted. The second established that the 
contracts of all utilities and infrastructure companies operating in the country would 
be renegotiated. In addition, it stipulated that the institutional arrangement and the
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rules governing that process would be defined by the executive in presidential 
decrees. This chapter -  which covers the time period o f the first days of 2002 through 
April 2003 thus, does not test for the impact that the choice of the legal instrument 
has on the stability of delegation. That is already discussed in detail in the previous 
three chapters. Instead, this chapter puts under scrutiny a more general, and equally 
relevant, contention of this thesis: that in Argentina regulatory policy defined in a 
presidential decree is likely to be far less stable than regulatory policy defined in 
statute. Following this prediction, then, the narrative in this chapter should show that, 
since it was defined in a statute, the freezing of tariffs was a policy subject to fewer 
changes than the renegotiation of contracts.
Chapter 7, finally, advances the major conclusions of this research project. In the first 
part it summarises the major assertions advanced in this thesis as well as the findings 
in each of the empirical chapters. The second part discusses the normative 
implications of these findings not only for the design of regulatory policy in 
Argentina but also for the design of economic policy and economic reform in general.
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Chapter II
The Institutional Determinants of Regulatory Stability in Argentina
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1. Introduction
At the beginning of the ‘90s, policy-makers in Argentina decided to delegate 
important regulatory powers to independent agencies. As advanced in the previous 
chapter, the main thrust of this thesis is that they sometimes seemed to ignore that it 
was critical to adapt the new system to the structure and organization of the country’s 
institutions in order to gain the outcomes they expected. I also foreshadowed that the 
choice of the legal instrument used to define the key features of the newly created 
regulatory regimes was particularly relevant. I argued that it was this choice that 
explains why in some sectors the new status quo became stable while in others it 
opened the door to constant changes in the rules of the game.
Before these propositions are empirically tested, they need to be more precisely 
defined. Also, the reasoning behind them needs to be clearly established. This chapter, 
then, proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses why delegation of regulatory policy to 
independent experts can be a “solution” to the time inconsistency problems that 
characterise economic regulation. It is argued, however, that since there are many 
circumstances that make it tempting to revoke delegation, the effectiveness of this 
solution depends on whether it is costly to revoke. In section 3, it is argued that the 
costs o f revoking policies -  including delegation -  depend on the structure and 
organisation of a country’s institutions. In section 4, the degree of policy stability 
provided by the structure and organisation of Argentina’s institutions, and the role 
played in this sense by the legal instrument used to define a policy, is analysed. 
Finally, section 5 concludes and presents a set of hypotheses that will then be 
empirically tested.
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2. Delegation and Credibility
For government policies ranging from utility regulation to monetary policy, the 
importance of credibility for eliciting optimal responses from private actors is well 
known. However, it is also well known that credibility is difficult for governments to 
acquire. In this sense, there are several circumstances under which government policy 
commitments are not credible. The most important, undoubtedly, is time 
inconsistency, which arises if  politicians announcing a certain policy today have an 
incentive to deviate from the policy at some point in the future.
The problem is that, when the success of the policy relies ultimately on the response 
o f rational individuals, and where policy-makers do not have a binding commitment 
holding them to an original plan, even adaptations made with the collective good in 
mind can hinder policy-makers form reaching their objectives (Kydland and Prescott, 
1977: 473-474; Barro and Gordon, 1983). This is because, it is claimed, rational 
actors anticipate the future moves of policy-makers and act accordingly1. Thus, when 
monetary policy is time-inconsistent, and hence not credible, private sector actors 
protect themselves and write contracts that build in high inflationary expectations. 
Similarly, when utility regulatory policy is time-inconsistent, private actors do not 
invest or, if  they do so, investment inefficiencies arise on several fronts. This limits 
the social value of the enterprise .
1 The problem o f  time inconsistency here analysed is the policy equivalent o f  imperfect commitment in 
incomplete contracting. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
2 For an in depth discussion on the effects o f  time inconsistency in utility regulation, see Spiller (1996a, 
1996b), Levy and Spiller, (1996), and Bergara et al. (1998).
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As argued by Keefer and Stasavage (1998), in the light of time inconsistency, and in 
order to generate credibility, one alternative for governments is to build a reputation 
for sound policy by engendering the expectation that certain policies will be followed 
in the future on the basis of actions that have been observed in the past . But building 
reputation is a difficult task, particularly for governments (Shepsle, 1991; Majone, 
1997). Moreover, there are circumstances where this mechanism alone fails to prevent 
reneging (North and Weingast, 1998).
A second alternative is for governments to give up their discretion and delegate 
policymaking competencies to independent agencies (Shepsle, 1991; Dixit, 1996; 
Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991: Majone, 1997)4. The latter, it is often claimed, are not only 
better equipped to make more informed policy decisions than elected politicians -  
who often lack the expertise to design policies or the capacity to adapt them to 
changing conditions or particular circumstances -  but also have different incentives. 
Indeed, either because of their preferences or their legal mandate, or both, 
independent agencies normally do not suffer form the short-time horizon that the 
democratic process often imposes over elected politicians -  namely, the next election. 
Because of this, their capacity to credibly commit themselves -  and to reduce 
election-induced uncertainty about the future course of policy - is larger than that of 
democratically accountable and elected bodies (Gilardi, 2002).
3 For an in depth discussion about the effects o f  reputation on credibility see Drazen (2000: 166-215) 
and relevant chapters in Persson and Tabellini (1994: 99-189).
4 The relation between delegation and credibility has been extensively studied in the central banking 
literature. In addition to the seminal work o f  R ogoff (1985), see Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. 
(1993), Alesina and Summers (1993), Alesina and Gatti (1995), Eijffmger and Schaling (1997), A l- 
Marhubi and Willet (1995), Cukierman and Webb (1995), Jensen (1997), and Moser (1999).
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From the above discussion, it is easy to understand why many predicted that 
delegation of utility regulation to independent experts in Argentina would finally 
improve the stability and credibility of the regulatory policy in that country. Indeed, 
not only was the recipe working soundly in other countries -  notably the US and the 
UK - ,  but it also seemed to be well founded on theoretical grounds.
2.1. The problem of delegation
To a great extent, the prediction above was based on the assumption -  relatively 
common in the literature on this topic - that once a policy is adopted it cannot be 
undone5. This, however, is an unrealistic assumption6. Indeed, as the literature on 
transaction costs and institutions emphasizes, while parties may have strong 
incentives to strike a bargain, their incentives are not always compatible with 
maintaining it (North and Weingast, 1998).
As noted by Heller et al. (1998), there are many circumstances that make it tempting 
for governments to renege on their policy commitments and to introduce policy 
changes. First (and most obviously), an altogether new leadership often faces different 
benefits and costs from individual policies: different leaders normally represent 
differing constituencies, whose interests are likely to vary. Second, even if  the 
individuals in power do not vary, coalition realignments -  a change in the 
government's base of support -  can also provide a motive for introducing policy 
changes. Indeed, as long as political leaders care about maintaining their hold on
5 In his seminal paper, for example, R ogoff assumes that the costs o f  doing away or overriding a 
monetary institution is infinite.
6 This has been noted, among others, by Keefer and Stasavage (1998) and Moser (1999).
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power, modifications in their supporters’ preferences will induce them to alter their 
policy stances. Third, the introduction o f policy changes can also become a tempting 
alternative when the value of the status quo is altered. These alterations can be 
originated in an external change in the economic environment. In this regard, if the set 
o f policies in place maintains the dire straits, then the net value of policy change 
increases greatly. Finally, the value of the status quo can sometimes change 
“internally” due to the accumulation of the leadership’s own decisions or because new 
-  and sometimes better - information about the policy in question becomes available .
This does not imply that the delegation of powers is revoked every time one or more 
o f the circumstances discussed above are present. Neither is it to say that delegation to 
independent agencies is only a short-term solution to the problems of time 
inconsistency. As Heller et al. (1998) argue, it is not sufficient for the occurrence of 
policy changes that politicians perceive them as desirable. In the first place, 
politicians must believe that they can identify plausible alternatives that correspond to 
their preferences. That is, they must know -  politically and technically -  how to 
accomplish their policy objectives. Second, and more importantly, they also need to 
have the means to enact policy change8.
3. Institutions and policy change
In the literature that analyses the central variables that affect political leaders’ ability 
to institute changes to the status quo, an often-heard claim is that “institutions matter” .
7 A s Heller et al. (1998) notice, while the first and second possibilities stem from changes in the 
government support coalition, the third and fourth consist o f  changes in the values o f  the status quo 
itself.
8 This point is also made by Heller and cCubbins (2001).
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Institutions, it is argued, set the context for political decision-making and create 
incentives for political leaders that shape and constrain their actions. In different 
contexts, thus, institutions might make the introduction of policy change more 
feasible or might hinder it -  binding policy-makers to keep a given policy and, hence, 
“stacking the deck” in favour of maintaining the policy status quo (Heller et al., 
1998:147).
As pointed out by Drazen (2000:133), there are important differences between 
policies, or promises, which have no legal backing compared to those that have been 
formalised thorough legislation9. The primary difference, according to this author, is 
that policies formally embedded in legislation normally have penalties attached to 
them so that there are explicit costs associated with not following them. Secondly, 
they make noncompliance more visible and hence more costly.
Drazen’s argument closely resembles that advanced by Lohmann (2003). According 
to her, a policy formalised through legislation enjoys some degree of credibility 
because the act of institutional creation (or formalisation) of that policy automatically 
provides an audience that can and will monitor the integrity of the institution. This 
audience, moreover, will impose “audience costs” on the policy-maker who dares to 
interfere with it (Lohmann, 2003:100). Put differently, creating an institution draws a 
“line in the sand” that focuses the expectations of an audience. The line in the sand is 
a public focal point that allows people to coordinate their beliefs about trigger- 
punishment strategies that will be executed in the event o f an institutional defection. 
In the case of monetary policy, for instance, the dismissal of a central banker, a
9 Moe (1990a:240) makes a similar claim.
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devaluation, the failure to achieve a monetary target -  all these being institutional 
defections -  generate an audience cost. According to Lohmann (2003:101), voters 
may vote the policy-maker out of office; wage-setters may write high inflationary 
mark-ups into nominal wage contracts; financial markets may engage in destabilising 
speculation or shift investment capital to other countries; cooperative understandings 
with other policy-makers on other dimensions of public policy may break down (the 
defecting policy-maker experiences a “loss of political capital”). In sum, Lohmann’s 
argument is that it is the audience cost -  or the threat of a punishment -  that makes the 
policy maker’s commitment to the policy credible10.
It is important to note, however, this chapter is concerned with factors that constrain a 
policy-maker to change a given policy, in a way that is fully legal, whenever 
circumstances make it tempting. This, of course, is distinct from the issue of 
compliance.
There is a growing literature that claims that formalizing a policy though legislation 
enhances its credibility because, in general, there are quite explicit institutional costs a 
policy-maker must face for changing that legislation. Within this literature, perhaps 
the most striking work is that o f George Tsebelis (1995, 2000, 2002). According to 
him, policy outcomes are the results of two factors: the preferences of the actors
10 To illustrate her claim, Lohmann (2003:101) suggest comparing two situations. First, a man and a 
woman sit together in a restaurant, and the man ask the woman how she would feel about marrying 
him. Second, a man and a woman stand together in a church in front o f  an audience o f  relatives; a 
priest asks each o f  them in turn whether they want to marry the other; and each o f  them says yes. In the 
first situation, there is no audience, and it is easy for the man and the woman to disagree on the 
question o f what exactly, if  anything, was promised. In the second situation there is an audience, and 
there is a line in the sand, and these two ingredients explain why the degree o f  commitment is higher in 
the second situation than in the first. Similarly, a policymaker who m oves his or her lips might ex p o st 
wriggle out o f  a policy promise, saying that she or he was misinterpreted or misquoted. By way o f  
comparison, a policymaker who dismisses a central banker because the latter refused to do the 
policymaker’s bidding can hardly argue that it was all just a big misunderstanding.
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involved and the prevailing institutions. In his view, given that the identity of players 
and their preferences are variable while institutions are more stable, policy outcomes 
will vary depending on who controls political power as well as where the status quo 
is. For developing his propositions, he focuses on the more stable part o f the 
interaction and tries to assess the outcomes focusing only on institutions, with limited 
knowledge of the identity of actors that produce them. He then makes predictions 
about the consequences for policy stability of the number of actors involved or their 
relative positions, without knowing exact numbers or locations.
In a nutshell, Tsebelis’ basic argument is that in order to change any given policy, or 
to change the legal status quo, a certain number of individual or collective actors have 
to agree to the proposed change. He calls such actors veto players. Veto players, as 
well as the points in which they are located, are generally specified in a country by the 
Constitution, or by the political system. Every political system has then a 
configuration of veto players, that is, a certain number o f veto points, with a certain 
number of veto players positioned at these points, who have specific ideological 
distances among them, with each having a certain cohesion.
According to Tsebelis, all of these characteristics affect the set o f outcomes than can 
replace the status quo (the winset o f the status quo, as he calls the set o f these points). 
The size of the winset o f the status quo has specific consequences for policymaking 
(or, more accurately, for legislation and legislating). In this sense, he contends that 
significant departures from the status quo are likely to be far more difficult -  and 
policy stability greater -  in countries where decision makers have to face a large 
number of veto points, with a large number of veto players (positioned at these
45
points), and where the degree of congruence among these veto players is small. 
Conversely, in countries where decision makers have to face a small number of veto 
points with few veto players positioned at these points, and the degree of congruence 
among these players is large, introducing significant change to the status quo is likely 
to be easier -  and, hence, policy far less stable.
In a similar vein, Cox and McCubbins (2001) contend that polities can be located on 
one particular point of the continuum between decisiveness -  that is, the ability to 
enact and implement policy change -  and resoluteness -  the ability to commit to 
maintaining a given policy. As Tsebelis, these authors also claim that a country’s 
location on this continuum greatly depends on its basic political institutions, which 
generate not only a certain separation o f powers (or veto players), but also a certain 
separation of purpose (or the degree to which veto players have similar preferences 
and political incentives, and are accountable to the same groups, pressures and 
demands). Drawing on previous works by public choice scholars like Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), they argue that as more actors must be taken into account in a policy 
logroll, and as more diverse are the preferences of these actors, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to ensure that every party to the negotiations receives sufficient 
value to accept the deal. Put differently, changing policy becomes increasingly costly, 
and hence the polity becomes more resolute when the number of parties to a 
negotiation, and also when the diversity in their preferences, increases. In contrast, 
changing policy becomes easier, and the polity more decisive, as the number of 
parties to a negotiation, and as the diversity of their preferences, decreases.
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In sum, as it has been argued in previous pages, there are many circumstances that 
might make it tempting to political leaders to renege on their policy commitments. 
Following the above discussion, however, it can be argued that political leaders’ 
capacity to actually do so depends on the structure and organisation of a country’s 
institutions. Indeed, since the latter determines the number o f veto points, the number 
of players positioned at these points, and the distance among them, it also determines 
the costs of withdrawing or manipulating the policy in question. One should then 
expect that in countries with more veto players in the political system, with more 
divergent preferences, it is harder on average to overturn delegation. This leads to 
more credibility.
4. Institutions and Policy Stability in Argentina: The stability of policies defined 
in Statutes
What do the structure and organisation of Argentina’s institutions tell us about policy 
stability in that country? Do they enhance the credibility of policy or, on the contrary, 
do they provide incentives for political leaders to enact policy change whenever they 
perceive that is optimal to do so?
According to the country’s constitution, Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 
twenty-three provinces and a semiautonomous federal capital. It has a bicameral 
legislature and, drawing on Shugart and Haggard (2001), its political system can be 
characterised as a “pure presidential” democracy. The president, who cannot dissolve
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the legislature and has discretionary powers to appoint Cabinet ministers11, is directly
12elected via a modified version of the double complement rule for a four-year term . 
Although the president can seek re-election for one four-year term, he or she must
13wait four years prior to seeking a third term in office . Within the Legislature -  
which cannot shorten the tenure of the president -  the 257 members of the Chamber 
of Deputies are elected using closed list proportional representation, from 
multimember districts (the 23 provinces and the federal capital) also for fixed four- 
year terms14. One half of the chamber, however, is renewed every two years, with 
every district renewing one half of its legislators (or the closest equivalent). The 
Senate, meanwhile, is composed of 72 members, with every province (and the federal 
capital) represented by three senators elected for six year terms with two seats going 
to the plurality winner and one going to the second finisher15. Elections for senators 
are staggered and one third of the provinces renew their senators every two years.
11 The 1994 constitutional reform introduced the institution o f  the cabinet chief. Like the remaining 
Cabinet ministers and other executive officials, he or she is appointed and can be removed at the 
president’s discretion. Unlike the case with other executive officials, however, the cabinet ch ief can 
also be removed by Congress (via a vote by an absolute majority o f  the members o f  both the Chamber 
o f  Deputies and the Senate).
12 This mechanism for electing the president was established in the 1994 constitutional reform and 
stipulates that, i f  in the first round no candidate receives either (1) over 45% o f  the valid vote, or (2) a 
minimum o f  40% o f  the valid vote and at the same time is more than 10% ahead o f  the second place 
candidate, then a runoff is held between the top candidates from the first round. Before the 1994 
reform, the president was elected for a six year term via an electoral college within which majority o f  
the votes was required for election. Electors were selected from 24 multimember districts using the 
same proportional representation formula and threshold as for the election deputies.
13 Before the 1994 constitutional reform the president could only seek re-election after sitting out for 
one term.
14 Each o f  the 24 districts receives a number o f  deputies in proportion to its population, with the 
following restrictions: 1) that no district receives fewer than five deputies, and 2) that no district 
receives fewer deputies than it possessed in the previous democratic period.
15 Prior to the 1994 constitutional reform, all o f  the country’ provinces and its federal capital were 
represented by two senators, who were elected indirectly for nine-year terms by the provincial 
legislatures using the plurality formula (except in the federal capital where they were selected via an 
electoral college). By lottery, two-thirds o f  the Senate began in 1983 with either three- or six-year 
initial terms, with no province having two senators on the same cycle.
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As other constitutions, the Argentine constitution also structures the policymaking 
process by defining: the stages a bill has to go through to become government policy; 
the actors who take part in the process; and the powers these actors have to influence 
policy outcomes. These structures depend, of course, on the type o f legislative input 
required. If the introduction of new policy does not need constitutional amendments, 
the ordinary policymaking procedure for passing new legislation -  or, alternatively, 
for introducing changes to the existing legislation -  requires that a majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies, a majority in the Senate, and the president of the Republic 
agree on an alternative to the existing policy.
At a first glance, thus, Argentina appears to be a country with a relatively large 
number of veto players. In Cox and McCubbins’ (2001) terms, it can be argued that 
its constitutional structure generates a relatively high separation of power. However, 
as these authors contend, whether or not this division of powers provides the basis for 
policy resoluteness greatly depends on the degree of separation of purpose showed by 
the country’s polity. That is, it depends on the relative degree to which the executive 
and the majority in the Legislature have similar political preferences and respond to 
precisely the same set of actors and interests16.
As argued by Shugart (1995), Shugart and Haggard (2001:96), and Samuels and 
Eaton (2002), all presidential systems have an inherent tendency to generate division 
of purpose17. However, the extent to which they actually do so is variable. In this
16 See also Samuels and Eaton (2002).
17 This point illustrates these authors’ disagreements with some o f  the recent literature on “veto 
players”, which tends to treat regime type as on the same level o f  theoretical importance as other
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sense, according to these authors, in presidential systems the institutional combination 
most conducive to unity of purpose -  and, hence, to more decisive governments -  is 
concurrent presidential and legislative elections, a party centred electoral formula, a 
unicameral Congress elected congruently with the president’s constituency, and full 
renewal of seats at each election. This combination generates presidential majorities 
more so than other possible combinations. Furthermore, even when there is no 
presidential majority, this format at least increases the likelihood that legislators are 
chosen out o f a process in which the same national issues that dominate the
|  o
presidential campaign are likely also to play a major role in their own election .
On the contrary, the institutional combination most likely to produce a separation of 
purpose -  and hence resolute governments -  is non-concurrent legislative elections 
(especially all-midterm), a candidate-centred electoral formula, a federalist upper 
house, and staggered legislative elections. In the authors’ view, these institutions 
promote a separation of electoral incentives of legislators from issues that dominate 
the presidential campaign. Presidents under such formats, moreover, are unlikely to 
enjoy legislative majorities or are likely to enjoy them only through part of their 
terms.
Where does Argentina lie on this continuum between systems that produce division of 
purpose and those that produce unity of purpose? Again, like with separation of
variables. In their view , on the contrary, the differences between regimes are fundamental and should 
be considered theoretically prior to the introduction o f  other variables (Samuels and Eaton, 2002:5).
18 One very important factor that affects separation o f  purpose is the party system. In this sense,
Shugart and Haggard (2001:94) point out that all o f  the conditions facilitating unity o f  purpose can be 
undercut i f  the party systems is too fragmented to deliver either unified government or at least stable 
legislative coalitions supporting a given president.
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powers, the country’s institutions are conducive to a high degree of division of 
purpose19. As discussed above, not only does the country have a bicameral Legislature 
and employ a mixed electoral system with staggered elections in both houses, but 
also, only portions of the Legislature are elected concurrently with the president, and 
both the Chamber and the Senate are highly malapportioned20. As a result o f this 
combination, the Argentine president has been unlikely to enjoy stable majorities in 
both chambers of Congress. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 below, since 
redemocratization in 1983, only between 1995 and 1997 has the party of the president 
controlled a majority in both chambers of Congress21. Most of the time, thus, the 
distribution of institutional power fits the definition of a divided government 
(Mustapic, 2002:25)22.
19 Shugart and Haggard (2001), and Samuels and Shugart (2003), build an index for twenty-two 
presidential systems that ranks countries according to the degree o f  separation o f  purpose in their 
polity. According to that index, Argentina belongs to the group o f  countries with the highest separation 
o f  purpose and it is only surpassed by Russia and Brazil.
20 The most striking feature in this last respect is the overrepresentation (in proportion to their 
population) o f  the smaller provinces and the underrepresentation o f  the largest ones. According to 
Jones (1998), for example, the least populous provinces (Catamarca, La Pampa, La Rioja, San Luis, 
Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego) contain 3.9% o f the population, yet possesses 11.7% and 25% o f  the 
seats in the Chamber and the Senate respectively. In contrast, the country’s most populous province 
(Buenos Aires), w hile accounting for 38.7% o f  the national population, only holds 27.2% o f  the 
Chamber seats. As pointed out by Jones (1998), if  the 257 Chamber seats were allocated based purely 
on population (with each province receiving one seat at the minimum as in the United States), then the 
province o f  Buenos Aires would have 99 deputies instead o f  the 70 it currently possesses. For further 
evidence supporting this conclusion, see Jones (2001) and the excellent work o f  Samuels and Snyder 
(2001).
21 It should be noted that since 2003, the president’s party has controlled a majority in both chambers o f  
Congress.
22 However, Shugart and Haggard (2001:93) note that the changes introduced in the 1994 constitutional 
reforms may have moderately reduced the likelihood for separation o f  purpose. They contend that the 
shortening o f  the terms for both president (from six to four years) and Senate (from nine to six years) 
somewhat reduces both the amount o f  time any given president w ill face legislators elected before he 
was elected as well as the share o f  such holdover seats. In their view, moreover, the move from indirect 
to direct election o f  senators should encourage greater unity o f  purpose. Before, senators only had to 
please provincial party leaders. Now they have to please voters in their provinces, which may tend to 
broaden their interest in national issues to the extent that these matter to voters more than to provincial 
party leaders.
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Table 1. Percentage o f  seats o f  president’s party in Congress
President Legislative period C ham ber of Deputies Legislative period Senate
Alfonsin (UCR) 1983-1985 50.8 1893-1986 39.1
(1983-1989) 1985-1987 51.6 1986-1989 39.1
1987-1989 45.4
M enem  1 (PJ) 1989-1991 47.2 1989-1992 56.3
(1989-1995) 1991-1993 45.1 1992-1995 62.5
1993-1995 49.4
M enem  II (PJ) 1995-1997 5 1.0 1995-1997 55.1
(1995-1999) 1997-1999 46.3 1997-1999 55.1
De la Rua (ALIANZA) 1999-2001 48.2 1999-2001 29.1
(1999-2001)
Duhalde (PJ) 2001-2003 47,5 2001-2003 56.5
(2002-2003)
*Source: Molinelli, Palanza and Sin (1999) for the period 1983-2001, and my own calculations for the 
period 2001-2003.
The division o f  purpose shown by the Argentine polity is also a result o f  the relatively 
poor degree o f  cohesion shown by the country’s principal political parties (i.e., the 
Partido Justicialista and the Union Civica Radical). As has been discussed elsewhere, 
this is not only the result o f  the political system -  party unity tends to be higher in 
parliamentary system s than in presidential systems (Dierm eier and Feddersen, 1998; 
Laver and Shepsle, 1996) - but also o f  the structure o f  incentives derived from 
electoral institutions. Party cohesion typically reflects the relative importance o f the 
party label vis-a-vis the personal reputation o f  individual candidates in achieving 
elective office and pursuing successful political careers (Cain et al., 1987; Cox and 
McCubbins, 1991). To the extent that personal characteristics influence the chances to 
win legislative office, individual legislators enjoy a greater degree o f independence 
from party leaders. On the other hand, if  winning elective office depends primarily on 
the party label, individual legislators face little incentive to act independently o f their 
parties. In this sense, while single m ember districts, candidate centred formulas, and 
the plurality system  are said to encourage the cultivation o f  a personal vote, large 
district magnitude, party centred formulas and closed lists make individual politicians 
more dependent on the party label (Cain et al., 1987; Shugart and Carey, 1992).
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Argentina has a mixed structure of incentives for party unity derived from electoral 
institutions. On the one hand, the electoral formula in the country is party centred and 
the lists are closed. As discussed above, the combination o f party centred formulas 
and closed lists should render politicians seeking office in Congress highly dependent 
on the party label. On the other hand, however, the country’s constitutional provisions 
stipulate that each of its provinces is a plurinominal district. As a result, the principal 
political parties have decentralised organisations and democratic rules of competition 
for the election of their authorities and candidates. Hence, provincial branches of the 
principal political parties normally enjoy a significant amount of autonomy in regard 
to activities such as the creation o f party lists and the formation of electoral alliances 
at the district level23. As Jones (2001,) argues, this is not to say that in Argentina the 
national party is not an important actor in the electoral process at the district level, or 
that there is a low level of party discipline in the Argentine Congress. On balance, 
however, the provincial party level organisations are dominant and, as a result, the 
parties are only weakly cohesive in the Legislature24. Even when governing parties 
control an important share of seats in the Legislature, the level of responsiveness of 
legislators to the president (or to national party leaders) is normally low and, 
therefore, so is the ability of the latter to advance his legislative agenda.
From the discussion above, it follows that the structure and organisation of 
Argentina’s institutions not only generates a relatively high division of powers but
23 For further analysis on this issue, see Jones (1998, 2001); Spiller and Tommasi (2003); Jones et al. 
(2002); Mustapic (2002); and De Luca et al. (2002).
24 Mark Jones has constructed a Party Centralisation Index to capture how responsive legislators are to 
national party leaders. The index centres mostly on the sources o f  leverage that party leaders have that 
stem from the electoral system. However, it also takes into account other incentives such as leaders’ 
control over the appointment o f  legislators to committees and control over the legislative agenda. 
According to this index, Argentina is the country in Latin America where legislators are the least 
responsive to national party leaders. For more details, see Jones (2005).
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also o f purpose. According to the predictions offered by the literature on policy 
change reviewed earlier in this chapter, it should then be quite difficult to use the 
ordinary policymaking procedure to introduce and radical changes to the legislative 
status quo. Policy resoluteness, therefore, should be a feature of the Argentine 
political system.
4.1. The case of the decrees o f urgency and need and its effects on the stability o f 
policy defined in statutes.
It should be noted, however, that not all changes to the statutory status quo in 
Argentina are introduced following the ordinary policymaking procedure. Like in 
other presidential democracies, presidents in that country have been given the power 
to occasionally introduce or modify policies through the so-called “decrees of need 
and urgency” (DNUs). According to Article 99.3 of the 1994 Constitution, the 
president can resort to this type of decree -  which have immediate legal effects -  
“only when exceptional circumstances make it impossible to follow the ordinary 
lawmaking process” and “insofar they do not regulate penal, fiscal, electoral or 
political party matters”25. As for the rules of approval, the constitution provides that 
the chief of cabinet must submit the DNU within 10 days to a permanent bicameral 
committee, which must send its opinion to the floor for a final decision. As noted by 
Negretto (2004:552), although the Constitution does not establish what happens if  
Congress fails to act, it has become a convention that the rule of tacit approval
25 Before the 1994 Constitution, DNUs were a paraconstitutional practice. As Negretto (2004:551) 
notes, however, their appearance on the Argentine political stage was relatively recent. In fact, the first 
decree o f  this kind was the one that launched the so-called Austral Plan in 1985 during Raul A lfonsin’s 
administration.
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applies. According to this rule, a decree becomes a new law unless the legislative 
Assembly explicitly rejects the measure. That is, mere inaction by Congress implicitly 
ratifies the decree as valid law26.
Does the president’s power to pass DNUs challenges the predictions about policy 
stability in Argentina discussed above? Put differently: does the existence of this type 
of legal instrument neutralise the impact that we should expect from the high degree 
of division of power and purpose in that country? How does that impact on the 
durability of policy relating to the delegation of power to independent regulatory 
agencies?
From the work of Gabriel Negretto (2004), the answer to this question would be that, 
since DNUs substantially enhance the ability of the executive to introduce policy 
changes that legislators might have not initiated and might not have approved in the 
absence of this instrument, the existence of this type of decrees not only weakens the 
vertical and horizontal accountability of the political system but also, and
27consequently, the stability of the statutory status quo . He argues, in this sense, that 
one feature o f DNUs is that they are a very powerful form of agenda power. Indeed, 
they allow the executive to produce an immediate change in policies that had been 
passed by ordinary policymaking procedures without the Assembly having the
26 In July 2006, Congress voted a law (26.122) regulating the approval o f  decrees o f  urgency and need. 
It should be noted, however, that this law did not introduce any major change to the status quo. Indeed, 
it confirmed that the chief o f  cabinet must submit the DNU within 10 days to a permanent bicameral 
committee and that the latter must send its opinion to the floor for a final decision. The new  
regulations, moreover, did not establish any deadline for Congress to decide. They specified that a 
DNU applies unless the legislative assembly explicitly rejects the measure.
27 Some scholars have even claimed that the use o f  this legal instrument is an absolute impediment to 
the consolidation o f  democracy in that country. See, in this regard, the work o f  O ’Donnell (1994), 
Haggard and Kauffman (1995) and Przeworski (1991).
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opportunity to discuss ex ante its merits. The Assembly, therefore, is forced to take 
action ex post, choosing not between the status quo ante and a proposal but between a
new policy and the reversionary outcome that would obtain when the decree is
28rejected or amended after it produces legal effects .
In the view of Negretto (2004), another important reason why the existence of DNUs 
seriously undermine the stability of policy defined in statutes is originated in the fact 
that, following the rule o f tacit approval, the only way the Argentine Congress can 
oppose a DNU is by following the ordinary policymaking procedure and passing a 
new statute. As he notes, the ability of Congress to do such a thing is, however, very 
limited.
Negretto advances two reasons for this: First, although the country’s constitutional 
and electoral rules make unified government a very unlikely event, the chances of 
having a minority president in both chambers is even rarer. Indeed, the president’s 
party has always enjoyed either a majority or a large plurality in at least one chamber 
of Congress. In the chamber of deputies, in particular, since 1983 Argentine 
presidents have had a level o f representation above 45%. Considering that the absence 
of opposition in at least one chamber is sufficient to prevent the formation of an 
opposition coalition in Congress, one could then deduce that the chances of Congress 
of opposing a DNU by means of a new statute are relatively weak.
28 In this respect, Negretto (2004:536) argues that i f  legislators prefer the status quo to a decree but the 
latter to the reversionary outcome, the decree w ill stand. In addition, even i f  legislators prefer the 
reversionary policy to the decree and they are able to repeal it, the decree w ill also stand if  the costs o f  
rejection outweigh the costs o f  acceptance. Note in this regard that a similar argument is developed by 
Moe and Howell (1999a: 145) regarding executive orders in the US.
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The second factor identified by Negretto as limiting Congress’s ability to oppose 
DNUs is related with the president’s veto power. As he notes, presidents in Argentina 
not only have the power to veto an entire bill but also to promulgate the items or 
articles o f the bill with which they agree while vetoing and returning to the originating 
chamber for reconsideration the vetoed portions. As in other pure presidential 
democracies, an override of any presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in 
both chambers. That is, only if the two chambers of Congress approve the same bill 
again by two thirds of the vote is the president constitutionally bound to promulgate it 
into law. Therefore, even in the rare event that opposition forces are able to gather a 
majority in both chambers and pass a bill repealing or amending a decree, the 
president can always veto their decision. In that case, he only needs the support of 
one-third of the members in one chamber (86 deputies or 24 senators) to uphold his 
veto against the will o f the majority in the Congress. Put differently, the president can 
ultimately defend his policy preferences with the disciplined behaviour of only a 
minority o f one of the chambers.
Negretto’s arguments seem not only very well constructed but also appealing. And so 
does the evidence he presents to support his claims. He shows that between 1983 and 
December 2001, presidents in Argentina issued 315 DNUs29. According to his data, 
on 249 occasions (79% of the cases) Congress chose not to vote on DNUs. On 41 
occasions (13%) Congress chose to ratify the executive’s policy. That is, on 290 
occasions (92%) Congress implicitly or explicitly approved the DNUs passed by the 
executive. Only in 25 o f 315 DNUs (7.9%) did Congress choose to pass a bill
29 According to that data, Alfonsin signed a total o f  11 DNUs, Menem 255 (in both terms), and De la 
Rua 49. Note, however, that existing data on Argentina’s DNU s is shrouded in controversy due to large 
discrepancies on its estimated count. For other estimates, see Ferreira Rubio and Goretti, (1998); 
Mustapic (2002); Molinelli et al. (1999); and Kim (2006).
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modifying or abrogating the president’s initiative. As the author notes, however, on 9 
o f these occasions the executive vetoed those bills. Interestingly, Congress overrode 
none of these executive vetoes.
In the light of discussion above, should one then arrive to the conclusion that 
presidents in Argentina have an unlimited capacity to change the statutory status quo 
according to their preferences? Put differently, does the existence of DNUs 
completely neutralize the effects on stability o f policy one would expect given the 
high division of power and purpose of Argentina’s polity? In what follows, it will be 
argued that the answers to these questions are not precisely what one would expect 
following Negretto’s claims. I will argue that although it is true that DNUs give 
presidents some leverage in the policymaking process, this leverage has important 
limits.
Following Negretto’s analysis, one should not expect the executive in Argentina to 
ever seek policy by statute. Recall that, according to this author, while it takes a 
disciplined majority in each house of Congress for a president to successfully have 
statutory policy, it takes merely a disciplined third in any one house o f Congress for 
that same policy to survive in decretal form and become permanent law, with the 
added value that it happens faster and without risking an amendment. The empirical 
record, however, clearly suggests that it would be wrong to expect such a thing. 
Indeed, between 1983 and 2001, DNUs in Argentina only accounted for 38.5% of all 
legislative changes initiated by the executive30. Put differently, presidents
30 This percentage is obtained computing the 315 DNUs signed by the presidents during that period 
(Negretto, 2004), and the 503 (out o f  1004) substantial bills they submitted to Congress (Calvo and
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implemented far fewer policies by DNUs than with the consent of Congress31. 
Equally relevant in this respect, this trend has occurred despite the fact that, on 
average, it has not been easy for the executive to obtain legislators’ approval to its 
legislative initiatives. Indeed, for the 1004 substantial law initiatives that presidents
17submitted to Congress during the 1983-2001 period , the average rate of approval 
was 51% (Calvo, 2007; Calvo and Aleman, 2006) . Case study evidence also shows 
that this last percentage includes many initiatives that suffered extensive amendments 
in the Legislature (Llanos, 1998, 2001; Magar, 2001a, 2001b; Etchemendy and 
Palermo, 1998)34. It becomes clear, therefore, that when seeking changes to the 
statutory status quo, and even though DNUs give them a substantial leverage in the 
policymaking process, presidents in Argentina do prefer to resort to ordinary 
mechanisms of legislative initiative over extraordinary ones.
In recent years, several political scientists within the new institutionalism have 
theorized about determinants of this choice. In the view of some of them, presidents
Aleman, 2006). If, alternatively, Kim’s (2006) figures were computed -  he estimates the total number 
o f DNus for that period in 243 -  the percentage in question would drop to 32.5%.
31 The percentage o f  decrees (out o f  the total number o f  changes introduced by the executive to the 
statutory status quo) varies substantially across administrations. Using the estimates o f  DNUs in 
Negretto (2004) and the estimates o f  substantial bills initiated by the executive and passed by Congress 
in Calvo and Aleman (2006), it follows that this figure averaged 6% during A lfonsin’s presidency;
47% during M enem’s first and second terms; and 51.5% during Del la Rua’s. Using the estimate o f  
DNUs in Kim (2006), the percentages are: 5%  for Alfonsfn, 37.7% for Menem (first and second terms), 
and 54.4% for De la Rua.
32 Calvo (2007) and Calvo and Aleman (2006) obtain this number by deducting from the total o f  
executive initiatives (2,909) those bills where the executive: informed Congress o f  the promulgation o f  
an executive decree; requested authorisation for the president to leave the country; requested the 
confirmation o f  presidential appointees; and requested the ratification o f  good will international 
treaties.
33 Calvo (2007), shows that the variation in the rate o f  approval o f  presidential initiatives ranged 
considerably both across and within administrations. According to his data, Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989) 
and Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001) got between 30% and 80% o f  their proposed bills approved. 
Carlos Menem (1989-1999), meanwhile, had between 20% and 60% o f  his initiatives. For an 
alternative method for measuring executive legislative success in Argentina -  and, o f  course, different 
results - see Saiegh (2005), and IADB (2006).
34 Calvo (2007) claims that in the period 1983-2001, o f  those presidential initiatives that Congress 
approved, between a third and a half were heavily amended in committee.
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normally opt for extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative -  like DNUs in 
Argentina, medidas provisorias in Brazil, or executive orders in the U.S. -  in 
situations of Congressional gridlock or when they have a difficult time in persuading 
Congress to pass their legislative agenda. By doing so, politically weak presidents -  
who, according to these scholars, are more likely to appear during divided 
government -  not only can find ways of bypassing an uncooperative Legislature, but 
also they can enjoy the privilege of position taking, framing policy questions, or 
directly delivering promises made to key constituencies . Meanwhile, a second group 
of scholars argue that the main problem with this view -  and the predictions it 
advances -  is that it ignores the constraining effect o f Congress. They note that while 
presidents may want to issue more decrees during times of divided government, they 
may be restricted from doing so because it is easier for an opposition-controlled
i f
Legislature to repeal the president’s decree initiative . Presidents, therefore, should 
pass more decrees during times of relatively greater consensus between the executive
37and the Assembly and, particularly, during unified government .
35 For a more in depth discussion on this view -  commonly referred as the “unilateralist” or “evasion” 
hypothesis see Cox and Morgensten (2002), and Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998).
36 Most o f  the authors within this group acknowledge that when Congress passes a law amending or 
revoking one o f  the president’s unilateral actions, the president can react by resorting to his veto 
powers. However, drawing on the work o f  Neustad (1990), Sala (1998), and M oe and Howell (1998a, 
1998b), among others, these authors note that this is not cost free. More precisely, they note that if  
Congress overturns a presidential unilateral action by legislation, and the president is forced to resort to 
his veto powers, the president’s “professional reputation” may be severely damaged and a legislative 
history may be established that prevents him from taking this sort o f  action in the future. It is normally 
assumed, therefore, that i f  a president is likely to have his unilateral actions overturned by Congress, he 
will probably refrain from issuing them.
37 Scholars who share this view -  commonly referred as the “delegation” or “constrained unilateralism” 
hypothesis -  often argue that the use o f  decree powers can also be seen as a rational strategy on the part 
o f the legislature. Drawing on delegation theory and on principal-agent models, they claim that 
legislators can derive benefits from having the president assume direct responsibility for policy, 
notably when such policies represent the preferences o f  legislators and are unpopular. For a more in 
depth discussion on this view see, among others, Carey and Shugart (1998, 296), Figueredo and 
Limongui (2003), and Reich (2002). Note, moreover, that these works have clear parallels to those by 
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), McCubbins, N oll, and Weingast 
(1987, 1989, 2005).
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In contrast to the case of other presidential democracies where the empirical evidence
38does not provide conclusive support for either of these theoretical constructions , in 
the case of Argentina the empirical record seems to confirm that there is a link 
between the propensity to use executive decree and the difficulty the executive 
experiences in persuading legislators to pass its legislative agenda. Indeed, Calvo 
(2007) and Calvo and Aleman (2006) show that there is a statistically significant 
negative association between changes in the success rate o f presidents’ legislative 
initiatives and the issuance of DNUs. Interestingly, however, their statistical analyses 
do not provide support for the notion that minority presidents are stalemated by 
Congress or, more generally, that the levels of partisan support presidents have in the 
Legislature affect the approval probabilities of their initiatives. According to these 
authors, what do affect these probabilities are the electoral cycle and the public 
approval of the president’s performance. More precisely, their results show that: a) 
presidents are more successful during the honeymoon year and suffer markedly 
during their last year as lame ducks; b) presidents are more likely to get Congress to 
vote their initiatives when their popularity is high. In the light o f these results, and by 
transitivity, one could then conclude that presidents in Argentina are more likely to 
introduce changes to the statutory status quo by means of DNUs when their popularity 
is low and during their last year in office.
Also in support of the claim that presidents in Argentina are more likely to introduce 
policies by extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative when they face a hostile
38 The use o f  executive orders in the US has been studied in M oe and Howell (1999a, 1999b), Gleiber 
and Shull (1992), Gomez and Shull (1995), Shull (1997), Howell and Lewis (2002), Cooper (2001, 
2002), Howell (2003, 2006), Mayer (1999, 2001), Deering and Maltzman (1999), Krause and Cohen 
(1997, 2000), Mayer and Prize (2002), and Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b). The use o f  medidas 
provisorias by Brazilian presidents, meanwhile, has been analysed by Reich (2002) and Pereira et al. 
(2005). Finally, case study evidence on other presidential democracies where the executive can also 
resort to extraordinary mechanisms o f  legislative initiative can be found in Carey and Shugart (1998).
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Legislature is a recent paper by Kim (2006). According to this author, when issuing a 
DNU, presidents anticipate the likelihood that Congress will reverse executive action 
by legislation. Within this framework, Kim hypothesizes, presidents should be more 
inclined to flex their decree muscles when the potential for conflict in the Legislature 
is high and the risk o f taking unilateral action is low. And this, the author predicts, is 
more likely to happen when the marginal difference in the number of seats held by the
39majority and opposition is relatively small .
Kim (2006) also argues that in order to better analyse the president’s limits to 
unilateral action, one should not only focus on the interaction between the executive 
and the legislative, but should also consider the role of the courts. He contends that 
DNUs can always raise doubts about whether the president has overstepped the 
bounds of his legal authority and the courts, hence, can rise up and strike down 
president’s actions. Therefore, when issuing a decree, the president’s perception of 
judicial veto also plays an important role in his decision. The author predicts, then, 
that when the preference of the majority opinion in the judiciary is unlikely to be in 
his favour, the chances of a president’s decree being declared “unconstitutional” by 
the courts is higher, and one should not expect that the president will risk passing it. 
In contrast, when the president faces amicable judges, the constraints on his ability to 
exercise his unilateral decree power falls, and the chances of observing and increase
39 According to Kim (2006), divided government and the saliency o f  opposition in the legislature can 
be one and the same in a relatively polarised two-party system. However, this may not necessarily be 
so in a multiparty setting with relatively unstable coalitions and/or low party discipline.
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in the amount o f legislation he passes using extraordinary mechanisms of legislative 
initiative should increase40.
Kim’s hypotheses seem well supported by the empirical evidence presented in his 
work. Indeed, his statistical analyses reveal that there is a significant negative 
relationship between the marginal difference in the size of the pro-government and 
opposition parties in each chamber and the number of DNUs issued by the executive. 
More precisely, these analyses show that between 1982 and 2000 a 1% increase in the 
difference of pro-government and opposition coalition in the two legislative chambers 
have led to about 9% to 11% corresponding decrease in the number of DNUs passed.
Kim has also found evidence that the dynamic of executive decrees is also constrained 
by opposition in the courts. Indeed, he shows that the percentage of different cases 
decided by the courts against the government is closely related the number of DNUs 
passed41. His analyses reveal, more precisely, that in the period between 1982 and 
2000, for each 1% increase in the share of Supreme Court decisions that went against 
the government on decree related cases, the number of DNUs decreased by 
approximately 3%. In addition, they show that for 1% increase in the proportion of 
Supreme Court decisions that went against the government on cases related to 
important decrees and government appeals, the number of DNUs decreased again by 
about 2.5%. Similarly, a 1% increase in the proportion of Supreme Court decisions
40 Although Kim does not theorise on the determinants o f  the decisions taken by the courts, it is pretty 
obvious that he adheres to those who regard court decisions as derived not from strict legal principles 
and law but from the individual policy preferences o f  the judges.
41 Kim uses data on rulings to measure opposition in the courts -  collected by Helmke (2005) -  
because, he claims, data for the distribution o f  seats in the Supreme Court does not have enough 
variation in the period between 1982 and 2000.
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overturning pro-government decisions in the lower courts resulted in approximately 
4% decrease in the DNU issued by the president. Interestingly, Kim’s analyses also 
show that after accounting for opposition in the Legislature and the courts, the divided 
government variable is not significant.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Negretto and others do have a point when they 
claim that DNUs in Argentina give presidents a strong proactive power to change the 
statutory status quo and that this can be a source of instability for those policies 
defined in statues. The discussion above, however, clearly suggests that these claims 
need some important qualifications. First, not all the changes introduced by the 
executive in Argentina to the statutory status quo are by means of DNUs. As the 
empirical evidence reveals, DNUs only explains less than 40% of the changes to the 
statutory status quo initiated by the executive. The remaining 60% are changes 
introduced by statute and, consequently, with the prior consent of Congress. Second, 
and closely related, reliance on DNUs does not derive from the mere existence o f the 
presidential authority to use them but is rather contingent upon the political 
environment. More precisely, it is contingent upon the level of presidential legislative 
success and the degree of political opposition the executive faces both in the 
Assembly and in the judiciary.
In Argentina, in sum, the existence of DNUs can result in less stability in policies than 
one would expect from a simple look at both the country’s division of power and 
purpose and the ordinary policymaking procedures. What the discussion above 
suggests, however, is that the power of the president to impose his or her policy
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preferences using DNUs does have limits. To a certain extent, defining policies in 
statutes can still be considered a useful mechanism to prevent policy instability. As it 
is discussed in the next section, this point becomes even clearer when policy defined 
in other types of legal instruments is considered.
4.2. When the president governs alone (or almost): the stability of policies defined in 
other types of legal instruments.
It is important to note that in Argentina policies defined in statutes -  or, alternatively, 
in legal instruments of equal weight, such as DNUs -  only represent a small fraction 
of the universe of policies in force. Indeed, most policies are defined in other types of 
legal instruments. Among others, these instruments include regulatory decrees (which 
fill out the details necessary of the implementation of laws passed by a legislative 
Assembly), administrative decrees (which regulate matters of exclusive competence 
of the president as chief o f an administration or matters delegated to him by the 
Assembly) and resolutions (which regulate matters of competence of ministers or 
secretaries of state or, again, which have been delegated to them by the Legislature)42.
Do these alternative legal instruments enhance the credibility of policy? Do they 
“bind” policy-makers to maintain the policy defined by them? Do they, on the 
contrary, provide incentives for the political leaders to enact policy change whenever
42 Several students o f  presidentialism have argued that in parliamentary democracies, relatively more 
policies are defined in statutes. They note that those political systems produce governments that 
normally enjoy a strong legislative backing and that, therefore, do not face much difficulty -  relative to 
governments in presidential systems -  in persuading Congress to pass their legislative initiatives. See 
Shugart (1999); Shugart and Carey (1992); Shugart and Haggard (2001); Samuels and Eaton (2002); 
Samuels and Shugart (2003).
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they perceive that is optimal to do so? How does the stability of policies defined in 
regulatory decrees, administrative decrees, and resolutions compare with those 
defined in statutes? Should one expect these instruments to be a good source of 
commitment?
To answer these questions it should first be noted that, contrary to policies defined in 
statutes, those defined in regulatory decrees, administrative decrees, or resolutions not 
only can be introduced unilaterally by the executive, but can also be revoked or 
amended in the same way43. That is, when introducing or changing legislation defined 
in these legal instruments, the executive can act without the Assembly having the 
opportunity to discuss ex-ante the merit of the proposal44. When introducing or 
changing this type of legislation, therefore, the executive becomes the only veto 
player in the policymaking process. This has far-reaching implications. As it has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter, single veto players not only lack formal constraints 
that limit their ability to initiate policy change but also, and equally important, they 
can select any point within its indifference curve. It would then follow that policy 
defined in regulatory decrees, administrative decrees, and resolutions should be easier 
to introduce and, after that, changed -  vis-a-vis policy defined in statutes. Policy
43 It is important to note here that, at least in legal terms, policy defined in regulatory and 
administrative decrees can only be changed by means o f  another presidential decree. Policy defined in 
resolutions, meanwhile, can be changed either through a presidential decree or another resolution -  in 
this case, issued by the relevant minister or secretary o f  state. What the law strictly prohibits, however, 
is the use o f  a resolution to change policy defined in a decree.
44 Like with DNUs, this factor alone provides the executive with a strong form o f  agenda control. 
Indeed, once one o f  these alternative legal instruments is enacted, legislators are presented with a fa it  
accompli. They are then left in the position to choose between the new policy and the reversionary 
outcome that would obtain if  the new policy is rejected or amended, rather than between the status quo 
ante and the proposal. In this scenario, if  legislators prefer the status quo ante to the new policy but the 
latter to the reversionary outcome, the new policy is likely to stand. Moreover, even i f  they prefer the 
reversionary policy to the new status quo and they are able to repeal it, the new status is also likely to 
stand if  the costs o f  rejection outweigh the costs o f  acceptance -  as it is often the case with measures 
whose effects are immediate and imply radical departures from the status quo.
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defined in these legal instruments is therefore likely to be far less stable than policy 
defined in statutes.
From the analysis in the previous section, however, it becomes clear that this 
prediction needs to be taken with caution. Like with DNUs, the fact that the executive 
can legislate by these alternative means without the prior consent of Congress does 
not mean that the latter, or the courts, inescapably have to tolerate the new status quo. 
That is, changes to the status quo introduced using regulatory decrees, administrative 
decrees, and resolutions can also trigger ex post legislative or judicial responses that 
the executive probably anticipates and, consequently, that are likely to play a role in 
his decision. Put differently, just as it happens with DNUs, there are probably limits to 
the capacity of the executive to introduce policy changes by means of these other 
types of legal instruments45.
The obvious questions here are: What is the chance that the Assembly or the judiciary 
become ex post veto players of policy changes introduced using legal instruments 
such as regulatory decrees, administrative decrees and resolutions? How strong are 
the limits on the executive when introducing policy changes using these legal 
instruments? Are these limits similar to those presidents face when they consider the 
option of introducing changes to policy defined in statutes using DNUs?
45 Like with DNUs, these limits are probably present despite the fact that the executive has important 
formal powers to eventually impose its policy preferences. Recall that if  legislators pass a bill repealing 
or amending a presidential action, the president is empowered to veto their decision. The president, 
moreover, only needs the support o f  one-third o f  the members o f  one chamber to uphold his veto 
against the will o f  the majority in the Congress.
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As discussed above, one particular feature of DNUs is that they allow the president to 
introduce changes to policy previously defined in statutes. When issuing a DNU, 
therefore, the president is normally entering into a risky business. First, he is probably 
interfering with issues that legislators consider important and on which -  overcoming 
major collective action problems and enormous transaction costs -  they had reached 
agreement46. Second, it is quite likely that the preferences that the executive is 
imposing are contrary -  or at least, divergent -  from those of Congress. Recall in this 
regard that what the empirical record reviewed in the previous section suggests, is that 
there is a link between the propensity to use DNUs and the difficulty the president 
experiences in persuading legislators to pass his legislative agenda.
Interestingly, this is not the case with other types o f legal instruments the executive 
can use to introduce policy changes. In fact, regulatory decrees, administrative 
decrees and resolutions are not normally used to introduce changes to policy 
previously defined in statutes, since the legality of this could be easily challenged in 
the courts, but to introduce policy which the constitution defines as the exclusive 
competence of the executive or, alternatively, which legislators previously delegated 
to the executive. It is important to note here that, contrary to what happens in other 
presidential democracies such as in the US, in Argentina, when the Legislature 
delegates policymaking powers to the executive, it rarely attempts or manages to 
insert substantial policy details in the legislation that creates that delegation47. Equally
46 These costs not only stem from the division o f  purpose that characterises the Argentine polity but 
also from the internal organisation o f  Congress as an institution. In relation to this second issue, Moe 
and Howell (1999a: 146) note that each Congressional decision faces a maze o f  obstacles: a bill must 
pass through committees and floor votes in the House and the Senate; it must be endorsed in identical 
form by both houses; and it is threatened along the way by party leaders, rules committees, holds, and 
other roadblocks.
47 For an analysis o f  the US case, and more generally, for very useful theoretical insights into this issue, 
see, among others, Fiorina (1982), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), McCubbins (1985), McCubbins,
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important, it seldom puts in place effective institutional arrangements to detect actions
48of the executive that do not respect the terms of the delegation of powers . As a 
result, the executive in Argentina is often left with substantial discretion in 
formulating and implementing the policy that it has been delegated. To a certain 
extent, when the executive introduces policy using these legal instruments, it is 
interfering with policy definitions that are unlikely to be a source o f conflict with the 
Legislature. Consequently, the chances of the Assembly becoming an ex post veto 
player is probably lower than when introducing policy changes using DNUs.
However, Congress is not the only actor that is less likely to become an ex post veto 
player when the executive legislates with regulatory decrees, administrative decrees 
and resolutions. Indeed, the same can be said about the courts, and notably, the 
Supreme Court. The reasons for this are twofold. First, contrary to DNUs, the use of 
regulatory decrees, administrative decrees and resolutions do not require the executive 
to invoke the existence of exceptional circumstances that justify their passage49. And 
if one takes into account that the main challenge by a court against DNUs is that the 
exceptional circumstances invoked by the executive could not be verified, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, when there is no need to invoke exceptional
Noll and Weingast (1987,1989, 2005), Ferejohn (1987), McCubbins and Page (1987), Horn and 
Shepsle (1989), Moe (1984, 1989, 1990a, 1990b), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), M oe and Wilson 
(1994), O ’Halloran (1994), Lupia and McCubbins (1994), Horn (1994), Epstein and O ’Halloran (1994, 
1999), Bawn (1995, 1997), Huber and Shipan (2000, 2001), and Huber et al. (2001).
48 Although the reasons for this have yet to be studied in more detail, some authors have recently 
advanced some hypotheses. According to Spiller and Tommasi (2003 ,2007), the main reason why 
Congress in Argentina often makes broad delegation to the executive and seldom puts in place effective 
Congressional oversight mechanisms is that legislators often see their job as a temporary stop in their 
political career. According to these authors, these “amateur” legislators have little incentive to 
specialise, to acquire specific policy or legislative expertise, and to develop strong Congressional 
institutions. Eaton (2003), argues that Congress in Argentina has serious problems in detecting shirking 
by the executive because in that country the information that legislators need in order to do so is very 
difficult to acquire.
49 Recall that the 1994 Constitution established that the president can resort to this type o f  decree only 
when exceptional circumstances make it impossible to follow the ordinary lawmaking process.
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circumstances, the chances of a court challenge o f policy changes introduced using 
these legal instruments should be considerably slimmer50.
The second reason why the courts are less likely to become an ex post veto player of 
policies introduced using regulatory decrees, administrative decrees, and resolutions, 
is better understood if one assumes that judges not only base their decisions on legal 
principles and law but also -  and sometimes exclusively - on their policy preferences 
and, notably, on strategic and institutional considerations51.
It should be noted that when dealing with cases involving DNUs, the courts are often 
faced with the job of having to resolve a conflict between the executive and Congress. 
In most cases this is centred on the limits of the powers and competences of the 
former vis-a-vis the power and competences of the latter. This, o f course, is not an 
easy task. Judges acknowledge that their decision can trigger reprisals. If, for instance, 
their decision inhibits the executive from imposing its preferences, the executive can 
react by not implementing the measure effectively52. Alternatively, the executive can 
choose to punish the courts with more aggressive policies such as court packing, 
budget cuts, or impeachment.
50 This argument is probably appealing for those working with the perspective o f  traditional legal 
studies, who look to formulaic legal interpretations to predict court outcomes.
51 There is recent literature concerning judicial decision making, mostly referred to the US case, that 
shows that this is a legitimate assumption. See among others Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), Rosenberg 
(1991), Ferejohn and Weingast (1992), Eskridge and Ferejohn (1992), Gely and Spiller (1990, 1992), 
Spiller and Spitzer (1992), George and Epstein (1992), Schwartz (1992), Spiller (1992), Zuk et al. 
(1993), Cameron (1994), Schwartz et al. (1994), Epstein and Walker (1995), Epstein and Knight 
(1996), Gillman and Clayton (1999), Howell (2001; 2003), and Ferejohn,, Ronsenbluth, and Shipan 
(2004).
52 As noted by Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b), this is far from irrelevant. I f  the executive refuses to 
cooperate -  or more likely, i f  it purposely acts very slowly, ineffectively, or in ways that alter or distort 
the judicial intent -  the policy pronouncements o f  the courts threaten to be empty, and their integrity 
and social standing as a political institution can be put seriously at risk.
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The discussion above does not imply that when dealing with cases involving DNUs -  
or more generally, with cases that involve a conflict between the executive and the 
Legislature -  the courts will always rule in favour of the executive. First, non- 
compliance with a court ruling can be very damaging for the professional reputation 
of a president. Second, and more important, most of the other reprisals that the 
executive can use to punish the courts (i.e. court packing or impeachment) cannot be 
implemented unilaterally. That is, the executive needs the consent of Congress to 
implement these reprisals. And strategic judges, obviously, are probably aware of this 
reality. They are likely to know that: a) most of the policies introduced using a DNU 
can be seen as an usurpation o f legislative powers by the executive; b) if these 
policies were passed through that legal instrument, it was probably because the 
preferences of the Legislature were not aligned with those of the executive and, 
hence, the latter had difficulties in defining them in statutes; c) that if they rule against 
the executive, and the latter tries to take reprisals, the Legislature has all the powers -  
and probably the motives -  to stop it. When dealing with cases involving DNUs, in 
sum, strategic judges have good reasons to believe that they are freer to rule according 
to their preferences -  even if  this means ruling against the interest of the executive -  
without being punished.
Interestingly, the same cannot be said about policies defined in regulatory decrees, 
administrative decrees and resolutions. As noted above, when the executive legislates 
using these legal instruments, it is normally dealing with policies outside the 
jurisdiction of Congress or that, to a greater or lesser extent, legislators had 
empowered the executive to define. When dealing with cases involving controversies
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about the legality of policies introduced by these legal instruments, consequently, 
judges probably anticipate that if  they rule against the executive, and the latter tries to 
punish them for doing so, Congress faces little incentives to come to their rescue. In 
the light of this, it is reasonable to predict that when dealing with these cases, the 
executive’s threat of reprisals will probably be more credible than in cases involving 
controversies about the legality of DNUs, and also as a result, that judges -  assuming 
that they behave strategically -  will probably be less likely to rule according to their 
preferences if these are against the executive53.
At this point, it can be concluded that both the assembly and the judiciary are in a 
weaker position to oppose policy changes through regulatory decrees, administrative 
decrees, and resolutions than when the device is a DNU. It is reasonable to expect, 
then, that when introducing policy changes using these legal instruments, the limits 
and constraints that the executive faces are likely to be less effective than the limits 
presidents face when he considers the option of using DNUs. It follows that for the 
executive is relatively easier or less costly to change the policy status quo when this is 
defined in a regulatory or administrative decree, or a resolution, than to change the 
status quo of policy defined in a law, even if this change is introduced using 
extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative. In the light of this, and equally 
important, it can also be concluded that policies defined in these other instruments,
53 This argument concerning the courts as ex post veto players when considering regulatory decrees, 
administrative decrees and resolutions is in the vein o f  recent examination o f  the strategic approach to 
judicial decision-making. Briefly, this approach contends that the higher the fragmentation in the 
executive and legislative branches o f  government, the higher the probability the courts will rule against 
power holders, and the more the courts will be involved in policymaking. With reference to judicial 
decision-making in the U.S., this argument is advanced in Gely and Spiller (1990, 1992), Ferejohn and 
Weingast (1992), Bednar et al. (2001), and Ferejohn (1999, 2002). When studying judicial decision­
making in Argentina, this argument is used in Helmke (2002,2005), Iaryczower et al. (2002), and 
Chavez (2004). With regard to other national cases, see Epstein, Knight, and Shetsova (2001), Vanberg 
(2000), Scribner (2002), Barros (2002), and Rios (2007).
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provide relatively more incentives for the executive to enact policy change whenever 
it perceives that is optimal to do so. That is, they make they introduction of policy 
changes relatively more feasible.
O f course, this is not to say that policies defined in these three legal instruments are 
invariably easier to change than policies defined in statutes. Although highly unlikely 
given the division of power and purpose that characterises the Argentine polity, it can 
happen that on certain policies, or during particular periods of time, the preferences of 
the executive and the Assembly become aligned54. In those circumstances, it should 
not be surprising that both parties agree to introduce changes to the status quo, 
provided it is considerably different from the proposed situation. And if  the legal 
instrument used to enact those changes is a DNU and not a statute, it is probably 
because legislators acceded to the use of that legal instrument. It those circumstances, 
moreover, it is pretty unlikely to see the courts stepping in. Indeed, they will probably 
anticipate that such behaviour is likely to trigger reprisals that nobody -  particularly 
Congress -  will try to impede.
In certain occasions, meanwhile, it can also happen that when introducing changes to 
the status quo using regulatory decrees, administrative decrees or resolutions, the 
executive is interfering with policy that, although Congress previously put it in its 
hands, it contains substantial policy details or includes effective procedural 
instructions -  aimed at ensuring that the executive makes the sort of decisions that the 
enacting coalition of Congress approve. If, in addition, the executive imposes policy 
changes contrary to the preferences of Congress, the likelihood that the latter becomes
54 This is likely to happen during times o f  severe crisis.
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an ex post veto player will probably increase -  vis-a-vis changes that the executive 
introduces to policy that Congress previously delegated to it in broad terms and that 
was not filled with procedural instructions. In those cases, moreover, it is also more 
likely that the courts will step in. Indeed, judges will probably anticipate that if they 
rule against the executive, and the latter tries to take reprisals, the Legislature will 
probably come to their rescue.
It is important to bear in mind, though, that circumstances that could make the 
introduction of changes to policy defined in a statute more feasible than the 
introduction of changes to policy defined in regulatory decrees, administrative 
decrees, and resolutions, in Argentina are the exception rather than the norm. 
Therefore, one can safely predict that the structure and organisation of the polity in 
that country normally result in that policies defined in statutes are likely to be more 
stable than policies defined through other legal instruments and, hence, better 
equipped to “stack the deck” in favour of maintaining the policy status quo.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have claimed that for sustaining inter-temporal commitments and 
developing stable utility regulatory policies, delegation to independent experts is only 
part of the solution. Since there are many circumstances that might make it tempting 
to reverse this policy, it is equally important to ensure that governments cannot easily 
renege on their policy commitments.
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Drawing on recent developments within new institutionalism, it is contended that the 
structure and organisation of a country’s institutions plays a crucial role in satisfying 
this second requirement. First, this is because it moulds the number of veto players 
whose agreement is necessary to introduce changes to the status quo -  that is, the 
division of power in the polity. The second reason is that it shapes the divergence of 
preferences among these players -  that is, the division o f purpose in the polity. And 
both factors, in turn, determine how costly it is to change policy and, hence, how 
stable policy in that country is likely to be.
It is then argued that from a simple look to the structure and organisation of 
Argentina’s institutions, one could be tempted to conclude that Argentina is a country 
where policies should enjoy a relatively high degree of stability. Indeed, when policy 
changes are enacted through ordinary policymaking procedures, the country’s 
institutions require political leaders to gain the consent of numerous veto players 
whose preferences are rarely homogeneous.
1 then pointed out, however, that this conclusion would only be correct if the sole 
legal instrument available to define policy in Argentina were statutes that, in addition, 
could only be changed by means of another statute -  that is, with the involvement of 
both the executive and legislative branches of government. This, however, is not the 
case. What a closer look to the rules o f the game reveals is that, in the first place, 
statutes in Argentina can be changed unilaterally by the executive using extraordinary 
mechanisms of legislative initiative (i.e. DNUs). In the second place, and more
75
importantly, only a small portion of the policies in place in that country are defined 
using this legal instrument.
The chapter then discusses the implications of these two matters for policy stability in 
Argentina. In line with some authors, I have argued that the power of the executive to 
introduce unilateral changes to the statutory status quo does pose a threat to the 
stability of policies defined in statues. Challenging their view on this issue, however, I 
have shown that, since there are important limits to this power, the gravity of this 
threat should not be exaggerated.
What does constitute a real hazard to policy stability in Argentina is the tendency to 
allow the executive to define policy through other legal instruments, such as 
regulatory decrees, administrative decrees, and resolutions. This is for two reasons. 
Firstly, when legislating by these legal instruments, the executive acts without the 
need to obtain the prior consent of other veto players -  notably, the Assembly. As 
claimed with regard to DNUs, this feature alone provides the executive not only with 
the opportunity to act as a single veto player, but also with a strong form o f agenda 
control -  leaving other veto players in the position to choose not between the status 
quo ante and the proposal, but between the new policy and the reversionary outcome 
that would obtain when the new policy is rejected or amended. Secondly, and equally 
important, when legislating by these legal instruments, the chances of observing either 
the Assembly or the judiciary becoming ex post veto players are normally remote. The 
limits and constraints that the executive faces are thus likely to be less effective than 
the limits presidents face when he considers the option of using DNUs to introduce
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changes to policy defined in statutes. It follows, therefore, that for the executive is 
relatively less costly, and hence easier, to change policy when this is defined in a 
regulatory or administrative decree, or a resolution, than to change the law by any 
means, including extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative.
In the light of this, the following hypotheses can be advanced. First, given the 
structure and organisation of Argentina’s institutions, the stability and credibility of a 
policy there is to a great extent governed by the choice of the legal instrument used to 
define it. Second, that stability in the delegation of important regulatory powers 
should hold only in those industries where the key features o f the regulatory regime 
were defined in a statute. In these industries one should expect that the legal 
instrument used to define the key features of the regulatory regime made the political 
costs of introducing policy changes relatively high for the executive and, therefore, 
politicians stuck to the original agreement. Finally, in industries where the legal 
instrument used to define the key features of the newly created regulatory regimes 
was a regulatory decree, an administrative decree or a resolution, one should expect 
that politicians faced few constraints to renege on their previous policy commitments. 
In these industries, therefore, delegation of important regulatory powers to 
independent experts was probably only a temporary policy and regulation returned to 
be a domain where policy-makers introduced policy changes whenever their 
preferences dictated it.
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Chapter III
Telecommunications Regulation during Menem years: 1989-1999
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1. Introduction
In the previous chapter 1 concluded that the delegation o f regulatory powers to 
independent agencies was not necessarily irreversible. More precisely I hypothesised 
that in those sectors where the legal instrument used to defined the key features o f the 
newly created regulatory regime was a presidential decree, or other legal instrument 
that could be changed unilaterally by the executive following ordinary mechanisms of 
policymaking, the executive could introduce changes to the status quo without facing 
significant challenges of other veto powers. In those sectors, therefore, delegation of 
important regulatory powers to independent experts was likely to be only a temporary 
policy. Regulatory policy in those sectors, thus, was likely to be returned to the 
control of government officials.
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, to test these deductively derived assertions 
this chapter presents an in-depth investigation of the telecommunications regulatory 
framework during Carlos Menem’s administration. Since in this sector the key 
features of the regulatory regime were defined in a presidential decree, if the 
hypotheses discussed above are valid, the narrative presented in this chapter should 
confirm that delegation of regulatory powers to independent experts was, contrary to 
what policy-makers originally expected, a policy that not only did not become a 
permanent feature of the policy landscape but also one that did not contribute to create 
an environment of regulatory policy stability.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the basic features of the 
privatisation process and of the regulatory regime policy-makers originally put in
79
place in the early 90s. Section 3 analyses the stability of the rules of the game during 
Carlos Menem’s first and second administration (1989-1995 and 1995-1999, 
respectively). For purposes of clarity this section is divided into five subsections, each 
analysing a particular time period: 1990 to 1992; 1992 to 1993; 1993 to 1996; 1996 to 
1997; and 1997 to 1999. Section 4 concludes.
2. The privatisation of Telecommunications in Argentina: Basic Features and the 
Design of the Regulatory Regime
2.1. Privatising under difficult economic conditions
As Hill and Abdala (1993:12) argue, one of the most remarkable aspects of the 1990 
privatisation of telecommunications in Argentina “is that it happened at all”. In 1987, 
faced with a large government deficit, with a need for additional investment in the 
telecommunications sector, which neither the major public telecommunications 
company (ENTel) nor the government could finance, and with a high level of corrupt 
and irregular practices within the firm, Alfonsin’s (1983-1989) new Minister o f Public 
Work1 advocated the liberalisation of the supply of telecommunications. His plans not 
only included the introduction of new private management but the partial privatisation 
of ENTel. The liberalisation process was initiated by three executive decrees that 
allowed the Secretary of Communications to issue permits to private 
telecommunications service providers2.
1 Rodolfo Terragno.
2 Decrees 1651/87, 1757/87, and 1842/87.
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Given the high level o f political uncertainty, and ENTel’s administrative problems 
and internal corruption, the government decided to sell the company through 
negotiations, inviting a potential investor to evaluate the company and discuss the 
terms. The government planned to keep control o f the company by retaining 51% of 
the shares, while 9% of the shares were to be transferred to workers for free, and 40% 
would be sold to a new investor who would be responsible for the management of the 
company.
The government entered into a preliminary agreement with Telefonica of Spain. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the partially privatised company would have had a 
complete monopoly over the provision o f all types telecommunications services in the 
country -  including cable TV but not cellular telephone and public telegraph -  for 25 
years with an option to extend this monopoly another 10 years.
However, even though there was popular support for the partial privatisation of 
ENTel, the government was unable to persuade Congress to approve its project (Hill 
and Abdala, 1993:12; Llanos 2001:82). The government’s party, Union Civica 
Radical (UCR), had lost the 1987 Congressional elections and the opposition party, 
Partido Justicialista (PJ), held a majority in the Senate. According to Hill and Abdala 
(1993), this opposition, which actually resulted in a rejection o f the government’s 
project in Congress, was due, on the one hand, to some members ideological 
objections to privatisation and, on the other hand, to some members objections to the 
actual terms of the deal, particularly the lack of competition and adequate regulation. 
In these authors’ view, moreover, the opposition party also anticipated winning the
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1989 presidential election and, therefore, was unwilling to support any action that
■y
could help the ruling party’s candidate .
By the time of the election of Carlos Menem in 1989, Argentina was in the midst of a 
severe economic crisis. Its severity prompted the moderate wings of the two major 
political parties to build an informal coalition in order to bring the new government 
quickly and give it the power it needed to address the accelerating economic 
deterioration. The primary goal of Menem's government was to take advantage of the 
opportunity presented by the shift to cooperative politics in Argentina and 
demonstrate its ability to transform the economy.
The privatisation of telecommunications provided the new government an excellent 
opportunity in this respect. The rationale for its selection was clear. First, it could 
provide a quick fix for the government’s dwindling coffers. Second, and as discussed 
earlier, it had been on the previous government’s privatisation agenda. For a president 
eager to make clear that his new pro-market convictions were to be taken seriously, 
the failed attempts o f his predecessor constituted an unavoidable point of departure 
(Gerchunoff and Torre, 1998: 122).
There were other more objective reasons, though. As pointed out by Urbiztondo and 
Gomez-Ibanez (2002), during the 1970s and in the late 1980s, the government used 
the prices for publicly provided services such as telecommunications as a tool in its 
fight against inflation. That led to growing deficits and a collapse in investment by 
publicly owned companies. In the case o f ENTel, the combination of low tariffs and
3 For a better review o f  this failed attempt to privatise ENTel, see Molano (1997) and Margheritis 
(1999).
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the company’s inefficiency caused its operating deficit to increase to roughly US$ 1.5 
billion per year by 1989. According to Shaikh et al. (1996), in 1990 ENTel 
contributed 1.7% to GNP and employed 45,000 people. Its line-per-employee (72.2) 
and revenue-per-employee (US$32,000) ratios indicated that the enterprise was 
overstaffed in comparison with the telecommunications companies of other major 
nations. Quality of service was poor and declining. Completion rates for domestic 
long distance calls were below international standards for mature networks. Repair 
time was slow and digitalisation of the network amounted to a modest 13.4 percent. 
Demand was not satisfied and backlogs were growing. Clandestine connections and 
under-the-table payments to some labour groups were common. In sum, the 
government’s claim that consumers stood to gain from privatisation was fairly 
credible. As Rhodes (2002) argues, “ENTel’s service at that time was so bad it was 
hard to imagine anything that would make it worse”.
The momentum for this sale was thus derived from the country’s economic crisis, the 
company’s disastrous performance, and a rare political opportunity. This gave the 
whole process its own dynamic; the fact that the completion of the sale was central to 
the government’s attempt to establish its credibility imposed a discipline on the actors 
involved and limited the influence of the sale’s critics. However, this also resulted in 
the fact that the sale conditions and the need for a regulatory regime were secondary 
to the completion of the transaction (Hill and Abdala, 1993; Gerchunoff and Canovas, 
1995: Manzetti, 1999; Abdala and Spiller, 1999).
Following the passage of the State Reform Law on August 17th 1989, the new 
government moved quickly to start the privatisation process. The need for speed
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determined that the privatisation would be implemented through presidential decrees 
rather than through statutes, which would have posed the risk o f being caught up by 
interest groups in the Congress4. Moreover, in anticipation that both governmental 
and outside political resistance to the sale of ENTel would grow over time before 
defining its principles, a very tight timetable was set for the bidding process and for 
the accompanying institutional reforms5.
As pointed out by Torre and Gerchunoff (1999:9), the establishment o f such a tight 
timetable had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, it 
evidenced the government’s commitment to privatise ENTel. Moreover, it helped to 
limit the ability of those who oppose the privatisation to articulate a sound opposition 
to the process6. On the negative side, however, and taking into account that most of 
the critical aspects of the privatisation had not been defined, it weakened the 
government’s bargaining position with potential buyers.
The executive decrees initiating it and laying down its principles were issued almost a 
month later after the passage of the State Reform Law. These decrees modified 
portions of the 1972 National Telecommunications Act that were incompatible with 
the privatisation, striking out its provisions that had reserved exclusive rights to the 
government to provide and control telecommunications services7. An interventor was
4 It should be noted that the State Reform Law explicitly allowed the executive to privatise using 
presidential decrees.
5 Decree 731/89. A s stated in this piece o f  legislation, the government’s intention was to complete the 
sale in a period o f  180 days.
6 According to Corrales (1998), opponents o f  privatisation included, first, public sector workers 
(including company managers) who feared that de-nationalisation would probably lead to job cuts. 
Second, unions. Third, major businesses that supplied state enterprises and received lucrative public 
contracts. And fourth, Congressional representatives and party leaders responsive to the 
aforementioned constituencies. Teisman (2002), analyses other tactics used by the government to break 
their opposition.
7 Decrees 59/90 ,60 /90 , 61/90, and 62/90.
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appointed to oversee the privatisation process , and she and her team immediately 
began to work on preparing the company for sale9.
The “Pliego de Bases y  Condiciones para la Privatization del Servicio Publico de 
Telecomunicaciones” (Document of Terms and Conditions for the Privatisation of 
Telecommunications Services), together with the transfer contracts, laid out the 
conditions for the sale of ENTel10. Following the provisions in the Pliego, ENTel was 
broken up both functionally and geographically. Functionally, it was separated into 
basic, international and competitive services, the latter two comprising telex and data 
transmission services and naval radio communications. Basic services were divided 
geographically into the northern and southern regions. Four new stock companies 
were created to provide all of these services. Two of the new companies were 
established exclusively to provide basic services for a period o f seven years, with an 
option for three more -  contingent on the achievement of a set of required targets11. 
After the end of this period, the companies would continue to have a license to 
operate, but it would no longer be exclusive. The third company, which was also 
granted an exclusive license for the same period of time, was created to provide 
international services. The fourth, finally, was created to offer competitive services
8 The person chosen by president Menem was Maria Julia Alsogaray, a well known advocate o f  
privatisations in Argentina and the daughter o f  Alvaro Alsogaray, a leading figure o f  the center-right 
Union de Centro D em ocratico  (UCeDe).
9 The legal, technical and financial advisers for the privatisation were selected competitively among 
both local and international firms. The World Bank provided financial assistance and technical advice. 
As pointed out by Shaikh et al. (1996), the privatisation o f  ENTel was one o f  the conditions o f  the 
Public Reform Loan that the Bank made to Argentina.
10 The Pliego was contained in executive decree 62/90.
11 Initially, the interventor wanted to break the company into seven units before the sale and, therefore, 
create a kind o f  benchmark competition. However, consultants from US investment bank Morgan 
Stanley recommend it be divided into just two regions in order to achieve the goal o f  attracting 
investors (Rhodes, 2002).
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19throughout the country . The ownership of the last two companies was split equally 
between the first two. The government auctioned blocks of 60% of the two companies 
established to provide basic services through open international competitive bidding.
Between the publication of the Pliego and the date of transference, numerous 
modifications were introduced to the conditions of the sale. These modifications 
weakened the credibility of the government and this, in turn, resulted in a sharp 
decrease in the number of participants in the bidding process (Hill and Abdala, 1993; 
Schvarzer, 1993; Abdala and Spiller, 1999). Of the fourteen potential purchasers who 
bought the bidding documents, seven submitted applications for prequalification. 
However, only three actually submitted bids for ENTel. A consortium led by the 
Spanish Telefonica de Espaiia won the bidding process for both regional monopolies, 
but was allowed to purchase only one. A group headed by Bell Atlantic came in 
second, but at the last minute it had trouble raising the funds, and its place was taken 
by a consortium between STET and France Telecom.
The transfer contracts were signed on November 8th 1990. The shares in the northern 
company, henceforth known as Telecom Argentina, went to the consortium operated 
by France Telecom Cable and Radio, and STET. The shares in the southern company, 
henceforth known as Telefonica de Argentina, went to the consortium operated by
1 TTelefonica o f Spain . The government retained 40% of the shares in the two
12 For further details on the process o f  privatisation, and the design o f  the regulatory incentives -  such 
as rate setting procedures, performance standards, barriers to entry and interconnection -  see Gonzalez 
Lanuza (1992), Hill and Abdala, (1993), World Bank (1993), Shaikh et al. (1996), Abdala and Spiller 
(1999), and Manzetti (1999).
13 As pointed out by Rhodes (2002), in total, 35 corporations, 83% o f  which were financial institutions, 
were part o f  the winning consortia.
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companies, 25% of which was to be sold to the general public, 5% to telephone 
cooperatives, and 10% to ENTel employees14.
The wining consortia paid a total of US$1.65 billion for their 60% of the companies, 
offering a combination of cash and Argentine government bonds15. As argued by 
Urbiztondo and Gomez-lbanez (2002), the assertions of those who claimed that the 
price paid was too low seemed to be confirmed when the government gained US$830 
million from the sale of another 30% of Telefonica de Argentina’s stock on the New 
York and Buenos Aires stock exchanges in 1991, and US$1.2 billion for the sale of 
another 30% of Telecom Argentina’s stock in 1992.
2.2. The regulatory regime
As commonly pointed out, the most serious shortcomings in the privatisation o f 
ENTel were in the design and implementation of the regulatory regime (Hill and 
Abdala, 1993; Gerchunoff and Canovas, 1996; Guasch and Spiller, 1999; Abdala, 
1994; Urbiztondo, 1999). In that sense, although the Pliego outlined the basic rights 
and obligations of the privatised companies and provided for general regulatory 
principles and the establishment o f a regulator, little was done to implement a 
regulatory regime before privatising. More specifically, although the Pliego had 
committed the government -  and in particular the Secretariat o f Communications in 
the Ministry of Public Works -  to develop and issue the details of the regulatory
14 With the objective o f  breaking union leaders’ opposition to privatisation, unions were given 
responsibility for administering employee-owned shares (Murillo, 2000).
15 It should be noted that, at that time, these bonds were traded for about 19% o f  their face value. The 
U S$1.65 billion counts the bonds at their market rather than their face value.
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framework by February 1990, these details were not issued until just three days before 
final bids were to be submitted.
According to Hill and Abdala (1993:20-21), there were two reasons for this delay. 
First, and as it has been already discussed, at the beginning of the bidding process the 
government placed higher priority on rapidly completing the sale than on developing 
a strong regulatory regime. Second, the Secretary of Communications and most of his 
staff did not support the government’s privatisation plans16. Believing that the 
privatisation team would not succeed, they did not approach the task of developing 
and implementing a regulatory framework with any sense of urgency.
The Decree 1185/90, which was finally passed in June and was drafted by a joint 
Argentine/World Bank team (Hill and Abdala, 1993), provided the legal basis for a 
regulatory agency and regime. It included and extended the regulatory principles 
outlined in the Pliego and .created a telecommunications regulatory agency, the 
ComiSion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, henceforth known as CNT.
This decree placed three obligations on the regulators, in no particular order of 
importance: a) to assure the continuity, regularity, equality and generality of the 
services; b) to promote the universal character of the basic telephony service at fair 
and reasonable prices; and c) to promote fair and effective competition in the supply 
of those services not subject to exclusivity.
16 The Secretary o f  Communications, Julio Guillan, had been the leader o f  the telecommunications 
workers’ union.
In relation to the allocation of roles and responsibilities, the new legislation provided 
that political authorities would retain responsibility for broad and long-term policy -  
notably, defining the legislative framework, deciding issues of sector restructuring, 
public investment, taxation, subsidies, and managing inter-govemmental relations. 
The regulator, meanwhile, was delegated a much more detailed and specific mandate. 
Formally, the powers and responsibilities originally delegated to the regulators 
included17:
a) Awarding or cancelling licenses, authorisations and permits -  with the exception 
of exclusive licenses;
b) Modifying the conditions of authorisations and permits;
c) Modifying the conditions of licenses -  subject to obtaining the consent of the 
licensee, and the approval of the Executive office for exclusive licenses;
d) Advising the Executive office on whether or not new services supplied in the 
telecommunications market should be introduced under an exclusive license;
e) Deciding whether exclusive regimes should be extended;
f) Inspecting and verifying as to whether the conditions contained in the licenses, 
authorisations and permits were met;
g) Reviewing and approving investment plans for operational compatibility, 
minimum quality of service, and interconnection of networks as well as the 
standards and rules for interconnection;
h) Addressing consumer complaints;
17 Several months later, in December 1990, a presidential decree (2798/90) marginally amended and 
expanded this list.
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18i) Preventing anticompetitive behaviour, particularly as a result of cross subsidies ; 
j)  Verifying that requirements for competitive procurement were met; 
k) Approving tariffs in cases where rates had to follow guidelines set in a license;
1) Imposing fines and penalties on firms for not complying with their obligations; 
m) Facilitating the settlement of disputes between sector operators, and between 
operators and consumers.
At the time of the establishment o f the new regulatory regime, the declared intention 
o f policy-makers was to set up a regulatory agency at an arm’s length relationship 
with both political authorities and with regulated firms and other private interests. In 
that sense, the decree provided that CNT was to be headed by five commissioners19. 
All of them would be appointed by the executive -  although one on the 
recommendation o f the Federal Council of Telecommunications, which represented 
the provinces. Commissioners would be appointed for five year terms, with the 
possibility of being re-appointed for one additional term, and their terms would be 
staggered. The executive was also to designate one of the commissioners as president 
of the commission. The decree 1185/90 also established that CNT’s authorities could
be removed by the Executive Office and that the latter would not be forced to consult
20other branches of government before taking such a decision .
18 It should be noted that at the time o f  the creation o f  the new regulatory agencies, responsibility for 
the enforcement o f  the 1980 competition law was allocated to the Comision Nacional de Defensa de la 
Competencia.
19 In December 1990, however, a presidential decree (2728/90) increased the number o f  commissioners 
to six.
20 Article 18 o f the Decree 1185/90. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the legislation required the 
participation o f  two agencies, directly controlled by the Executive Office, in the removal process: the 
Sindicatura General de Empresas Publicas and the Procuracion General del Tesoro de la Nacion.
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Regarding the institutional arrangements set up to ensure that regulators were at arm’s
length from private interests, the decree provided that the regulator would be
separated from regulated firms. Moreover, the legislation included explicit rules
prohibiting regulators from holding a position or an interest in a firm subject to their
control. These prohibitions extended to the commissioners’ immediate family and
21were complemented by restrictions on previous and subsequent employment .
Policy-makers explicitly intended to ensure that the regulatory bodies would have the 
institutional autonomy required for their independence from both government and 
business, as well as to foster and retain technical expertise. This involved: providing 
the regulatory agency with reliable sources o f funding, permitting regulators to 
impose sanctions on operators for not complying with their obligations, and endowing 
them with enough managerial flexibility to carry out their duties. In this regard, the 
decree 1185/90 provided that CNT would be responsible for annually elaborating its 
own budget, which would be included in the national budget for its discussion in 
Congress. Moreover, it stipulated that the agency’s budget would be financed both 
through a levy imposed on regulated firms operating in the sector and license charges 
to users of the radio spectrum. The levy was set up as a percentage (0.5%) of 
operators’ income. These funds were to be deposited in an account at the Banco 
Nation  and administered by the regulatory agency. Any funds not used by the agency
in performing its assigned tasks would be used to develop both public and official
22telecommunications and broadcasting services .
21 Article 14 o f the decree 1185/90.
22 These arrangements were set up in articles 10 and 11 o f  the decree 1185/90.
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The sanctions that CNT could apply, meanwhile, included warnings, fines, total or 
partial cancellation of exclusivity, and the cancellation of licenses, authorisations or 
permits23. The regulator was also given powers to contract external consultants, 
design its own organisational structure, decentralise/delegate tasks, etc.24. 
Additionally, it was formally endowed with an important degree of flexibility to 
recruit and remove its own staff.
Finally, the decree also established certain institutional arrangements to ensure that 
the regulator remained accountable for its actions. It stipulated, in this sense: that 
regulators’ decisions could be subject to appeal not only to courts but also to the
25relevant political authority -  which had the power to modify those decisions ; that 
the regulatory agency would have the obligation to publish information and advice to 
all interested parties26; and that the regulator’s accounts and performance would be 
scrutinised internally by Sindicatura General de Empresas Publicas, and externally
r 27by the Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nacion .
23 Article 6 (t) o f  the decree 1185/90.
24 It is important to note in this regard that, although the agency would be responsible for proposing its 
own organisational structure, Article 19 o f  the decree 1185/90 established that the latter would be 
subject to approval by the Executive office.
25 The arrangements for appealing CNT’s decisions were stipulated in article 33 o f  the Decree 1185/90.
26 Regarding the powers o f the regulators to publish the information supplied to them by operators, 
Article 32 o f  the decree 1185/90 the decree established that firms would be entitled to ask the regulator 
to keep their information confidential, but it would be up to the regulator whether to keep it as such or 
to release it.
27 Benedetti and Petrecolla (1999) argue that although these arrangements were advances in the right 
direction, policymakers should have complemented them with other key safeguards o f  accountability 
such as: obliging the regulator to publicise their decisions and to give reasons for them, requiring it to 
produce an annual report on the agency’s activities, and imposing the duty to carry out public hearings 
before deciding on important issues. The authors note that, on the issue o f  public hearings, Article 30 
o f the decree strangely established that, only after January 1994, it was up to the CNT whether to carry 
out a public hearing when considering issues “with severe social repercussion”. The article in question 
also stipulated that only those parties authorised by CNT were allowed to take part in that procedure.
92
3. Regulatory stability during the Menem years (1990-1999).
3.1. The early days (1990- 1992)
The first incarnation of CNT was staffed entirely by former employees of the
Secretariat of Communications and ENTel. In fact, some o f them became executive
28officers of the newly created regulatory agency . According to Hill and Abdala 
(1993:25), this group had no experience in regulation and little vision as to the role of 
a regulator. Moreover, they were not associated with the moderate portion of 
Menem’s party that backed reform and had neither supported the privatisation nor 
expected it to succeed29. In these authors’ view, this would explain why the regulatory 
authorities did little to put the regulatory framework outlined by the decree into 
action.
As a result, important decisions were not taken, and the work of the authority began to 
pile up30. Moreover, the CNT’s methods of decision-making were problematic. 
Although the legislation provided few incentives for the regulators to follow an open 
and transparent process, their decisions were rather idiosyncratic and made on the 
basis of personal relationships (Hill and Abdala, 1993:25-27).
28 CNT's first board o f  director was composed by Raul Jose Otero (president), Jorge Angel Aguirre, 
Humberto Garuti, Mahamad Chain - all o f  them appointed in the presidential decree 2068/90. In 
December 1990, the board was completed with the appointment o f  Armando Achem in representation 
o f the Federal Council o f  Communications -  appointed in the decree 2714/90. A lso in December, and 
when the executive augmented the number o f  commissioners to six, Alfredo Parodi was appointed to 
complete the list (Decree 2729/90).
29 See also Rhodes (2002).
30 It soon became clear that the newly appointed regulators were not w illing -  or lacked the capacity -  
to address issues such as imbalances in rates between services, develop standards and processes for 
issuing licenses, issue licenses in time, effectively address consumer complaints, or review and verify 
whether the companies were meeting the performance targets set for them under their contracts (Hill 
and Abdala, 1993).
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In early 1991, the Ministry of Public Works was merged with the Ministry of 
Economy. This brought CNT under the purview of the new Minister of Economy, 
Domingo Felipe Cavallo. As inflation had begun to accelerate again, Cavallo’s 
priority was to restore macro economic stability. Therefore, the problems generated 
by CNT’s sluggishness were not at the top of the minister’s agenda.
The introduction of the Convertibility Law in March 1991, however, changed the 
situation. The main component of this law was the anchoring of Argentina’s exchange 
rate to the dollar in a one-to-one convertibility scheme. In response to accelerating 
inflation, moreover, another part o f the law banned all price indexing formulas that 
were linked to the Argentine Consumer Price Index (CPI). As pointed out by 
Urbiztondo (2002), this made the telecommunications tariff formula void since it was 
governed by a price-cap formula that adjusted prices relative to the Argentine CPI31.
As explained by Hill and Abdala (1993:25), the repeal o f the indexing formula meant 
that the nominal price of telephone services was frozen and subject to erosion by 
inflation. Under the terms of the Pliego and transfer agreements, any modification of 
the terms of the exclusive licenses was subject to compensation. However, CNT’s 
authorities did nothing to replace the existing indexing formula. They argued that, 
despite being frozen, telecommunications tariffs were high enough.
31 More precisely, the Pliego established that during the two years following the transfer, the companies 
could adjust their prices monthly to keep pace with changes in the CPI. In addition, it provided that 
during that period they could increase their real prices every six months if  CNT determined that real 
price increases were needed to provide licensees a 16% rate o f  return on their investment. For the next 
five years, meanwhile, the Pliego established that prices would be governed by a “price cap” formula. 
The maximum increase allowed would be the change in the CPI less 2 percentage points. Finally, if  the 
companies were granted an extension in their licenses, it was instituted that the price cap would be the 
CPI less 4 percentage points.
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In response to CNT’s inaction, the companies refused to participate in the preparation 
of the prospectuses for the public sale of the government’s remaining shares in the 
companies. Eventually, this forced the government to negotiate. Nevertheless, it was 
the Ministry of Economy -  and not the CNT -  who carried out the negotiations with 
the companies. The solution finally reached was to modify the formula from 
Argentine pesos to U.S. dollars32. That is, tariffs would be expressed in dollars and 
would be adjusted each semester according to changes in the U.S. PP133.
3.2. The first round of changes (1992 -  1993).
CNT’s poor performance and failure to act was also having implications outside the 
telecommunications sector. It undermined the credibility o f the government’s 
privatisation program among investors and, hence, the political feasibility of future 
privatisations of other state-owned monopolies. In December 1991, therefore, the 
Under-Secretariat of Communications was recreated in the Ministry of Economy and 
Public Works, thus bringing CNT under closer scrutiny by the economic authorities34.
One month later, following the publication of a World Bank report that highlighted 
the deficiencies of the regulatory agency, the government instituted an administrative 
intervention of CNT, replacing its president and commissioners with an interventor
35and four deputy interventors . It should be noted that, in Argentina, administrative
32 The new tariff formula was established in the decree 2585/91.
33 Since domestic inflation did not converge to international standards until the second half o f  1992, 
and cumulative inflation since the beginning o f  convertibility had been 62.2%, the firms took the 
changes in the formula as a violation o f  their licenses, and initiated (unsuccessfully) legal actions in an 
attempt to get the cumulative difference according to the old formula (Artana et al., 1996 and Artana et 
al„ 1998).
34 German Kammerath, was appointed Under Secretary.
35 Jose Palazzo was appointed interventor and Jose Sanchez Elias, Federico Pinedo, Elizabeth Remedi 
and Ricardo Femandez, deputy interventors. Decrees 136/92, 349/92, 748/92 and 749/92.
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interventions are normally used only in extraordinary cases -  generally where 
mismanagement has taken place -  and for limited periods of time. Thus, by choosing 
to administratively intervene CNT for a period of twelve months, the government 
intended not to create a bad precedent, and signalled that this was an exceptional 
circumstance.
According to Hill and Abdala (1993:27), unlike the commissioners they replaced, the 
interventors were associated with the political coalition supporting economic reform 
and, in particular, with Minister Cavallo. Motivated by beliefs in the value of 
economic liberalisation and competition, they were faced with two main tasks. First, 
they needed to address the pressing backlog of regulatory decisions left by the agency 
inaction in the first year. Second, they had to chart out CNT’s future strategy for the 
long term, and ensuring the availability of the resources to implement this strategy. 
Although the short-term issues inevitably dominated CNT’s agenda during the first 
months of the intervention, some actions to foster the agency’s regulatory capacity 
were also undertaken. In collaboration with the World Bank, the Under-Secretariat of 
Telecommunications formulated a plan for developing CNT’s administrative, 
organizational, and regulatory capacity.
Despite the progress on many fronts, the uncertainty surrounding the whole regulatory 
regime -  and the decisions made within it -  was not eliminated. Although the 
administrative intervention of the regulatory agency was extended twice for another 
180 days36, officials at the Ministry of Economy were aware that the intervention of
36 Decree 1095/92 and 760/93.
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the agency was a transitory arrangement and, if  they wanted to gain more control of 
the sector’s regulation, they would have to achieve it through other means.
Encouraged by its success with the stabilisation and reform program, the economic 
authorities gained increasing formal control of the regulatory agency. In October 
1992, following the approval of the Ley de Administracion Financiera y  Sistemas de 
Control, they severely limited CNT’s access to the funds raised to finance its 
activities (FIEL, 1999). Similarly, in April 1993, and with the intention of curtailing 
the power of provinces in regulatory decisions, they sought a presidential decree that 
partially changed the institutional arrangements for appointing CNT’s authorities37. 
As discussed above, the decree 1185/90 provided that one of CNT’s commissioners 
would be appointed by the executive following the proposal of the Federal Council of 
Communications. The new legislation, instead, granted more discretion to the 
executive in the appointment process38. It stipulated that the executive would be
“J Q
entitled to choose one of the three candidates proposed by the Council .
In October 1993, the administrative intervention controlling the CNT finally came to 
an end and new regulatory authorities were appointed following a rather ad hoc open 
call and contest40. These changes, nevertheless, came along with another important
37 Most o f  the provinces, even those controlled by the ruling party, had a rather conflictive relationship 
with the national economic authorities.
38 Decree 761/93.
39 The decree also established that, unlike other commissioners who would be appointed for a period o f  
five years, renewable for one additional term, the commissioner representing the Council would be 
appointed for just one year, renewable for four additional terms.
40 By means o f  the presidential decree 2161/93, Rinaldo Colome was appointed president o f  the 
regulatory agency. Its board o f  directors was completed with the appointment o f  Carlos Alberto 
Killian, Isaac Ruben Salmun, Roberto Carlos Door, Henoch Aguiar and Hector Mario Carril -  the last 
one on behalf o f  the Federal Council o f  Communications. In June 1994, Rinaldo Colome exchanged 
positions with the Subsecretary o f Communications, Oscar Gonzalez (Decree 961/94). This exchange 
o f positions was another indicator o f  the government’s disregard for the rules o f  the game regarding the 
appointment and removal o f  regulators and, above all, for the independence o f  the regulatory agency.
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transfer of CNT’s responsibilities in favour of the economic authorities41. Indeed, the 
presidential decree 2160/93 established that it would now be the responsibility o f the 
newly created Secretariat of Public Works and Communications -  in the ambit of the 
Ministry of Economy -  deciding on critical regulatory issues such as:
a) policy definition in the telecommunications sector in Argentina;
b) approval o f compatibility standards, quality requirements, and interconnection 
rules;
c) definition of rates, rights, and fees in the field of telecommunications in 
Argentina (and, consequently, a substantial portion of CNT’s funds);
d) advising the Executive on whether new services supplied in the 
telecommunications market should be introduced under an exclusive license;
e) the award and cancellation of licences (provided in competition);
f) the extension of the exclusivity regime (when such extension is contemplated 
in the license);
g) the regulation, control, fiscalisation and verification of the conditions under 
which licenses are granted;
h) the amendment of licenses (when the possibility of introducing them is 
contemplated in the license, and subject to the consent of licensees -  and 
approved by the executive in the case of exclusive licenses);
i) all the issues referred to international agreements, treaties, and services;
This decree also introduced other important changes in the regulatory governance of 
the sector. First, it cancelled some of requirements originally set up in order to ensure
41 Decree 2160/93.
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that regulators were at an arm’s length relationship with operators42. Second, it 
considerably limited the attributes of institutional autonomy and managerial flexibility 
originally endowed to the regulatory agency. It was established that CNT’s budget 
would need to be approved by the Secretariat of Public Works and Communications 
before its inclusion in the national budget. Moreover, it was also decided that the 
agency’s powers to contract external consultants would be subject to the Secretariat's 
consent. Finally, the decree 2160/93 also limited the regulator’s powers to carry out 
public hearings. In this respect, it established that in order to do so, it would first need 
to obtain the Secretariat’s authorisation.
3.3. The second round of changes (1993 -1996)
By the time all the changes discussed above were introduced, however, the industry’s 
main concern had changed. Beginning in the early 1990s, the newly privatised 
companies began to face competition on international calls from call-back services43. 
With the increasing penetration of these services, its providers were gradually cream- 
skimming the licensees’ market and, thus, making the tariff structure unsustainable44.
42 More specifically, although the new legislation also included explicit rules prohibiting regulators 
from holding a position or an interest in a firm subject to their control, similar to those originally 
stipulated in the decree 1185/90, these prohibitions did not extend any more to the commissioners’ 
immediate family, nor were they complemented by restrictions on previous and subsequent 
employment.
43 With call-back, a customer in Argentina who wanted to make an international call would dial an 
exchange in the United States signalling the number without completing the call. The original number 
would be left, and the U.S. exchange would then place the call at the cheaper U .S. rates. Although call­
back services were cumbersome to use, frequent callers found them worthwhile, given the high tariffs 
o f  international calls in Argentina.
44 Note that for many years the telecommunications tariff structure in Argentina used long distance 
communications to subsidise the development o f  local networks and the universal service. Since the 
technology available did not allow competition, the introduction o f  these cross subsidies was out o f  the 
question. At the end o f  the 1980s, moreover, when the country was in the grip o f  hyperinflation, the 
structure o f  cross-subsidies in favour o f  urban residential customers became even more exaggerated as 
the government decided to protect low-income customers from the sharp decline in real earnings 
(Navajas and Porto, 1990; and Porto and Navajas, 1989). Thus, when the sector was privatised in 1990, 
the tariff structure in place was plagued by distortions that, in most cases, did not respond to an
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As discussed earlier in this chapter, the introduction o f the Convertibility Law in 1991 
led to a significant change in the tariff formula. This change was only accepted by 
licensees under the condition that they would be allowed to change the structure of 
prices set up at the time of privatisation. In April 1992, a presidential decree ratified 
that agreement and established that the rebalancing o f tariffs -  which was also 
contemplated in the privatisation Pliego -  should be instituted in June that year45. 
More than two years later, nevertheless, no advance had been made in this matter.
As pointed out by Abdala and Spiller (1999:56), two factors help to explain 
regulators’ reluctance to introduce changes to the tariff structure. First, they 
acknowledged that what was at stake was an important and politically costly transfer 
of rents from residential users (who made an intensive use o f local calls and by a large 
majority lived in the city of Buenos Aires) to commercial and professional users as 
well as to users located in the rest o f the country (who made an intensive use of long 
distance and international calls). Second, regulators took into account that it was 
unlikely that the economic authorities would accept changes that could introduce an 
alteration in inflation rates and, hence, affect their stabilization efforts.
In October 1993, the new regulatory authorities formally authorised the use of the call 
back46. This was the perfect excuse for the companies to increase their pressure for 
fulfilment of the rate adjustments agreement of 1991. The pressures proved to be
economic rationale (FIEL, 1999; Urbiztondo and Gomez-Ibanez, 2002). At that time these distortions 
were so prominent that the accounting company Price Waterhouse recommended the government to 
rebalance the tariff structure before privatising. However, since that could have jeopardised the 
feasibility o f  the whole process, the government opted not to introduce major changes to the tariff 
scheme and left these changes for later (Rhodes, 2002).
45 Decree 506/92.
46 Less than a year before, the CNT had banned its use arguing that it constituted an abusive use o f  the 
basic telephone service. The decision, nevertheless, was never implemented due to the extremely high 
cost o f  enforcing it.
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effective. In fact, the Undersecretary of Telecommunications and the companies 
started negotiations on a rebalancing proposal presented by the latter. In September 
1994, press information reported that they had reached an agreement. Immediately 
thereafter, however, a consumer organisation filed an action de amparo -  a measure 
similar to an injunction -  demanding that the government should be prohibited from 
instituting any change in the tariff scheme until the government plans were openly 
discussed in a public hearing. The presiding judge granted a preliminary injunction to 
give himself time to study the case. This decision eventually resulted in the 
intervention of the Economic Minister and the holding of the first public hearings in 
the sector since its privatisation (Rhodes, 2002).
As Argued by Artana et al. (1998), the proposal put forward by the companies was 
very unsatisfactory both from an efficiency and a welfare point of view. In short, it 
‘solved’ the required rebalancing (too high international and long distance domestic 
charges and too low rental charges and local call rates) with a modest reduction in the 
former, and a similar increase in the latter. However, it also disguised a big increase in 
tariffs by proposing a segmentation of the main metropolitan area (Buenos Aires) 
whereby local calls would be classified as short distance domestic calls, i.e., reducing 
the geographical definition of urban area.
Once it became public, the proposal aroused a wave of criticisms and suspicion not 
only from well-informed analysts but also from important interest groups -  notably, 
consumer organisations and opposition legislators -  which used the hearings carried 
out in November in the cities of Buenos Aires and Mendoza as a good opportunity to 
loudly voice their opposition to the proposed adjustment. With economic arguments
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being relegated to a second place, press coverage o f the dispute was, in general, 
favourable to the case against adjustment. Given the proximity of the next presidential 
elections, and fearing that any resolution of this rather conflictive issue could 
negatively affect its electoral prospects, the government decided to postpone any 
decision on the issue at stake until after the elections.
As the discussions on the rebalancing gained public relevance strong disagreements 
on the issue began to appear within the government, particularly, between the 
regulators vs. officials in the Ministry of Economy (Abdala and Spiller, 1999). While 
the latter favoured an increase in local calls to compensate reductions in long distance 
and international calls, the former contended that the rebalancing o f tariffs did not 
necessarily require an increase in local calls. In their view, companies should not be 
compensated for a cut in the price of international calls, since these cuts were a 
natural product of the competition that resulted by technological advances (such as the 
call back). Officials in the Ministry of Economy, conversely, feared that any 
rebalancing with adverse effects on the revenues of companies would be perceived as 
a form of expropriation.
In May 1995, the tensions between the regulators and the Ministry of Economy 
culminated in the resignation of a couple of CNT’s commissioners, including its 
president. Almost immediately, and with the purpose of gaining complete control of 
the agency, officials in the Ministry of Economy obtained a presidential decree that 
established the second administrative intervention o f the regulatory body47. The 
argument used to justify this decision was that, with the resignation of its president,
47 Decree 702/95. This decree also established the appointment o f  Raul Agiiero as Interventor.
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the regulatory body was headless. The presidential decree that stipulated the 
administrative intervention of the agency also provided another important change in 
the rules of the game. It established that appeals to CNT’s decisions would now be 
decided directly by the Minister o f Economy.
Based on the negative experience of the 1994 hearings, the UnderSecretariat of 
Communications, which fell under the Control of the newly created Secretariat of 
Energy and Public Works of the Ministry of Economy, decided to take direct control 
o f the rebalancing process and hired the international consulting firm National 
Economic Research Associates (NERA) to complete a report on issue. This report 
was presented by mid 1995 and, in it, the consultants strongly criticised the licensees’ 
rebalancing proposal, arguing that its approval would have generated an important 
increase in the companies’ profits. Moreover, they advanced a new technical proposal 
for adjusting rates with seven different options, depending upon the constraints that 
one could include in the adjustment process (Nera, 1995).
These options were discussed in a second round of public hearings, which took place 
in January 1996. Immediately thereafter, the Minister of Economy issued a resolution 
ordering the secretary o f energy and public works to make a decision on the 
adjustment rates, after the companies had chosen one of the options of the NERA 
report. This resolution, which could be construed as a direct government involvement
4 o
in fixing rates , was never implemented, though.
48 The Pliego explicitly provided that the government was not entitled to fix or change (or even propose 
a change to) tariffs.
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3.4. The third round of changes (1996 -  1997)
Since his appointment in 1991, the relationship between President Menem and his 
minister of economy had never been free of conflict. Menem was a politician and his 
background lay in Peronism -  a tradition of populism, protectionism, open state 
purse-strings and state nannying, especially in creating industry and providing jobs49. 
Cavallo, meanwhile, was an economist and his practice was almost the opposite: 
economic and fiscal rigour, opening of the markets, privatisation, etc. Despite the 
minister’s constant clashes with other ministers and leading members of the ruling 
party, this was the formula that defeated hyperinflation at the start o f the 1990s and 
then brought three years o f spectacular growth. As argued by Corrales (1997), Menem 
needed Cavallo, and that explains why he repeatedly backed his awkward subordinate 
and, as discussed above, granted him vast discretionary powers over economic policy.
Shortly after the re-election of President Menem in May 1995, this began to change. 
The Mexican crisis that started in the last months of 1994 had strong spillover effects 
on the Argentinean economy. As it happened in other emerging markets, Argentina 
entered into a sharp recession in 1995 and unemployment reached unprecedented 
levels. In this context, the economic authorities were forced to introduce several 
unpopular measures such as cuts in social spending. Although by the end of that year 
growth resumed again, unemployment remained high and, for the first time in many 
years, voters were showing discomfort with the management o f the economy. In 
August 1995, to make things worse, an intense fight started between the president and 
Cavallo over the control of the post office privatisation process. Since then, not only it
49 For an in depth discussion on M enem's relationship with the values and ideas o f  traditional 
Peronism, see Szusterman (2000).
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became clear that Cavallo no longer enjoyed the favour o f the president but also that 
his dismissal was a simple matter of time50.
As in the past, the telecommunications sector was affected by the ups and downs in 
the relationship between the president and his subordinate. In March 1996, shortly 
after the minister ordered the secretary of energy and public works to make a decision 
on the rebalancing of tariffs, the president removed the Under-Secretariat o f 
Communications, and consequently CNT, from the Ministry o f Economy. By means 
of a presidential decree, the office was upgraded to the rank of a Secretariat reporting 
directly to the president51. With the clear objective o f curtailing Cavallo's powers, 
moreover, it was established that the newly appointed Secretary of Communications 
would not only have all the roles and responsibilities previously in the hands of the 
Minister of Economy, but additionally, he would be responsible for:
a) advising the executive on the definition and execution o f telecommunications 
policy, supervising its enforcement and proposing an adequate regulatory 
framework;
b) providing assistance, together with the regulatory bodies, in the control of 
telecommunication services’ operators;
c) generating proposals on the optimal mechanisms for protecting consumers’ 
rights;
d) preparing projects on regulatory legislation;
e) and co-ordinating the implementation of telecommunication policies 
established by the executive.
50 In July 1996, finally, Cavallo was forced to resign and a new minister o f  economy was appointed.
51 Decree 245/96.
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Complementing these changes, two months later, another presidential decree restored 
to CNT many of its original roles and responsibilities -  which, as already discussed, 
had been cut in 1993 in favour of the Minister of Economy52. It should be noted, 
however, that this last decree did not represent a return to the allocation of regulatory 
roles and responsibilities between political officials and regulators instituted at the 
time of privatisation. Indeed, the new configuration of regulatory powers left the 
former with a much bigger stake in regulatory policy than in 1990. That is, although 
the last round of changes reversed the cut in regulators’ powers established in 1993, 
this did not come along with a limitation in those regulatory powers that political 
authorities had increasingly taken over since the creation of the regime.
The changes did not end there. In April 1996, a presidential decree established a 
comprehensive modification of the structure of the national bureaucracy53. Among 
other changes, it provided the fusion of CNT with the postal services’ regulator 
(Comision Nacional de Correos y  Telegrafos) and the creation of the National 
Communications Commission (CNC). Despite new directors being appointed54, the 
regulatory agency continued to be run through administrative intervention.
Once in the ambit of the president, the executive expanded the role of political 
authorities in the regulation of telecommunications even further. In addition to the 
powers already granted to the Secretary of Communications, and by means of two 
presidential decrees, the executive established that it would also be this secretary’s 
responsibility to institute the prime regulation for the provision of telecommunications
52 Decree 515/96.
53 Decree 660/96.
54 Alberto Gabrielli was appointed as president.
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and postal services55. According to the new legislation, that comprised instituting the 
prime regulation of: interconnection; quality o f service; use of the radio electric 
spectrum (as well as rates, rights and fees for its use); management o f satellite 
services; imposition of sanctions against independent operators; provision of 
accounting and cost information by licensees and their related firms; and customers’ 
rights and obligations (of both basic and mobile telephony). Furthermore, the decrees 
in question also granted the Secretariat responsibility for deciding on other critical 
regulatory issues such as granting and cancelling licenses (provided in competition), 
authorisations and permits; proposing the tariff policy for regulated services, and 
approving the tariffs o f those provided under exclusivity or without effective 
competition; approving interconnection rules; representing the country with 
international telecommunications institutions; and setting up the procedures for 
carrying out public hearings and other consultation mechanisms. Last but not least, it 
was also established that it would be the task of the Secretary of Communications “to 
instruct CNC about the regulatory policies to follow” and “intervene” in the agency’s 
organisation56.
As discussed above, the May 1996 presidential decree had given back the regulator’s 
original role and responsibilities. Thus, most of the legislative changes introduced 
thereafter during the year, resulted in a potentially conflictive duplication of 
responsibilities between the political and regulatory authorities. In January 1997, 
however, the executive introduced a major cut in the role and responsibilities o f the 
regulatory agency57. More specifically, it was established that CNC’s regulatory 
functions would now have to be pursued in conformity with the policies defined by
55 Decrees 1260/96 and 1620/96.
56 Decree 1620/96, Annex II, point 7 and 14.
57 Decree 80/97.
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the executive through the Secretariat of Communications. Moreover, it was explicitly 
provided that in most regulatory issues -  notably, the critical ones -  CNC would act 
as a mere advisory body to the Secretary of Communications.
The changes to the status quo introduced by this last presidential decree also affected 
other critical components of the sector’s framework within which regulatory decisions 
were made. First, it was established that CNC would now be headed by eight 
members -  one president, two vice-presidents, and 5 commissioners. The president, 
vice-presidents and four of its commissioners would be appointed for a period o f five 
years, with the possibility o f being re-appointed for one additional term. The 
commissioner appointed in representation of the provinces, meanwhile, would 
continue to be appointed by the executive for a period o f one year, but with the 
possibility of being re-appointed for one additional term -  and not any more for four 
terms, as established in April 1993 in the decree 761/93. Second, it was stipulated that 
the agency’s budget would need to be approved by the Secretary of Communications. 
Third, it was decided that CNT’s accounts and performance would now be scrutinised 
externally by the Auditoria General de la Nation.
3.5. The rebalancing of tariffs and its aftermath (1997-1999).
While all the changes discussed above were taking place, officials in the newly 
created Secretariat of Communications decided to adopt a more decisive approach to 
implementing the much delayed adjustment in tariffs. One of their first actions was to 
repeal the ministerial resolution issued in February that ordered the sector’s 
authorities to make a decision on the adjustment rates, after the companies had chosen
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one of the options of the NERA report. In September 1996, moreover, a consultation 
document was published on the issue.
Shortly after its publication, however, consumer organisations and other interest 
groups strongly criticised the mechanism on the grounds of the short period of time 
(one month) that they were given to submit responses. In reactions to these critiques, 
the Secretariat’s authorities opted to establish a new mechanism for the rebalancing to 
take place. This new mechanism did not differ much from that adopted in 1994. That 
is, in line with the provisions of the Pliego, it was established that the government 
could not propose any adjustment but, instead, it could only evaluate and decide on 
proposals made by the companies (with the final consent o f the firms).
In October 1996, the licensees presented a new rebalancing proposal, which closely 
resembled one of the alternatives suggested in NERA’s report. In a nutshell, the new 
proposal included an 80% increase in the rental charge; an average increase of 50% in 
local call rates; the adoption of larger differentials for peak hours tariffs; a decrease 
between 15% and 59% in national long distance calls; a decrease of 55% in 
international calls; and the elimination of free minutes embodied in the low tariff 
structure, which was compensated with the creation of a low user scheme to protect 
low-income consumers.
A public hearing was carried out to discuss the proposal in December 1996. The 
hearing was carried out in Posadas, a provincial capital located 1000 km away from 
Buenos Aires. Although by carrying it out there the Secretariat authorities sought to
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avoid the pressure of pro-urban interest groups, the hearing ended up being a heated 
reiteration of old arguments by both the opponents and supporters of the rebalancing.
As discussed above, as 1997 started, the last round of changes in the sector’s
CO #
governance were already in place . The government decided to put an end to this 
lengthy and extremely conflictive process and go ahead with the adjustment. In 
February, it established a new tariff scheme by means o f the presidential decree 
92/97. This introduced some modifications to the proposal discussed in the last public 
hearing. As pointed out by Abdala and Spiller (1999) and Artana et al. (1998), these 
amendments were intended to make the adjustment less abrupt and, therefore, reduce 
the expected political opposition to the rebalancing. Among other things, they made 
the increase in the residential rental charge and in the price o f local calls considerably 
lower than those requested by the firms. It should be noted, however, that with the 
exception of short distance interurban calls, the reductions in the prices o f both 
interurban and international calls were in general less sharp than those proposed by 
the firms.
Contrary to the expectations o f many government officials, the introduction of the 
new tariff scheme was not the end of this story. In a few weeks, there were dozens of 
lawsuits demanding the interruption of the adjustment in telephones rates, with a few 
demanding the opposite. Contributing to generate a rather confusing situation, the 
judges’ responses to these demands were far from homogeneous. In fact, although
58 On the last day o f  January, moreover, the government decided to put an end to CNC’s administrative 
intervention and appoint new directors: Roberto Catalan was appointed CNC's president (Decree 
88/97),Roberto Uanini first vice-president (Decree 89/97), and Hugo Zothner second vice-president 
(Decree 90/96). The board was completed with the appointment o f  Federico Lujan de la Fuente 
(Decree 1648/96), Alberto Jesus Gabrielli (Decree 48/97), Patricio Feune de Colombi (Decree 68/97), 
Antonio Salim Name (Decree 91/97), and Maria Alarcia in representation o f  the Federal Council o f  
Communications (Decree 358/98).
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most of them decided that the rebalancing was illegal and, therefore, companies 
should not charge according to the new tariff scheme, a judge in Cordoba ruled in 
favour of the adjustment59. The reaction of the companies to this situation was not 
uniform. The northern company (Telecom) decided to go ahead with the adjustment, 
while the southern one (Telefonica) did not send out any bills in Mendoza and Buenos 
Aires in reaction to the legal actions and possible fines. By mid year, the situation was 
rather chaotic and all the relevant actors waited for a Supreme Court ruling. It soon 
became clear, however, that this ruling would be postponed until after the October 
parliamentary election60.
The presidential decree introducing the new tariff scheme did more than to trigger the 
involvement of the courts. Motivated by its salience and the proximity o f the next 
legislative elections, opposition legislators also moved rapidly to capitalise on the 
popular discontent with the new tariff scheme and introduced several bills that 
provided the rejection of the decree 92/97. Moreover, they called the Secretary of 
Communications to explain the provisions of the decree before the Communications
Committee both in the in the Senate and the chamber of Deputies61. Although in more
62moderate terms, legislators of the ruling party also questioned the tariff adjustment . 
In this sense, while some of them advocated the amendment of the decree in question, 
most did not favour challenging the executive’s decision. Instead, they chose to sign a
59 For a more detailed review o f  the judicial decisions on this matter, see Artana et al. (1998) and Vispo 
(1999).
60 See La Nacion 16/04/97,24/12/97,05/02/98,06/05/98; and Ambito Financiero 27/03/97, 16/04/97, 
27/08/97, and 29/08/97.
61 Seven months later, in September 1997, Kammerath was called again to the lower chamber’s 
Communications Committee. On that occasion, he was required to explain the developments in the 
implementation o f  the rebalancing o f  tariffs and in the process to award PCS licenses, which was also 
the object o f  an intense legal battle. See La Nacion, 18/09/97.
62 Most o f  the peronist legislators who opposed the new tariff scheme belonged to those districts 
negatively affected by the rebalancing (notably, Capital Federal and Buenos Aires). See La Nacion, 
14/02/97; 28/02/97; 01/03/97 and Ambito Financiero 13/02/97.
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statement where they committed to create a legislative committee that would study 
and propose a rapid liberalisation of the market63.
The limits to Congress’ action to reverse the changes introduced by the executive 
became evident when the session to discuss the decree failed due to the lack of 
quorum. In fact, only 68 out of 257 members of the Chamber of Deputies were 
present to discuss the issue . In the light o f this result, it became rather obvious that 
the legislative manoeuvres of those legislators who opposed the changes in the tariff 
scheme were basically publicity stunts. That is, they were opportunities to voice their 
disgust with those changes while showing that they attempted to change them. 
Knowing beforehand that their proposals would not succeed, their intention was not 
only to increase the salience of the issue but also to exploit it when campaigning in 
the subsequent election65.
In August 1997, the Bicameral Committee of State Reform and Monitoring of 
Privatisations (Comision Bicameral de Reforma del Estado y  Seguimiento de las 
Privatizaciones) made public its complaints regarding the presidential decree that 
introduced the rebalancing66. It should be noted, however, that the majority of its 
members did not focus their critiques on the provisions of the decree but on the fact 
that the executive had neither informed the committee about its plan to introduce
63 See La Nacion 04/03/97 and 05/03/97; and Ambito Financierol l/02/97and 09/04/97.
64 More than half (39) o f  those who were present that day, represented the City or the Province o f  
Buenos Aires. Moreover Ju st 9 belonged to the ruling party.
65 According to Rhodes (2002), the rebalancing o f  tariffs was an issue very present in the electoral 
campaign o f  opposition parties in 1997 legislative campaign and helps to explain the peronists defeat in 
those legislative elections.
66 The creation o f  this bicameral commitee was provided in the State Reform Law in 1990.
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changes to the contracts signed at the time of privatisation, nor had it required its 
opinion in this respect67.
A few months after the new tariff scheme was introduced, and despite the fact that it 
was already being implemented in most provinces, all the relevant actors knew that 
the future of the decree 92/97 depended on a decision of the Supreme Court. Given 
the composition of its members, few believed that Argentina’s highest tribunal would
CO
rule against the preferences of the executive . Indeed, on several occasions, 
government officials expressed their confidence in obtaining a favourable decision69.
In May 1998, the Supreme Court finally arrived to a decision on the rebalancing of
70tariffs . Briefly, the Court ruling provided not only that the presidential decree that 
established the new tariff scheme was legal but also that the judiciary was not entitled 
to intervene in the setting of tariffs, since that would result in an invasion of the 
jurisdiction of another branch of government. In its ruling, moreover, the Supreme 
Court argued that the rebalancing had been introduced following a legal procedure, 
which allowed all interested parties to present their view, and, therefore, the executive 
had not exceeded the limits of its powers.
As expected, the decision was gladly received by the government and, particularly, by 
the licensees. In the last months, some judges had gotten tough with the companies 
and had imposed substantial fines on them for charging according to the new tariff
67 See Ambito Financiero 25/08/97.
68 Five out o f  nine o f  the Supreme Court’s judges had been appointed by Menem.
69 See La Nacion 03/09/97.
70 Before that, the Attorney General was consulted on whether the Supreme Court should resolve the 
dispute. As contended by Urbiztondo (2000), the Attorney General’s reply was not clear and gave rise 
to further uncertainty.
113
scheme71. The Supreme Court cancelled those fines. In contrast, those who did not 
welcome the validation of the rebalancing were, once more, consumer organisations, 
the ombudsman and opposition legislators, who decried the Court’s lack of 
independence from the executive72. However, confronted with the Supreme Court’s 
decision that ratified the new tariff scheme, their room for manoeuvre was rather 
limited. The only way left to them to overturn the provisions of the decree 92/97 was 
getting Congress to pass a law annulling it.
As in early 1997, many legislators of the ruling party still opposed the rebalancing of 
tariffs provided in the decree 92/97. Indeed, press information indicated that almost 
half o f the peronist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies was ready to vote for the 
rejection of the decree in question73. Their dissatisfaction was not only limited to the 
changes in tariffs, but also with the performance of regulatory authorities. In fact, 
many of them pointed out that, despite the decree 92/97 explicitly requiring the 
regulators to carry out a regular assessment of the impact of the rebalancing on 
licensees’ earnings, almost a year and a half after the new tariff scheme had been 
instituted, the government had failed to produce this study. Moreover, influenced by 
the increasing profits that both Telefonica and Telecom had been reporting since the 
changes in the tariff scheme, many legislators suspected that the impact was far from 
being neutral.
Given this challenging scenario, president Menem personally urged peronist 
legislators of both chambers not to reverse the government’s tariff policy74. A week
71 See La Nacion 06/05/98 and Ambito Financiero 08/05/98.
72 See Ambito Financiero 08/05/98; and La Nacion 09/05/98.
73 See La Nacion 14/05/98.
74 See La Nacion 13/05/98.
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after the Court’s decision, the Secretary of Communications had appeared before the 
Chamber of Deputies and had strategically announced that, before arriving to any 
conclusion regarding the impact of the rebalancing on licensees' revenues, the 
Auditoria General de la Nacion -  which reported to Congress -  would have the 
opportunity to audit all the relevant figures75. In practice, knowing beforehand that the 
Auditoria did not have enough expertise and resources to carry out that task properly, 
this gave the executive the perfect excuse for even further delaying a resolution of this 
issue. However, it seems that these manoeuvres were enough to neutralize peronist 
legislators’ intents to reverse the rebalancing. In fact, the issue almost disappeared 
from the legislative agenda. As pointed out by Rhodes (2002), consumer 
organisations’ attention, meanwhile, turned towards the form in which telephone 
companies would collect payments from those who refused to pay or had not received
76their telephone bills during the controversy .
As 1998 ended, the most conflictive regulatory issue that the government had 
addressed was left behind. In March 1998, moreover, the government had also been 
able to decide on the extension of licensees’ exclusive rights and had, through the
77Liberalisation Plan, instituted the prime features of the future opening of the market .
75 See La Nacion 05/06/98.
76 The majority o f  consumers with overdue bills were clients o f  Telefonica, which did not send bills for 
two or even three billing periods in the Capital Federal and the province o f  Mendoza between February 
and October 1998. Telecom, meanwhile, had about 25,000 customers with overdue bills (Rhodes, 
2002).
77 Both the extension o f  the exclusivity period for two additional years and the provisions o f  the 
Liberalisation Plan were established in the Presidential Decree 264/98. Briefly, the Plan stipulated that, 
by the end o f  1999, and before the complete liberalisation o f  the market in November 2000, the 
government would grant two more licenses to provide fixed, local and long distance telephony 
services. The number o f  operators that could compete for those licenses was, however, strongly 
restricted. Indeed, the plan provided that these new licenses would be granted only to consortiums 
composed o f  companies that were already providing telecommunications services in the country and 
were not controlled by Telefonica or Telecom. In practice, that provision limited the number o f  
potential entrants to just two consortiums. Meanwhile, the number o f  operators that could only enter 
the national and international long distance market before the complete liberalisation o f  the market was 
also strongly restricted. In fact, following the provisions o f  the Plan, only three operators -  in addition
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For telecommunications authorities, thus, the months before the October 1999 
presidential elections were perhaps the least conflictive in almost a decade.
Nevertheless, the lack of significant conflicts did not mean that they remained 
inactive. Between January and December 1999, and assisted by the newly created 
UnderSecretariat of Communications, the Secretariat of Communications instituted a 
new numbering plan and carried out the bidding process for the selection o f PCS 
operators78. In addition, and following the provisions of the Liberalisation Plan, public 
telephony was liberalised, new licenses for the provision of basic telephony were 
granted, and, once the technical aspects of the process were set up, the long distance 
market began to operate in competition. Furthermore, a new universal service 
regulation was established79, and, almost two years after the formal deadline had 
expired, a report on the impact of the rebalancing on licensees’ revenues was finally 
published80.
to the four that could also provide basic telephony -  would be granted a license to provide this service. 
The plan, finally, also established the complete liberalisation o f  public telephony, a partial 
liberalisation o f  the mobile services, and the introduction o f  several “social” targets regarding the 
provision and operation o f  telecommunication services, notably, in rural areas. For an extensive review  
and analysis o f  the 1998 Liberalisation Plan, see Celani (2000) and Chambouleyron (1999).
78 Originally, the Secretariat o f  Communications did not allow the participation o f  Telefonica and 
Telecom. This, however, was later reversed by the courts and, finally, these companies were allowed to 
participate.
79 Resolution S.C. 18.971/99. It provided the creation o f  a Universal Service Fund through a levy 
imposed on operators. Initially, that levy would be 0.6% o f  operators’ revenue and, from then on, it 
would gradually increase to reach 1% in 2004.
80 The report concluded that the impact o f  the rebalancing on licensees' revenues had been almost 
neutral. More precisely, it concluded that the new tariff scheme resulted in an increase o f  just 0.3% and 
0.06% in Telefonica’s and Telecom 's revenues, respectively.
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4. Conclusions.
Having presented an in-depth analysis of the stability of the rules of the game 
governing the regulation o f the telecommunications sector between 1990 and 1999, 
one question that naturally follows: what does this case study tell us about the 
hypotheses advanced in the second chapter of this thesis?
1 believe that what the study of the telecommunications sector during Carlos Menem 
years unambiguously reveals is that those hypotheses do depict a valid representation 
o f the story. Indeed, as predicted, in December 1999 the rules o f the game governing 
telecommunications regulation in Argentina were only a pallid and rather distorted 
picture of the rules originally put in place shortly after the privatisation of the sector. 
Indeed, while in the beginning of the 90s the sector’s key regulatory powers were in 
the hands of an agency designed according to the recipes favoured by the 
development consensus, almost a decade later most of these powers were back in the 
hands of government officials and few of the arrangements originally established to 
safeguard the independence, autonomy, and accountability of the regulatory agency 
remained in place. Regulatory policy, moreover, was as unstable, and hence, time 
inconsistent, as it used to be before privatisation.
The analysis of this case also reveals that the policy commitments of the early 90s 
were not kept because it was pretty simple for the executive to renege on them. As 
predicted, two factors accounted for this. On the one hand, since the sector’s rules of 
the game had been defined in a presidential decree, the executive only needed to pass 
another decree for introducing changes to the status quo. That is, it never required the
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consent of other veto players -  notably Congress. On the other hand, as the analysis of 
the case clearly shows, once these changes were enacted neither Congress nor the 
judiciary were able to step in and force the executive to play by the rules it originally 
established. Indeed, of all the significant changes that the executive introduced to the 
status quo during the time period covered in this chapter, only one -  the rebalancing 
of tariffs -  was close to be reversed by these other veto players. Even in this case, 
however, the executive was able to ultimately impose its policy preferences.
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Chapter IV
Telecommunications regulation during De la Rua years (1999-2001).
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1. Introduction.
In December 1999, a new government came to office. As it is discussed in this 
chapter, most of its officials believed that the problem with the regulatory reforms 
undertaken by the previous administration was not in their titles but in the way they 
were implemented. And to illustrate this point, many took the case of 
telecommunications. They admitted that the privatisation of the sector in the early 90s 
had resulted in a dramatic improvement in the performance of the industry. In their 
view, however, the improvements in performance could have been even more 
remarkable if, among other things, regulatory policy in that sector had been less 
politicized and unstable. Therefore, by the time the new government took power, one 
of its policy commitments was to break with the past and refrain from constantly 
interfering with the rules of the game governing telecommunications regulation in 
Argentina.
But would the government be able to maintain this commitment? Following the 
hypothesis in this thesis, the answer to this question should be that, since the rules of 
the game in the sector were still defined through presidential decrees, it would be very 
unlikely to see the new government keeping its original promise. Put differently, if  the 
hypotheses in this thesis are valid, the following case study should corroborate that, 
like in the previous nine years, and despite the new government original intentions, 
telecommunications regulation between 1999 and the last days of 2001 was also 
subject to the changing whims of the executive’s preferences and, therefore, to 
constant changes in the rules o f the game.
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Of course, these assertions need to be tested empirically. And in order to do so, this 
chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I analyse some relevant background. 
Among other things, I discuss the determinants of Fernando de la Rua’s victory in the 
1999 presidential elections, and the political and economic challenges that his 
government faced immediately upon taking office. In section 3 , 1 discuss the issue o f 
the stability of the rules of the game in the telecommunications sector between 
December 1999 and December 2001. Like in the previous chapter, this discussion is 
divided into subsections. In the first the focus is on the time period between 
December 1999 and September 2000. In the second, 1 analyse the events between 
October 2000 and September 2001. In the third, finally, I discuss the circumstances 
that surrounded the last couple of months before the president’s resignation in 
December 2001. Section 4 concludes.
2. Background
On 24 October 1999, Fernando de la Rua was elected president defeating Eduardo 
Duhalde of the Peronist Party (PJ) by a margin of 49% to 38%. De la Rua won the 
election at the head of a coalition, known as the Alianza, between his own centrist 
Union Civica Radical (UCR) and the new center-left Front for a Country in Solidarity 
(FREPASO). Former economics minister Domingo Cavallo, running on the centre- 
right Action for the Republic party ticket, finished third with 10%.
As argued by Levitsky (2000), two developments were critical to this outcome. Over 
the course of the 1990s, fears of a return to hyperinflation faded and economic
121
stability was increasingly taken for granted. As a result, issues linked with the quality 
o f democracy -  devalued by a sector of the electorate during Menem’s first years in 
office -  gained salience. The emergence of these new issues such as corruption, 
education, and judicial independence, reshaped the dynamics of political competition, 
largely at the expense o f the Peronists. Because Menem fared poorly on most of these 
issues (particularly corruption), his image began to erode1.
A second and closely related development pointed out by Levitsky (2000), was the 
resurrection and unification of middle-class opposition. The UCR and FREPASO, 
which had been viewed as incapable of governing in the early mid 1990s, undertook 
two critical strategic changes in this respect. First, aware that they could not build a 
winning electoral alternative in opposition to the reforms introduced by Menem, 
leaders of both parties announced that they would not seek to undo these reforms . 
Second, the UCR and FREPASO formed the Alliance in August 1997, which ended 
the Peronist’s electoral ‘hegemony’ virtually overnight. With the bulk of the anti- 
Peronist vote united, the Peronist’s capacity to win elections with 40-45% of the vote 
was suddenly brought to question. Indeed, six months after its formation, the Alliance 
defeated the PJ by 46% to 36% in the 1997 legislative elections.
The October 1999 elections marked the consolidation of the aforementioned trends. 
De la Rua, who was the heavy favourite from the outset, managed to effectively 
present himself as a post-Menemist alternative, combining a promise of economic
1 In line with Levitsky (2000), Lewis (2002) argues that the 1999 Alliance victory can be attributed, 
first, to its acceptance o f  the broad feature o f  convertibility and, second, to the promise o f  clean 
politics.
2 Although the most important component o f  this promise was not modifying the provisions o f  the 
Convertibility Law, it also included maintaining the provision o f  public services in private hands and 
not reversing the advances made in the previous decade in trade liberalisation, the deregulation o f  
financial markets, etc.
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continuity with a clean government appeal. With his victory, many thought that there 
were real reasons for optimism regarding the future of the country. As Levitsky 
(2000) points out, for the first time in many years it seemed that Argentina had finally 
gotten its economics and politics right.
Reality, however, indicated that the new administration faced major challenges and, 
most importantly, significant shortcomings to address them (Corrales, 2002; Murillo, 
2002). Economically, the prospects for the new government were not encouraging. 
Among the market reformers of the 1990s -  and justified by the hyperinflation of 
1989-91 which called for drastic measures -  Argentina adopted the most inflexible 
exchange rate under the Convertibility Law of 1991 . This law obliged officials to 
uphold a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and banned the central 
government from printing money. This system, however, came with two tradeoffs. 
First, it purchased credibility because the government would not play dirty tricks with 
exchange rates. However, this was at the expense of competitiveness, and so the price 
of Argentine goods became expensive relative to the prices of Argentina’s trading 
partners. Second, it injected predictable rules, that is a non-changing exchange rate, at 
the expense of flexibility in fiscal and monetary policy. This made the country’s 
economy more susceptible to external shocks (Corrales, 2002; Mahon and Corrales, 
2002).
As argued by Corrales (2002), fixed exchange-rate regimes require impeccable fiscal 
accounts, very low deficits and low debt standards. Starting in 1997, however, 
Argentina began to fail in this regard. Rather than taking advantage of the economic
3 As argued by Corrales (2002:31), while the use o f  inflexible exchange rates to stabilise prices is not 
uncommon, Argentina’s approach was extreme.
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boom that year to lower the national debt and deficits, Argentina went on a spending 
and borrowing spree. This was because in 1997 President Menem decided to seek 
reelection to a third term, even though he faced formidable institutional and political 
obstacles4. Yet, Menem thought that with a good dose of populism -  which meant 
increasing spending and slowing down reforms -  he could manipulate political 
institutions and the public opinion to his advantage.
As pointed out by Corrales (2002:33) Menem’s quest for reelection against all 
institutional odds unleashed a spending race between the president and the leading 
Peronist governors who rejected his reelection plans. With an executive in desperate 
need for allies, and a group of party leaders desperate to contain him, fiscal prudence 
vanished. Everyone lost interest in fiscal austerity and in pushing for much needed 
reforms such as revamping the tax bureaucracy, introducing competition in the 
provision o f public services, liberalising labour markets, and reforming the revenue- 
sharing system between the federal government and the provinces. In the light of 
these developments, economic officials recommended raising taxes, decreasing 
expenditures, and using privatisation proceeds to make payments on the rising debt. 
But no one at the top cared. The only recourse left to economic officials was thus to 
increase the already high levels of public debt and to delay payments to public-sector 
suppliers. This, of course, only served to restore the “credibility deficit” that had 
plagued the state in the 1980s. Once again the government was in the business of 
cheating private agents, repeating the predatory behaviour of the previous decade. 
When the aftershocks of the Russian financial crisis hit Argentina in mid-1998, the 
concern of sceptical business leaders began to turn into widespread pessimism. When
4 It should be noted that the 1994 constitution explicitly prohibited the president’s reelection beyond a 
second term. Adding to this, the Argentine public was adamantly opposed to the idea.
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De la Rua took office in December 1999, the country had already entered into
recession.
In political terms, the context in which De la Rua took office was also very 
challenging. In the 1999 elections his coalition emerged four deputies short of a 
majority in the lower house of Congress. In addition, the Senate was still controlled 
by the Peronists, and a pro-Menem majority dominated in the Supreme Court. Unlike 
his predecessor, and to make things worse, the new president controlled neither the 
major labour unions nor many of the provincial governments5. Finally, because the 
new government was based on a coalition rather than a single party, everything 
indicated that policymaking would require constant negotiations between the UCR 
and FEPASO. As pointed out by Manzetti (2002), because these parties had never 
discussed how to turn an electoral partnership into a coherent government program, 
these negotiations were likely to become difficult and differences between the two 
parties were likely to arise over time6.
In sum, although De la Rua was elected for the explicit purpose of taking the country 
through “post-adjustment” politics -  i.e. increasing transparency, fighting institutional 
corruption, investing resources in social policy -  Menem’s legacy threw Argentina 
back to the adjustment stage. The new government was thus forced to regain the trust 
of investors that Menem destroyed in his last couple of years in office. Given the 
institutional and political constraints that it faced, however, its capacity to generate 
bold policy responses was rather limited.
5 In fact, the PJ dominated 14 out o f  24 governorships, including those o f  the three largest and most 
populated provinces (Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Santa Fe).
6 To make things even worse, the UCR’s party apparatus and most o f  its leaders in Congress were 
followers o f  one o f  De la Rua historical rivals: the former President Raul Alfonsin.
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3. Telecommunications regulation: new government and new preferences.
Within the new economic authorities, there was a sort of consensus that the results of 
the reforms introduced in the early 90s in the telecommunications sector were mixed. 
On the one hand, they admitted that the privatization of the industry had resulted in 
many positive outcomes. They were aware, that between 1991 and 1997, the 
telecommunications sector had attracted almost 20% of private investments in 
Argentina (Celani, 2000). As a consequence, the density of the service in 1999 (21 
lines per hundred inhabitants) more than doubled the 1990 figure (10.2 lines per 
hundred inhabitants)7. Moreover, while in 1990 only 13% of the network was 
digitalised, in 1999 that figure reached an impressive 100%8. Several indicators 
showed improved quality of service. Indeed, while in 1990 the average waiting time 
for repairs was 23 days, in 1999 it was just 2 days. Similarly, while in 1990 the 
average time to install a new line was 23.5 months, in 1999 it was less than 15 days 
(Chambouleyron and Viecens, 2002).
Many experts and government officials considered that these achievements were at 
the cost of high tariffs and therefore outstanding profits by the licensees (Levy and 
Spiller, 1996; Abdala and Spiller, 1999; Abeles et al., 1998, and Celani, 2000)9. In 
their view, better results could have been achieved had the regulatory framework been
7 The increase in the density o f  the service can also be explained by the progressive reduction in 
connection charges. In 1990 the commercial and professional connection charge reached US$ 2627. 
The residential connection charge was US$ 1050. In October 1998, all these charges had been reduced 
to US$ 150 (Abdala and Spiller, 1999:63).
8 The digitalisation o f  the networks allowed the provision o f  services -  apart from the simple 
transmission o f  voice -  such as Internet, data transmission and other added-value services.
9 According to Abdala and Spiller (1999), the average profit (as a percentage o f  their net worth) that 
Telefonica and Telecom obtained during the period between 1991 and 1998 was 11.78% and 10.50% 
respectively.
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less unstable and less subject to political considerations, notably in terms of 
investments, tariffs, and quality of service (Rozenwurcel and Cruces, 1998).
In contrast to the previous government, and in order to lower business costs and make 
the country’s economy more competitive, the winning coalition announced that their 
efforts would be focused on reducing telecommunication and other utility tariffs, 
introducing more competition in their provision, and on fostering more transparency 
and predictability in their regulation. In response to those who feared that this could 
lead to a rejection of the rule of law or an interventionist approach to regulation, they 
insisted that the new government would respect the existing rules of the game and that 
they would make no unilateral change in those rules10. They stressed that neither 
privatisation nor the key institutional arrangements established in the early 90s would 
be reversed. On the contrary, they made clear that if any change occurred, it would be 
with the consent of all relevant stakeholders and only with purpose of strengthening 
the existing regulatory regimes -  which, in their view, included granting the 
regulators more autonomy and independence as well as improving the accountability 
arrangements in place11.
10 These fears increased when shortly after the elections some rumours indicated that, inspired in the 
British experience, the new government was considering a one-off tax levied on the privatised utilities 
based on the extraordinary profits they obtained during the 90s. In the last days o f  October, however, 
the newly elected president emphatically rejected those rumours. See Ambito Financiero 27/10/99.
" See Ambito Financiero 28/10/99.
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3.1. Towards decree 264/00
Fernando de la Rua took office on the 10th of December, and, three days after, 
appointed a new Secretary of Communications12. Moreover, and by means o f a 
presidential decree, it was established that the Secretariat of Communications (and 
consequently CNC) would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the Presidency but of
13the Ministry of Infrastructure and Housing . The decree in question also listed the 
roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat. Surprisingly, and in contrast with what 
had been announced during the electoral campaign and the transition period, the 
provisions of the decree did not grant the regulatory body more powers, autonomy or 
independence. On the contrary, it confirmed that most of the key regulatory 
responsibilities would remain in the hands of political appointees -  in particular, the 
Secretary of Communications. A few days later, and with the only exception being the 
director appointed to represent the provinces, all the remaining directors of CNC were 
forced to resign and new ones were appointed14.
As mentioned above, one of the objectives of the incoming government was to reduce 
telecommunications tariffs. With this motivation in mind, a few days after taking 
office, a cut of 19.5% in the subscription charge for commercial users and a 5.5% 
reduction in the cost of urban calls for a limited group o f residential users was 
negotiated with operators. In April, moreover, the government announced that
12 Enoch Aguiar.
13 Decree 20/99.
14 At that time, the commissioner on behalf o f  the Federal Council o f  Communications was Jose 
Horacio Rufeil. His term ended in July 2000 and, from then on, his position remained vacant. The new  
authorities, appointed in the presidential decree 96/99, were Carlos Tristan Fomo (president), Carlos 
Alberto Killian (first vice-president), Raul Manuel Lisaguirre (second vice-president) and Guillermo 
Gustavo Klein. In July 2001, although there were still four positions vacant, the government appointed 
just one more commissioner: D iego Martin Nazareno (decree 1282/01).
128
telecommunications tariffs would not be further adjusted in line with United States’ 
Consumer Price Index.
Although the new authorities presented these agreements as an important achievement 
o f the new administration and as evidence of a change in the relationship between the 
government and telecommunication operators, industry experts and consumer 
associations did not share this view. Indeed, although they welcomed the 
government’s intention to cut telecommunications (and other utilities) tariffs, they 
objected that the reductions in question were actually minor15. They pointed out that if 
operators had agreed to lower their tariffs and not to adjust their tariffs according to 
the US’s inflation, it was simply because the government had promised to compensate 
them in future tariff revisions16.
In reaction to these critiques, telecommunications authorities responded that, for the 
first time in the many years, tariff reductions were being introduced not only for long 
distance calls but also for local calls. They announced, however, that the real 
reduction in tariffs would come along with the liberalisation of the market scheduled 
for November that year and that would involve, among other things, redefining the 
regulations governing licensing, interconnection, universal service, and use of the
17radio spectrum .
15 See La Nacion 15/12/99, 16/12/99, 17/12/99, 18/12/99 and 19/12/99; and Ambito Financiero 
15/12/99.
16 See Ambito Financiero 10/04/00.
17 In April, and following the passage o f  the Resolution S.C. 170/00, the Secretary o f  Communications 
issued four consultation documents on these issues.
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A variety of positions emerged as soon as the government made this announcement.
On the one side of the spectrum, potential entrants to the Argentine
telecommunications market advocated a dramatic reduction of entry barriers, which,
they claimed, involved an important reduction in interconnection charges and setting
18up a more flexible and entrant-friendly licensing regime . In their view, this would 
result in more competition in the market and, hence, in an expansion o f investments, 
better quality of services and lower prices19.
On the other end of the spectrum, incumbent companies claimed that, since there were
many cross subsidies still in place, a simple reduction of entry barriers -  such as a cut
in interconnection charges or a more flexible licensing regime -  would result in a
cream-skimming of the market by new entrants. And this, they claimed, would
seriously compromise their ability to finance the provision of service to the less
attractive segments of the market (notably, low income consumers and less populated
areas of the country)20. In their view, therefore, if the government was considering the
option of reducing entry barriers in the direction demanded by potential entrants, it
first needed to introduce changes to the existing rules of the game governing universal
21service as well as to the mechanisms to fund it .
18 At that time, the interconnection charge was fixed at $ 0.0235. N ew  entrants demanded reducing it to 
$ 0.01. See Ambito Financiero 06/06/00.
19 See La Nacion 17/05/00 and 06/06/00, and Ambito Financiero 05/06/00 and 06/06/00.
20 See Ambito Financiero 05/05/00 and 07/06/00.
21 Incumbents argued that in order to keep providing the service to the non-profitable segments o f  the 
market, all operators' contribution to the Universal Service Fund should be increased from 0.6% o f  
their revenue to 3%. See La Nacion 06/06/00. New entrants, meanwhile, argued that these demands 
were not justified. They claimed that i f  they were to contribute to the fund, their contribution should 
never exceed 1% o f  their revenue. See Ambito Financiero 06/06/00.
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It is important to note, however, that telecommunications companies were not the 
only stakeholders that had serious differences on how the de-regulation process 
should be implemented. Something similar happened within the government. Indeed, 
while the Minister of Infrastructure22 supported many of the incumbents' arguments 
and demands, the Secretary of Communications seemed to be more receptive towards 
entrants' claims .
The president’s trip to the United States in mid-June triggered several events that, 
once more, demonstrated the telecommunications regulatory regime’s fragility. The 
trip was scheduled for June 10th and, taking into account that most o f the potential 
entrants to the market were American firms, the Secretary of Communications 
regarded the trip as an excellent opportunity to announce the government’s policies 
for the sector. Therefore, a couple of days before that date, he passed a set of 
resolutions that drastically redefined the regulatory incentives that the previous 
government had set up for licensing, use of the radio spectrum, interconnection, and 
universal service24.
In contrast to the Menem administration’s model of managed deregulation, the new 
arrangements were clearly entrant-friendly, although they perhaps overemphasized 
assistance to entry while insufficiently attending to incentives for maintenance and
Sexpansion of the network . The life o f those regulations was extremely short,
22 Nicolas Gallo.
23 They estimated that the amount o f  investments that such an opening o f  the market would trigger 
could reach four billions dollars. See Ambito Financiero 06/06/00.
24 Resolution S.C. 259/00,260/00, 261/00, and 262/00.
25 For a detailed review o f  these regulatory arrangements, see Spiller (2000) and Urbiztondo (2002).
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however. Indeed, the day after they were passed, the Secretary of Coordination of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure passed a resolution that revoked them.
The whole situation was likely to turn into a fiasco. The president, however, did not 
leave the country with empty hands. A few hours before his departure, he signed a 
decree that ratified the scheduled date for the opening o f the market (November 8th), 
and set up a deadline (thirty days) for the ministries of economy and infrastructure to 
introduce all the relevant regulations26. The ministers were not given free hands, 
though. The decree was accompanied by a presidential instruction that comprised, in 
three annexes, a draft of the regulations in question and which were the same that had
27been introduced just a few days before by the Secretary of Communications .
The reactions to these events were almost immediate. In the view of potential 
entrants, the president’s decision to postpone a final pronouncement regarding the 
regulatory incentives that would be in place from November, not only introduced 
serious doubts about the government’s commitment to open the market but also 
opened the door to the lobby of incumbent companies . The latter, meanwhile, 
announced that if the government ratified the regulations drafted in the presidential 
instruction, they would challenge them in the courts and before international
29tribunals .
26 Decree 465/00.
27 It should be noted, however, that the presidential instruction did not comprise the draft o f  regulatory 
regime for the radio spectrum.
28 See La Nacion 14/06/00 and 15/06/00; and Ambito Financiero 14/06/00.
29 See Ambito Financiero 03/07/00; and La Nacion 04/07/00.
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The problems for the government did not end there. Motivated by the salience that the 
conflict increasingly gained, several opposition legislators presented a set of bills that, 
among other things, provided for a more direct role of the legislative branch in the 
sector’s regulation30. Although everybody acknowledged that there was little chance 
for any of these bills to be passed, the government was forced to promise that before 
implementing the deregulation process it would submit its proposal to the Comision 
Bicameral de Reforma del Estado y  Seguimiento de las Privatizaciones and this 
Commission would be allowed to present a non binding opinion31.
The government presented a new draft o f the regulations in the last days of July. By 
that time, it was no secret that, given the open conflict between the Secretary of 
Communications and the Minister of Infrastructure on how the deregulation process 
should be implemented, much of the responsibility for the preparation of this draft -  
and for its negotiation with the companies -  lay in the hands of the Secretary of 
Competition and Consumer Affairs32. Everyone acknowledged that his view on how 
the deregulation of the market should be implemented did not differ much from that 
held by the Secretary o f Communications. That is, he also advocated a radical 
opening of the market rather than a gradual introduction of competition. As officials 
in the Ministry of Infrastructure, however, he believed that if some of the provisions 
drafted in the presidential instruction were not amended -  notably, those which were 
openly assisting entry at the expense of incumbents -  little could be done to avoid the 
judicialisation of the issue.
30 See Ambito Financiero 29/06/00 and 06/07/00.
31 See La Nacion 21/06/00.
32 Carlos Winograd.
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As announced in June, the draft of the new regulations was submitted for review to
the Comision Bicameral de Reforma del Estado y  Seguimiento de las 
? ?Privatizaciones . Although initially everything indicated that those who supported 
the government’s proposal in that committee were in clear minority34, in the second 
week of August seven out of twelve of its members voted a report backing the 
government’s plans .
Having obtained this important clearance, in the first days of September -  that is, 
almost two month later than the date formally provided - ,  President De la Rua passed 
decree 764/00. As expected, it introduced new rules o f the game for licensing, use of 
the radio spectrum, interconnection and universal service. As demanded by incumbent 
companies and officials in the Ministry of infrastructure, these new rules somehow 
reduced some of the asymmetries provided in the June regulations. However, it is 
important to note that, as advocated by the Secretary of Communications, the new 
regulatory incentives introduced by the decree 764/00 resulted in a much more 
entrant-friendly regime than the one in place36.
The content of the new regulations showed that the Secretary of Competition and 
Consumer Affairs had been playing a crucial role in the latest regulatory 
developments. All the relevant stakeholders -  and notably, the president -  publicly
33 The draft was also submitted to the Sindicatura General de la Nacion (SIGEN). However, since that 
auditing body was directly controlled by the executive, everybody took for granted that its opinion 
would be favourable to the executive’s proposal. This proved to be correct.
34 See La Nacion 25/07/00, 27/07/00, 03/08/00, and 08/08/00; and Ambito Financiero 26/07/00, 
27/07/00, 02/08/00, and 07/08/00.
35 Surprisingly, only a couple o f  those votes were from legislators belonging to the president’s 
coalition. The remaining five votes came from opposition members. See La Nacion 09/08/00 and 
10//08/00; and Ambito Financiero 10/08/00.
36 For a detailed review o f  the regulatory incentives established in the Decree 764/00, see Urbiztondo 
(1999), and Chaumeil and Acuna (2001).
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agreed that his intervention had made possible to achieve what looked like a Pareto- 
improving situation. Nobody ignored, nevertheless, that his intervention had been
37rather ad hoc. In fact, it was not contemplated in any o f the sector’s legislations .
That would not be the case any more, though. Indeed, in addition to the changes 
discussed above, the decree 764/00 stipulated that, in the future, any amendment to 
the regulations it advanced would have to be introduced by means o f a presidential 
decree, and with the prior and joint intervention of the Communications Secretariat 
and the Competition and Consumer Defence Secretariat. Adding to this, the decree 
also established a list of regulations that, starting in November 2000, these
38Secretariats would be responsible for jointly designing, enforcing, and interpreting .
To the surprise of many in the industry, the regulations listed in the decree were far 
from irrelevant. With regards to licensing, for instance, the decree stipulated that it 
would be the joint responsibility of both Secretariats designing the auctions for 
frequency allotments, identifying the existence of cross subsidies, modifying the 
general structure of rates, and monitoring the existence of effective competition in the 
market, among other things. With regards to interconnection, these responsibilities 
would include calculating the prices of the network elements and functions associated 
with interconnection, determining and updating the essential facilities’ referential 
prices, establishing the methodology for calculating long run incremental costs, and 
setting up the regulations for the number portability scheme. With regards to universal
37 It is important to point out in this regard that the Competition and Consumer’s Affairs Secretariat 
was created in December 1999.
38 Without prejudice to these provisions, it was established that the Ministries to which both 
Secretariats respectively report could, through a single resolution, resolve other matters that both 
Secretariats should resolve jointly.
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service, it was decided that both Secretariats would be responsible for determining the 
distributions of funds among the different universal service categories and programs, 
calculating the net cost of the services provided, designing the auctions for the 
assignment of unserved areas, and determining the criteria for estimating the non­
monetary benefits of the scheme. Finally, it was established that with regards to the 
management of the radio spectrum it would be the joint responsibility of these 
Secretariats: designing the auctions for frequency allotment, determining the reference 
economic value for the frequency bands to be auctioned, and setting up the safeguards 
for avoiding concentration.
Complementing these changes, and since the Secretariat of Competition and 
Consumer Defence lacked the resources to take on the duties delegated to it, a new 
assignment of funds was established. The decree 764/00 provided, in this sense, that, 
as from January 1st 2001, and of the total incomes earned from the control, 
supervision, and verification rate established in the decree 1185/9039, 30% would be 
assigned to the Competition and Consumer Defence Secretariat, and the remaining 
70% to the Communications Secretariat and CNC40.
3.2. Dancing with the crisis.
Argentina was facing very complex political and economic problems by the time the 
telecommunications regulatory regime was being redesigned. The October resignation 
of Vice-president Carlos Alvarez made it painfully clear that the coalition that had
39 In addition to this, it was established that the Competition and Consumer’s Affairs Secretariat would 
receive 30% o f  the income earned from the rates, fees, tariffs, and charges that the government 
received for the use o f  the radio spectrum.
40 The decree, however, did not provide how the funds would be shared between the Communications 
Secretariat and the CNC.
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brought De la Rua to the presidency was almost broken. On the economic front, 
meanwhile, the recession that started in late 1998 had been eroding the country’s 
already precarious fiscal base, weakening its ability to service its large foreign debt. 
Making the fiscal bleeding even worse, international creditors, who were worried by 
the falling of solvency indicators, began raising interest rates. In the context of the 
currency board instituted in 1991, the government could not intervene with 
stimulative policies and it had no option but to introduce public-spending cuts and tax 
rises. Its bet was that the contractionary effect of a such squeeze would be outweighed 
by the boost to confidence from putting the public finances in order, allowing interest 
rates to fall. As 2000 ended, however, it was clear that the government had lost the 
bet. Faced with these serious problems, in March 2001 De la Rua decided to replace 
the Minister of Economy with the orthodox economist Ricardo Lopez Murphy. Two 
weeks later, however, Lopez Murphy was forced to resign and the president’s 
desperate response was to bring back Menem’s economic czar, Domingo Cavallo.
Telecommunications companies, and particularly incumbents, regarded these 
developments with concern. Month after month, the country’s brewing economic 
crisis was resulting in a decline in the sector’s level of activity, which combined with 
the deregulation of the market, was impacting negatively on both their revenues and 
profits. To make things worse, one of Cavallo’s first measures was to introduce an 
increase in the taxes paid by utilities41. Like their counterparts in other sectors, 
telecommunication operators were not allowed to pass on these tax increases to 
customers42.
41 Among other things, Cavallo re-imposed employer contributions on utilities and brought forward the 
payment o f the income tax corresponding to 2002.
42 When the sector was privatised in the early 90s it was established that any increase in the taxes paid 
by licensees could be passed on to consumers.
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Although operators fiercely opposed these measures, their room for manoeuvre was 
rather limited. That is, although they could have chosen to challenge them in the 
courts, they acknowledged that, given the high discretionary powers in the hands of 
the executive, the cost o f adopting that defiant strategy could far exceed any benefit. 
The companies’ tactic, thus, was to accept those increases as long as the government 
formally committed to compensating them in future tariff revisions or by adopting 
other operator-friendly policies43.
But as the economic crisis became worse, the national government was not the only 
one who desperately needed to collect more funds to address the imbalance in the 
public accounts. Regardless of their political colour, both provincial and local 
governments faced a similar problem and, like their national counterpart, they also 
regarded the telecommunications sector as a potential source of these much-needed 
funds. In May 2001, the lower chamber passed a bill which amended article 39 o f the 
1972 Telecommunications Law and stipulated that municipalities in all the country 
would be entitled to impose a levy on telecommunication operators for the use o f their 
aerial, terrestrial and subterranean space44. According to the project, the levy would 
be set up as a percentage of operators’ income -  up to 1% for the use o f the 
subterranean space, and up to 2% for the use of the aerial and terrestrial space -  and 
could not be passed on to the end users. Three months later the bill was also approved 
in the Senate.
43 Within this framework, telecommunications firms managed to defer the introduction o f  the 
multicarrier system for long distance calls and o f  the number portability regime.
44 Article 39 o f  the 1972 Telecommunications Law banned the imposition o f  local taxes on laying 
telecommunication wires.
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With the approval of both chambers, it was the president’s choice whether to enact the 
bill or to veto it. It was not an easy decision for the president, though. On the one 
hand, he had already assured legislators, provincial governors and local authorities 
that he would not obstruct the bill’s passage. On the other hand, however, he 
acknowledged that not using his veto powers was likely to result in an open conflict 
with telecommunications companies, who fiercely opposed the imposition of a new 
tax on them45. The potential costs of this were not to be underestimated. First, as a 
result of the liberalisation process initiated less than a year before, the government 
was expecting the companies to expand their investments and, as a result, to lower 
their tariffs. Ratifying legislators’ plans, of course, could easily jeopardise these 
expectations. Second, although reluctantly, telecommunications companies were 
cooperating with the government to tackle the latter’s financial needs. Endorsing the 
legislators’ initiative would probably lead companies to question -  or even worse, 
reverse -  their cooperation. Government officials finally did not ignore that 
telecommunications companies had fairly strong arguments to successfully challenge 
the bill in question in the courts. In fact, the imposition of this levy not only violated 
the provisions of the 1990 privatisation Pliego but also contradicted a 1997 Supreme 
Court ruling on that precise matter.
In September, President De la Rua passed the Decree 1194/01, which established a 
total veto of the bill providing the introduction of a levy on telecommunications 
companies for the use of municipalities’ aerial, terrestrial and subterranean space. As 
expected, telecommunications companies welcomed the president’s decision. In
45 See La Nacion 11/05/01 and Ambito Financiero 11/05/01.
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contrast, it was intensely opposed by legislators, provincial governors and local 
authorities, who accused the government of capitulating to the lobby o f operators46.
Although the government had been able to neutralize Congress’s action, that would 
not be the case for too long. As the crisis intensified, antiestablishment feelings 
multiplied and opinion polls showed that public support for privatisation had fallen to 
its minimum. In an attempt to capitalise on these sentiments, many blamed the 
government for talking much about the need to adopt a more robust approach to 
regulating the privatised utilities but, in practice, doing little. In their view, the
government’s alleged respect for the rule of law was just an excuse to justify its
inaction.
3.3. The last days of the victim
By October 2001, economic indicators continued to worsen and the government 
seemed more and more powerless. Voters had punished it in the last legislative mid­
term elections by voting for the opposition, abstaining, or deliberately spoiling their 
ballots to express their anger. The opposition Peronists emerged dominant (though not 
a majority in both houses of Congress)47. There were rumours that the president 
would have to step down early. At this point, few wanted to cooperate with a 
government that everyone had shunned.
The judiciary was not an exception. In the first days of September, a court ruling had 
already suspended the implementation of the Calling Party Pays (CPP) system for
46 See La Nacion 22/09/01 and 02/10/01.
47 For an in depth analysis o f  this election, see Szusterman and Bavastro (2003).
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calls made between mobiles, on the grounds that consumers had not been given the
48opportunity to express their view on the decision . Shortly after the October 
legislative elections, moreover, another court ruling established that 
telecommunications tariffs could not be adjusted any more according to the United 
States’ Consumer Price Index on the grounds that it violated the provisions of the 
1991 Convertibility Law. Although that piece of legislation explicitly banned any 
form o f inflationary indexation, the timing of the decision -  almost ten years after the 
institution of the adjustment arrangement -  made many observers suspect that the 
ruling was politically motivated. Acknowledging that the government was too weak to 
come to their rescue, telecommunication companies had no other choice but to 
publicise their discontent and appeal to the Supreme Court49.
The bad news for telecommunications companies would continue. In the last days of 
November, the lower chamber voted a bill that established that calls would be metered 
and charged on a per minute basis50. The initiative in question, which could have 
resulted in an average 30% reduction in the cost o f local calls, implied a major change 
in the sector’s tariff arrangements. Although in other circumstances this would have 
provoked immediate reactions from both operators and the government, as December 
began they both had other more urgent concerns.
48 The implementation o f  the CPP system for calls made between mobile phones was a demand o f  
companies providing mobile communications and was originally instituted in the first days o f  May 
2001. A couple o f  weeks later, however, and due to problems with operators during its implementation 
stage, the Secretary o f  Communications decided to suspend its implementation. In July, finally, 
operators reached an agreement with the sector’s authorities and the system was re-established. See 
Ambito Financiero 30/08/01.
49 See Ambito Financiero 10/10/01.
50 Since privatisation calls had been metered in units o f  120 and 240 seconds -  for peak and o ff  peak 
calls, respectively.
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Appointed as a “saviour”, Cavallo tried every possible gimmick to address the 
country’s dramatic economic situation. He first tried ‘heterodox’ measures to try to 
get growth. As argued by Bambaci et al. (2002), the minister’s bet was that his mere 
presence would boost enough confidence into financial markets, so that Argentina 
would no longer need to signal commitment through fiscal austerity and could 
concentrate on increasing competitiveness and growth. Since he was politically 
constrained to cut spending, he tinkered with industrial policy and, fatally, with the 
currency board itself, so that the peso was pegged for exporters half to the dollar, half 
to the euro. The timing for doing so, however, was disastrous. By raising the idea of 
devaluation, it spooked foreign investors, who demanded an even higher risk 
premium for holding Argentine bonds and, hence, driving up interest rates and 
deepening recession.
Cavallo then tried to restore investors’ confidence by courting the IMF, promising 
zero deficit and redoubling his efforts to negotiate a mega debt swap. This failed too. 
The minister lacked the support of Washington and the IMF, which were convinced 
that Argentina’s fixed exchange rate had to go and had already announced that there 
would be no bailout if  Argentina got over its head. Also, the ruling party interfered 
with the minister’s efforts, blocking the use of tax revenues to guarantee public debt 
and criticising his spending cuts. Therefore, he could do little to convince investors 
not to desert the country. To make things worse, day after day savers were emptying 
their bank accounts. Determined to continue making debt payments, however, the 
government ousted the Central Bank’s governor and eased the bank’s reserves 
requirements. The next move was to tap previously sacrosanct central-bank reserves 
rolling over obligations with the private pensions funds to do so.
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These actions triggered a bank run. In response to it, Cavallo made his last, desperate, 
throw. On December 1st, he imposed a ceiling o f $1,000 a month on bank 
withdrawals. As pointed out by Schamis (2002), with this measure the rules that had 
governed the economy since Menem’s first term back in 1991 were definitively 
broken. The so-called "corralito" adversely affected businesses' and individuals’ 
access to their bank accounts. From a commercial perspective, it severely hampered 
companies’ cash flow activity. Firms in almost every industry experienced difficulties 
in collecting payments and meeting obligations, leading to a virtual collapse in the 
chain of payments.
In such a situation, it is not difficult to understand why the change in the 
telecommunications tariffs that were derived from the bill approved by the lower 
chamber just a few days before went almost unnoticed. Devaluation and default now 
seemed inevitable and, along with them, the rupture of contracts and the introduction 
of new and drastic changes in the sector’s rules of the game. The Argentine public, 
moreover, was understandably angry and, in their search for whom to blame, 
everyone regarded as being part of the establishment came at the top of their list. 
Telecommunications operators, of course, were no exception.
The rest of the story is pretty well known. The economic measures weakened the 
government past the point of no return. Unrest broke out in the streets, as crowds in 
the poorer suburbs looted supermarkets while middle class groups in the city of 
Buenos Aires marched on the streets banging pots and pans. On December 20-21, and 
after 30 people lost their lives in the disturbances throughout the country, first 
minister Cavallo, then the rest of the cabinet, and finally president De la Rua resigned.
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4. Conclusions.
The main conclusion drawn from chapter 3 is that, as predicted by the hypotheses in 
this thesis, when Carlos Menem’s administration left government in December 1999, 
the regulatory regime governing telecommunications regulation in Argentina was 
strikingly different from that originally put in place shortly after the privatisation of 
the sector. Regulatory policy, moreover, was almost as volatile -  and, hence, time 
inconsistent - as it used to be before privatisation. The question that obviously follows 
here is: Was regulation o f telecommunications between December 1999 and the last 
days of 2001 also featured by regular adaptations to the changing preferences of the 
executive and, hence, to constant changes in the rules of the game? Put differently, 
did telecommunications regulation during the de la Rua’s years show the same 
features than during the years of his predecessor?
The evidence in this chapter shows it certainly did. In December 2001 
telecommunications regulation was governed according to rules substantially different 
not only from those established in the early 90s but also from those in place in 
December 1999. Among other things, while in December 1999 telecommunication 
operators were allowed to adjust their tariffs following the US’s consumer price index 
and to pass tax increases through to tariffs, in December 2001 this was not the case 
anymore. The most important difference, however, could be found in the rules that 
defined the framework within which regulatory decisions were made. Indeed, while in 
December 1999 the sector’s key regulatory powers and responsibilities were almost
144
exclusively in the hands of the Secretary of Communications, in December 2001 the 
latter had to share them with the Secretary of Competition and Consumer Affairs.
The narrative presented in this chapter shows, moreover, that telecommunications 
regulatory policy during De la Rua’s years was highly volatile and politicized. 
Undoubtedly, the best example o f this was the rather chaotic way the government 
implemented the liberalization of the market in 2000. As it has been discussed, given 
the sharp differences among government officials on how the telecommunications 
market should be liberalized, it took the government several months, and an 
embarrassing policy reversal, to finally put in place the rules of the game governing 
the process.
Therefore, the findings in this chapter confirm that although the government elected 
in October 1999 was committed to break with the past and create and environment of 
stability in the telecommunications sector, the fact that the key features of the sector’s 
regulatory regime were still defined in presidential decrees had the result that the 
incentives the government faced were not compatible with maintaining this 
commitment. Consequently, and as predicted by the hypothesis in this thesis, 
telecommunications regulatory policy between December 1999 and December 2001 
was almost as volatile as it had been in the previous nine years.
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Chapter V
The political economy of electricity regulation (1992 -  2002).
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1. Introduction
The theory in this thesis not only offers predictions about regulatory regimes defined 
in presidential decrees -  like the one established in the telecommunications sector - 
but also about those defined in statutes. Concretely, it hypothesises that, given 
Argentina’s institutional endowment, regulatory regimes defined in statutes are more 
costly to be changed and, therefore, they are likely to be more stable than regulatory 
regimes defined in other legal instruments that, following ordinary policymaking 
procedures, can be changed unilaterally by the executive.
To test these hypotheses, this chapter analyses the case of the electricity sector 
between 1992 and the last days o f Fernando de la Rua’s government in December 
2001. As it is shown below, the regulatory regime adopted in this sector showed 
close similarities to that adopted a couple of years before in the telecommunications 
sector. Indeed, as in the latter, it also involved the delegation of key regulatory 
powers to a newly created industry-specific regulatory agency and the setup of 
institutional arrangements to safeguard the regulator’s independence, autonomy and 
accountability. Unlike the telecommunications sector, however, the crucial 
components of these sweeping transformations were introduced using a statute and 
not a presidential decree.
Therefore, if the predictions and hypotheses in this thesis are valid, and in contrast to 
what happened in telecommunications, regulatory policy in electricity sector should 
have been more stable. As a result, by the end of President De la Rua’s term the 
sector should have still been organised and governed following institutional
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arrangements similar to those put in place in the early 90s. Following with the 
research design adopted in this thesis, this evidence should also corroborate that the 
relative stability of the rules of the game in this sector was not the consequence of 
the stability in the government’s preferences but of the causes identified by my 
theory. That is, the evidence in this chapter should confirm that if  the government 
chose not to renege on its original promises it was basically due to the difficulties 
that doing so involved.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first half, presents relevant information 
regarding the privatisation and reform of the electricity sector in Argentina. This 
involves discussing, among other things: a) the situation of the electricity industry 
before the introduction of the 1992 reform; b) the political environment within which 
this reform unfolded; c) the transformations that policy-makers introduced in both 
the internal organisation of the industry and in its regulatory governance; and finally, 
d) the effects of these transformations on the performance of the Argentine 
electricity industry. The second half of this chapter, meanwhile, analyses the issue of 
the stability of the rules of the game. In order to do so, I not only assess to what 
extent the electricity regulatory regime in December 2001 resembled that originally 
established in 1992 but also whether the results o f this assessment are consistent with 
the predictions of the theory in this thesis. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2. The electricity industry in Argentina before the 1992 reforms.
By the end of the 80s, the structure of the electricity industry in Argentina -  which 
accounted for almost 1.7% of the country’s GNP - consisted of six public enterprises
148
(constituting 74% of capacity), several utility companies owned by provincial 
governments (constituting 14% of capacity), a number of cooperatives and hundreds 
o f small self generators (constituting 12% of capacity)1. The three largest public 
enterprises were: Servicios Electricos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBA), Agua y 
Energia Electrica (AyE), and Hidroelectrica Norpatagonica Sociedad Anonima 
(H1DRONOR). SEGBA, which was the largest state owned company in the sector 
and was consolidated and nationalised in 1958, generated and distributed electricity 
in Capital Federal and the greater Buenos Aires, covering almost a third of the 
country’s population and over 40% of the electricity demand. AyE was the second 
largest firm and was formed in 1957. It operated 131 hydroelectric and thermal 
plants, and transmitted and distributed electricity to almost 400 localities, covering 
virtually the entire country. Finally, HIDRONOR was created in 1967 to tap the 
hydroelectric resources of Northern Patagonia. It managed large hydroelectric 
stations in the Comahue region and transported energy to Buenos Aires2.
The three enterprises were administratively dependent on the Secretariat of Energy 
and Combustibles (SEC), which was created in 1960 and was given the 
responsibility for regulating the electricity industry at the federal level3. Since then, 
the SEC’s responsibilities had been expanded to include: granting and managing 
service concessions under federal jurisdiction, setting technical norms, proposing 
tariffs for approval of the executive, promoting the interconnection of electricity 
systems, keeping statistical databases, and planning the electricity supply system
1 See Givori and Damonte (1991).
2 For a brief review o f the history o f  these companies, see Bastos and Abdala (1996).
3 The SEC changed status in an alternating fashion, from Under-Secretariat to Secretariat and back 
again (Bastos and Abdala, 1996:61)
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(Bastos and Abdala, 1996:61). The provincial companies were regulated by the 
respective provincial government.
The generation plants and the high voltage transmission systems of the different 
regions were almost totally integrated, forming the basis of the Sistema 
Interconectado Nacional (SIN)4. This was developed basically as a 500 kV system 
and the purchase and sale of electricity produced by its member companies was 
regulated by the Despacho Nacional de Cargas (DNC). The DNC, curiously, 
depended on AyE -  which also was responsible for investments in transmission.
As noted by Bastos and Abdala (1996:64), the organisation o f the system was based 
on the idea of minimising the total cost of load dispatch. That is, a merit order for the 
dispatch of power from the generating stations was established, based on information 
supplied by the generators and the actual demand conditions. The nature of the 
generation source was also taken into account. The DNC, by means of a computer 
program, determined the amount of generated electricity, power availability, entry 
order of the system, final demand forecast and the expected interchanges among the 
companies; then it calculated the energy tariffs and compensation for stand-by power 
according to the model. Tariffs could be adjusted with changes in fuel oil prices. 
Both energy and power were paid at the generation site, leaving transmission costs 
(mainly losses) to be paid by the purchasing agents.
Despite the advantage of having a diversity of considerably developed generation 
sources (hydro, thermal and nuclear) and a well established high-voltage
4 The SIN started to operate in 1973, when the first interconnected line linked the Litoral (coastal) 
electricity system with that o f  the greater Buenos Aires region.
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interconnected system, by the end of the 80s the performance of the electricity sector 
in Argentina -  the third largest in Latin America -  showed several indicators of 
deterioration. First, the system’s installed generating capacity significantly exceeded 
demand from 1975 on5. This was a result of expansion plans based on the observed 
demand growth rate in the 1960s. However, due both to obsolescence and to the lack 
o f adequate routine maintenance, not all of the excess capacity was available. The 
unavailability of the interconnected system -  which was a result of both the 
obsolescence and the lack of adequate routine maintenance -  increased from a low of 
15.9% in 1981 to 34.4% in 1988 and 19896. Non-technical losses (electricity theft, 
meter tampering, etc.) were also exceedingly high. Values were form 16 to 18% until 
1982, and increased subsequently to 22% in 1989-917.
Second, total investments in the sector averaged US$7000 per kW of demand 
increase during the period from 1970 to 1991. This figure was several times larger 
than typical values worldwide -  ranging from US$1800 to US$2000/kW. In the view 
of Dutt et. al. (1997) and FIEL (1992), these investment levels partly resulted from 
the high investment requirements per kW of installed capacity, and because of 
excessive expansion generating capacity. According to Bastos and Abdala (1996: 
53), the high unit costs o f investments was caused by the financial losses due to the 
immobilisation of the capital that was already invested and to the unfavourable
o
conditions for renegotiating the contracts .
5 The excess capacity was over 40% during most o f  the 1980s. See Bastos and Abdala (1993) and Dutt 
et al. (1997).
6 The unavailability o f  thermal power plants was particularly high, with values in the range o f  40-50%  
during 1988-91. See Bastos and Abdala (1993).
7 See and Dutt et al. (1997).
8 According to these authors, another source o f  over-investment was the way in which the projects were 
planned and financed. Hydroelectric projects generally had soft financing from international lending 
institutions and, at the time o f  ex-ante evaluations, the numbers were all positive because o f  favourable
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Third, the construction o f many power plants was delayed, due both to slower 
demand growth than anticipated and to periods of national financial crises. In this 
respect, it should be noted that while construction plans were made assuming the 
availability of low-interest loans, actual capital costs turned out to be much higher. 
This, combined with the aforementioned delays, led to considerable cost overruns. 
Moreover, the costs of hydro and nuclear power plants compared with natural gas- 
fired plants were estimated incorrectly, and as a result most of the capacity addition 
was in hydro and nuclear, implying higher costs overall9.
Fourth, the electric companies as a whole operated at a loss for most of the 1970s 
and 1980s, with high financial carrying charges making a significant contribution to 
the deficit (Bastos and Abdala, 1996:55-60). As noted by Bastos and Abdala (1996), 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, as fuel costs in Argentina soared, the real price of 
electricity fell by almost one quarter. Givori and Damonte (1991) show that the 
average long-run marginal cost for the 1980s was approximately 38 US$/MWh at the 
500kV level. The authors demonstrate that this figure was well above the average 
revenue for the period. Note, that average (nominal) wholesale electricity prices were 
around 30 US$/MWh at the end of 1982. They dropped to 25 US$/MWh by 1985, to 
less than 20 US$/MWh by 1987, and were around 15 US$/MWh by 1989. In the 
view of Spiller and Martorell (1996), these problems were a result of the fact that the 
Electricity Law of September 1960 did not stipulate a methodology for computing 
tariffs. The law, furthermore, was extremely confusing in its treatment o f return of 
capital, for it used different and contradictory terms like “Reinvestment Fund”,
loans conditions. In most cases, however, the financial calculations in the implementation phase 
differed considerably from the original ones.
9 Henisz and Zelner (2003:8) estimate that unnecessary investment in Argentina’s electricity sector 
during the 20 years preceding the Menem presidency amounted to US$ 25 billion.
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“Reserve Fund”, “Amortization”, “Interests on Capital”, “Interests and financial 
expenses in issuing debt”.
Last, but not least, regulatory policy was extremely volatile. The best example of this 
probably involved tariff setting. As career professionals were slowly displaced by 
staff enjoying the favour of the government of the time, tariffs became fixed 
according to a multitude of political considerations and bore little relation to costs. A 
study by Navajas and Porto (1990) shows the diversity of criteria applied over time 
to tariff structures and average tariff trends. This study found that ten different tariff 
criteria were applied during the period from the creation of SEGBA in 1958 to 1988. 
According to the authors, most of the tariff schemes put in place during that period 
featured elements not attributable to economic efficiency. In 1973 (and repeated in 
1975, 1983 and 1984), for example, while prices were increasing rapidly, the tariffs 
applied incorporated income redistribution criteria.
3. The politics of the electricity privatisation and reform
For the Menem administration, the problems discussed above, which became very 
obvious during the summer outages of 1988-89, were a clear illustration o f the need 
to introduce changes in the sector10. Initially, the government flirted with proposals 
to keep the sector in public ownership11. By 1991, however, following the
10 During that summer, a combination o f  low water flows in the hydro systems and poor availability o f  
many thermal and nuclear plants meant that electricity had to be rationed for many months (Gomez- 
Ibanez and Rodriguez Pardina, 2003).
11 In the beginning, the government believed that the essential problem o f  the electricity industry in 
Argentina was that the existence o f  several corporations limited the benefits o f  vertical integration and 
scale economies. To address this problem, in the second half o f  1989 it was announced that, as part o f  
the State Reform Law, the government would create the “Federal Electricity Company” (Empresa 
Federal de Energia Electrica, or EFEE). The company would merge AyE, HIDRONOR, SEGBA and 
other federal power generating companies, and would be a type o f  holding company with the legal
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appointment of Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economy and the introduction of 
the Convertibility Law, these proposals were abandoned. In the eyes of the new 
economic authorities, the performance of the industry would not improve unless both 
its regulatory incentives and governance were fundamentally changed.
I have stated earlier that the privatisations undertaken during the first couple of years 
of Menem’s government -telecommunications probably being the best example -  
were propounded while the government was confronted with two major challenges. 
One was a severe economic crisis. The second involved a serious credibility problem 
that emerged from the fact that the government was trying to resolve the crisis by 
adopting the very policies that he and his political movement traditionally 
repudiated. Privatisation at that time was therefore aimed directly at macroeconomic 
stabilisation and reaffirming the new government’s commitment to market oriented 
policies. Moreover, it was marked by a sense of both political and economic urgency 
that probably explains why the government could not afford to make better 
considered decisions that might have improved the quality of the policy. As the 
privatisation of ENTel clearly illustrates, the priority o f the government was to
status o f  a state-owned enterprise. It was also announced that SEGBA’s distribution services would be 
given in concession. A few moths later, in November 1989, the government signed the Federal 
Electricity Pact with 20 provinces. This specified that the national government would have jurisdiction 
over the SIN, DNC, federally owned generating stations, bi-national power entities, international 
electricity transactions, and the hydroelectric projects that were subject to prior agreements with the 
provinces. The Pact, moreover, ratified the intention to create EFEE. In this respect, it stipulated that 
among its other functions, the company would be responsible the setting o f  wholesale prices and 
implementing compensation mechanisms for revenues and expenditures for all SIN members. 
According to the pact, once EFFE absorbed AyE, SEGBA and HIDRONOR’s, electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution activities were going to be separated. Four regional companies were to be 
formed from the pool o f  power plants. Transmission and dispatch functions would be in the hands o f  a 
so-called Grid Company (Empresa de la Red), while five distribution companies would be set up, in 
which provincial governments would hold shares. These changes would be complemented with a 
reform o f  the sector’s institutional setting. Indeed, the Pact contemplated the creation o f  a Federal 
Energy Cabinet, which would be responsible for the main political-administrative decisions for the 
sector, with EFEE as its executive arm. It also stipulated that the bridge between the institutional and 
management spheres would be made via agreements, i.e., “Annual and Multi-annual Management 
Agreements” between EFEE and the SEE (with the supervision for CFEE). Most these reforms, 
however, were never implemented (Bastos and Abdala, 1996:69-71).
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respect tight deadlines, instead of safeguarding important economic issues such as 
increasing the productivity or competitiveness of the industries subject to reform.
The introduction of the Convertibility Plan in March 1991, and the improvement of 
the economic indicators that followed, substantially altered the context for policy 
choices within which privatisations in Argentina unfolded. As argued by Torre and 
Gerchunoff (1998), the gravity of the problems that ravaged the first year and a half 
o f Menem’s administration -  notably the economic crisis and the lack of political 
credibility -  lessened significantly. The government was no longer operating in a 
context dominated by urgency and, consequently, its capacity to choose policies and
12
to influence their content and the timing of their implementation increased . The 
new economic authorities, moreover, had an overall negative opinion of the 
privatisations advanced during the first year of government. In their view, the 
government’s imperative to collect funds quickly and gain credibility had given 
buyers a great leverage. This, they believed, had resulted in many sales of state 
owned companies with the guarantee that all the benefits of monopoly would be 
maintained. According to members o f the new economic team, the terms under 
which privatisations had occurred also explained why they had been surrounded by a 
whiff of corruption.
12 This is not to say that privatisation lost momentum in this new environment. On the contrary, it 
received a new boost from the logic established by the convertibility plan. The commitment to non­
devaluation and the refusal to print money meant that public sector finances were in a straitjacket. Only 
fiscal or commercial policies, or structural reforms like privatisations, were now available in order to 
strengthen the fiscal situation. Additionally, it soon became evident that one o f  the long-term problems 
o f convertibility would be a growing imbalance in the current account. As policymakers realised, a 
large capital inflow would thus be needed to cover this imbalance and the sale o f  state assets could be 
an important source o f  this inflow.
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When macroeconomic stability was achieved, officials in the Ministry of economy 
made explicit their intention to depart from the previous phase of privatisation. 
According to them, this would involve not only focusing on the impact of 
privatisation on the productivity and efficiency of the industries subject to reform, 
but also making substantial improvements in the privatisation procedures. In this last 
respect, the economic authorities clearly expressed their wish for Congressional 
involvement in the privatisation decisions.
The desire to allow legislators’ participation in the new phase of privatisations 
represented a big innovation in the government’s privatisation policy. The reasons 
that motivate this desire, however, were more complex than simply drawing a 
dividing line with the previous phase. It is important to note that the 1989 State 
Reform Law had declared a state of emergency affecting all state entities, enterprises 
and societies. The law, nevertheless, had only authorised the executive to implement 
its privatisation plans by means of presidential decrees in a limited number of 
enterprises13. For all the remaining enterprises, the State Reform Law required that 
new laws had to be passed. It follows that if the government was now expressing its 
wish for Congressional involvement in the privatisation decisions, it was not only 
because it wanted to improve the transparency o f the policy -  which probably it did -  
but also because that involvement was mandated by the State Reform Law.
By mid 1991, however, officials in the Ministry of economy were aware of the fact 
that, in contrast to what happened in July 1989, Congress would not accept to 
authorise the executive to implement the new privatisations by means of decrees.
13 The list o f  these enterprises was advanced in an annex accompanying the law in question.
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This had two reasons. On the one hand, following the outcomes of first phase of 
privatisations, legislators had already learnt that this equalled allowing the 
government to implement its privatisation plans in a unilateral fashion. On the other 
hand, in the last couple of years the distribution of power between the two branches 
of governments had changed significantly. As noted by Llanos (2001), in July 1989 
the president enjoyed a large majority in Congress14. By mid 1991, in contrast, the 
size of the president’s majority in Congress was significantly smaller. Indeed, his 
support came mainly from his own party, which controlled an absolute majority in 
the Senate but only a relative one in the lower chamber. Within the Peronist camp, 
moreover, party discipline was strong but not automatic. Therefore, in order to pass 
new legislation through the regular legislative channels, the president needed to 
persuade small allied parties -  notably in the chamber -  as well as his own rank and 
file.
Therefore, by mid-1991, both government and legislature acknowledged that a 
dialogue between the two branches would be needed for any future privatisations. In 
practical terms, that meant accepting Congress’ participation in the writing of the 
policy. Put differently, if the executive wanted to continue implementing its 
privatisation agenda, it would have to be by means of laws. It was not a surprise, 
thus, when in June the executive submitted to Congress the bill for the privatisation 
o f electricity. Neither was it a surprise that this bill, instead of comprising a mere 
declaration of “subject to privatisation”, advanced a detailed set of provisions
14 This majority was a result o f  the agreement with the radical party for the transfer o f  mandate from 
President Alfonsin to President Menem. Following that agreement, the Peronists accepted to assume 
the presidential office before the expected date (December 10th), but in return obtained the commitment 
o f  the Radicals -  who had a majority in the lower chamber -  to facilitate the approval o f  all economic 
laws that the new president would send to Congress from July to December, when the changeover o f  
Congressional seats was to take place.
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stipulating precise guidelines for the restructuring of the sector and the main features 
of a new regulatory regime.
4. The transformations in the electricity sector
By the time the executive submitted the bill for the privatisation of electricity to 
Congress, legislators were already aware of the executive’s new plans for the sector. 
Indeed, shortly after taking office in April 1991, the newly appointed Secretary of 
Energy, Carlos Bastos, managed to convince President Menem to sign a couple o f 
decrees advancing the guidelines that would govern the restructuring of the 
electricity industry in the country15. Following those guidelines, it became clear that 
the chosen solution was to make competition possible in those activities where it was 
deemed feasible and desirable.
As noted by Bouille et al. (2002), legislators did not oppose the executive branch’s 
reform proposal. However, they introduced several changes to it. Some of these 
changes were major and, perhaps more important, they were out of line with the 
preferences of the executive. Proof o f this was that, once the legislative process was 
completed and the bills had passed through the Congressional chambers, the 
executive made use of its partial veto power. Many of the amendments introduced by 
Congress, however, remained (Llanos, 2001).
The changes to the status quo introduced by the Law 24.065 -  and the norms that 
regulated its provisions -  were, nonetheless, remarkable. Indeed, they not only
15 Decrees 634/91 and 856/91.
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opened the door to the privatisation of the sector but also, and perhaps even more 
important, they resulted in a radical reform of the structure and organisation of the 
electricity industry in Argentina and in a sweeping transformation in the sector’s 
governance.
4.1. The reforms in the sector’s regulatory incentives.
Partially following the models adopted for the electricity sector in Chile and the 
United Kingdom, and aiming at allowing competition where possible, the new 
statutory framework for electricity separated the industry vertically in its activities: 
generation, distribution, and supply (or trading). Under the reformed structure, 
electricity generation was considered to be a service of general interest, was 
separated horizontally, and became essentially unregulated. Moreover, it was 
decided to organise it as a risk oriented activity with no need for generators to obtain 
permission prior to building or adding generation facilities.
Electricity transmission, meanwhile, was classified as a public service. Following the 
new legislation, the companies operating in this activity would be considered 
regional monopolies and were obliged to supply access to transmission lines as long 
as they had capacity to spare, for which they were allowed to charge a fixed transport 
fee16. In order to limit the monopsonistic and monopolistic power held by the 
transmission network, concession holders in this activity were banned from buying 
and/or selling electricity power17. Moreover, an open access mechanism was 
adopted, according to which the concession holders would not be accountable for
16 For a more in depth discussion o f  the new arrangements governing electricity transmission, see 
NERA (1998), Pistonesi (2001:54-55) and Rodriguez Pardina (2002).
17 See Petrecolla and Romero (2003:27)
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expanding the system, i.e. their responsibility would be limited to the operation and
18maintenance of the existing installations on a non-discriminatory basis . The so 
called “Public Contest” mechanism was adopted for this. That is, transmission 
expansion was to be determined by negotiated third party access19.
Electricity distribution, finally, was also classified as a public service to be provided
under monopolistic conditions. As in transmission, the law required “open access”
for distribution facilities, and operators were placed under a public utility obligation
to supply all the energy demanded within their concession areas. It was established
that distributors could buy their energy either directly from a generator for a
contracted price, or in the producers’ market at a three-month “stabilised” spot price
intended to approximate what would prevail in a free market. Under the new
framework, furthermore, operators became responsible for any expansion necessary
to meet the demand within the area of their concession. In order to prevent the
vertical re-integration of industry, it was established that firms operating a
20distribution network would not be allowed to generate electricity .
Complementing these provisions, the Law 24.065 created the concept of a wholesale 
electricity market, called MEM (Mercado Electrico Mayorista)21. “Active agents” of 
the MEM were to be the hydroelectric generation companies, the transmission 
company, and the distribution companies. Thermal generation companies and large
18 See Urbiztondo et al. (1999).
19 For a more comprehensive review o f  the regulation o f  transmission expansion in Argentina, see 
Artana et al. (1998:17), Abdala and Chambouleyron (1999), Littlechild and Skerk (2004a,b), Pistonesi
(2001), Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez Pardina (2003), and Rodriguez Pardina (2002).
20 For a more detailed discussion on the regulations governing electricity distribution, see Pistonesi 
(2001:55-56).
21 This market covers most o f  the country and more than 90% o f  electricity demand -  apart from the far 
south, which has its own interconnected market (MEMSP). See Pollitt (2004).
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consumers, could become agents of the MEM subject to authorisation by the 
Secretary of Energy. The law, however, did not define the precise rules governing 
this market. Instead, it specified that their enactment would be the responsibility of 
the Secretary of Energy22.
In April 1992, pursuant to the Law 24.065, the Secretary of Energy passed 
Resolution 61/92. It established that the transactions in the wholesale electricity 
market between buyers and sellers of electricity could take two forms: through a 
“contract” or “futures” market, and a “spot” market. In the wholesale market agents 
could make contracts for the future purchase/sale of electricity, with quantities, 
prices, and conditions freely negotiated among the parties. In the spot market, 
electricity demand and supply would be matched with an hourly and seasonal price. 
It was established moreover that the coordination of supply and demand would be 
done by an independent system operator, CAMMESA (Compama Administradora 
del Mercado Mayorista Electrico, Sociedad Anonima). This system operator would 
implement the operating rules issued by the Secretary of Energy, and would be 
responsible for the dispatching activity (via the Dispatch Management Agency -  
Organismo Encargado del Despacho), controlling exchanges in the bulk market as 
well as the operations through the transmission network, and performing settlements 
for all participants in the market23.
22 A lso it was established that technical dispatch for the Argentine Interconnection System (Sistema 
Argentino de Interconexion) would be under the National Transmission Dispatch (Despacho Nacional 
de Cargas -  DNDC) and that the Secretary o f  Energy would determine the rules and regulations to be 
followed by the DNDC in the performance o f  its duties.
23 It was also determined that CAM M ESA’s would be incorporated as a private law not-for-profit stock 
company and that it would be owned in equal proportions by the Secretariat o f Energy and the 
associations o f  generators, distributors, transmission carriers and large users. Furthermore, the new  
rules provided that the newly created company would have a board o f  10 members, to which each share 
holder would appoint 2 members. It was also established that the Federal State would appoint the 
Secretary o f  Energy to that board. He would also be the president o f  the corporation. The final member 
would be appointed with the assent o f  three o f  the associations subject to the veto o f  the Secretary o f
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In the spot market, the price was to be based on the system’s short term marginal 
cost of production, which would result from the cost of the last unit called on to 
generate electricity. The price, however, would have an additional component set by 
defining reference market price at the load centre, which would be located at Ezeiza, 
near Buenos Aires24. The wholesale market agents would supply and demand 
electricity at various “nodes” of the national electricity grid. The electricity price at 
each of these nodes would then differ from that at Ezeiza by a “node factor”. The 
magnitude of the node factor would be determined -  both hourly and seasonally - by
25the electricity transmission cost between the load centre and the node in question . 
Complementing these provisions, it was also established that each generator would 
have an additional payment for the capacity offered to the system. This capacity 
surcharge would depend on the system’s risk of failure and the economic cost of 
energy not supplied. To guarantee quality and that generators invest in additional 
capacity to meet demand in the long term, it was stipulated that the compensation 
would also include additional features such as frequency control, voltage stability, 
the willingness to stop generation when requested to do so by CAMMESA, etc26.
The pricing of distribution and transmission was determined by the regulatory 
framework. In both segments, basically, the tariffs were set in U.S. dollars and the 
regulation put in place was a version of the standard price capping formula, with 
tariffs reviewed every five years. In between reviews, it was established that prices
Energy. CAMMESA’s decisions, finally, would be made by majority voting but should include the 
Secretary o f Energy -  who would also posses veto power over all corporate decisions.
24 Ezeiza is where the high voltage transmission lines from the South connect to the ring that supplies 
the metropolitan area.
25 These arrangements are reviewed in more detail in see Dutt et al. (1997) and Gomez-lbanez and 
Rodriguez Pardina (2003).
26 For a more in depth analysis o f  the functioning o f  the MEM and the role o f  CAMMESA, see A lves 
Ferreira (2002), Pistonesi (2001), and Gomez-lbanez and Rodriguez Pardina (2003).
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could increase by PI -  X, where PI would be a weighted average of the consumer 
(33%) and producer (66%) price indexes in the US, and X would be set on the 
expected productivity trends and investment needs27. Finally, and in order to ensure 
that companies did not trade-off quality for prices, an explicit specification of the 
penalties was clearly spelled out in the concession contracts (Estache and Rodriguez 
Pardina, 1999).
4.2. The reforms in the sector’s regulatory governance.
As argued earlier in this chapter, the reforms introduced by the Law 24.065 not only
also resulted in a radical reform of the structure and organisation of the electricity
industry in Argentina but also in a sweeping transformation of its regulatory
governance. Drawing on the experience of the U.K., it was established that the
general supervision and regulation of the electricity industry -  and in particular, of
the distribution and transmission companies with concessions from the national
government - would be the responsibility of an independent regulatory agency, the
28Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad, henceforth know as ENRE . 
According to the Law 24.065, the agency, which was finally set up in 1993, would 
be responsible for the enforcement of the objectives that the law prescribed for the 
sector, and which included :
27 As noted by Estache and Rodriguez Pardina (1999), in practice transmission charges covered three 
components. First, a connection charge (a fixed charge differentiated according to voltage). Second, a 
capacity charge (also fixed to cover all operational and maintenance o f  the existing equipment). And 
third, an energy charge (reflecting the difference between the value o f  the energy received at the 
receiving node and the value o f  energy at the sending node). As for distribution, the main components 
were an energy charge (based on seasonal electricity costs reviewed every three months), a loss 
charge (corresponding to losses and equivalent to 11% o f  the distributor’s purchases), the connection 
and transmission costs, the cost o f  the capacity in the wholesale market, and a fixed distribution 
charge (differentiated for small and large users).
28 Article 54 o f  the Law 24.065.
29 Article 2 o f  the Law 24.065.
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- Adequately protect consumers’ rights;
- Promote the competitiveness o f both electricity production and demand markets, 
and encourage investments in long term supply;
- Promote the development, reliability, equality, free access, no discrimination and 
generalised use of the services and of the electricity transport and distribution 
installations;
- Regulate electricity transport and distribution activities, ensuring fair and 
reasonable tariffs;
- Promote efficiency in the transport, distribution and supply of electricity by 
establishing the appropriate pricing systems;
- Encourage private investment in generation, transport and distribution activities, 
ensuring market competitiveness where appropriate.
According to the law, ENRE would operate under the framework of the Secretary of 
Energy. To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, however, the legislation established a 
relatively clear allocation of roles and responsibilities between the Secretariat of 
Energy and ENRE. In this respect, it was stipulated that the government -  through 
the Secretary of Energy -  would retain responsibility for: a) defining and 
implementing broad and long term policy for the sector; b) promulgating the rules 
and regulations governing the wholesale electricity market; c) monitoring state 
owned generation companies; d) awarding concessions for the utilization of 
hydroelectric resources within inter-provincial waterways (in collaboration with 
provincial authorities); and approving foreign electricity trade contracts.
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Meanwhile, article 56 of the Law 24.065 stipulated that the functions and obligations 
placed on regulators comprised: a) defining the technical, safety and operating 
standards; b) determining and approving the basis for tariffs for the sector’s 
transmission and distribution companies; c) supervising the compliance of regulated 
transmission and distribution entities with established laws, regulations, and 
operating criteria -  including quality of service and environmental standards; d) 
administering the system of penalties and bonuses designed to control quality; 
selecting new concessionaires; e) guarding against anticompetitive behaviour in the 
market; f) and undertaking the resolution o f disputes in the sector.
Like in telecommunications, it was the policy-makers’ declared intention to set up 
the regulatory agency at an arm’s length relationship both with regulated firms and 
other private interests, and with political authorities. The Law 24.065, therefore, not 
only established that the electricity regulatory agency would be separated from 
regulated firms but also included explicit rules prohibiting regulators from holding a
30position or an interest in a firm subject to their control . To safeguard its 
independence form the government, moreover, the new legislation established that 
ENRE was to be headed by five commissioners, who would be appointed by the 
Executive Office -  two of them following the proposal of the Federal Electricity 
Council (Consejo Federal de la Energla E lectrica f]. Before appointing them, the 
law provided that the Executive Office would be required to communicate the 
reasons for its decision to a Congress Committee composed by members of the two 
chambers, which would have to submit an opinion on the Executive’s choice within
30 Article 60 o f  the law 24.054.
31 Articles 57, 58 and 59 o f  the law 24.065.
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30 days. The Law, however, clearly established that the Executive would not be 
formally constrained by the Committee’s opinion.
The legislation also provided that commissioners, who were appointed to five-year 
terms with the option of indefinite renewal, would be required to possess relevant 
technical expertise and professional experience in the field and that their terms
T9would be staggered . It also stipulated that regulators could only be removed by the 
Executive Office for specific and serious causes33. Before making any decision in 
this respect, however, the Executive Office had to communicate the reasons to the 
Congress Committee involved in the appointment process. As with appointments, the 
latter was empowered to submit a non-binding opinion on the Executive’s decision.
ENRE was also endowed with those attributes of institutional autonomy required to 
underpin the arm’s length relationships discussed above. First, the agency was 
provided with a reliable source of funding. The legislation provided that the agency’s 
budget would not be financed through public funds, but largely through control and 
inspection fees levied on the regulated companies, and allocated proportionately to 
each company based on their gross revenues from regulated activities, and through 
fines imposed on regulated firms for violations of the legislation or the company’s 
license/concession34. The legislation also stipulated that the agency would be 
responsible for annually preparing its own budget, which should specify among other
32 Complementing the provisions described above, and in order to foster regulator’s independence and
expertise, the presidential decree 1398/92, which “regulated” the law 24.065, established a more 
detailed mechanism for appointing ENRE commissioners. It provided that, before running an open call 
and contest for filling the positions, the Secretary o f  Energy would be responsible both for defining the 
profile required for each o f  positions, and for determining which posts were to be filled by candidates 
proposed by the Federal Electricity Council. It also stipulated that a Selection Committee -  composed  
by field experts -  would be responsible for preparing a shortlist o f  applicants. It was established that 
the Secretary o f  Energy would only be authorised to appoint short-listed applicants.
33 Article 59 o f  the Law 24.065.
34 Article 66 o f  the Law 24.065.
166
things the amount of the levy imposed on each operator35. Also with the objective of 
ensuring the autonomy of the newly created regulatory agency the legislation 
formally endowed regulators with the power to “demand from regulated firms the 
documents and necessary information to monitor compliance with norms and 
regulatory requirements”36. Equally important, the Law 24.065 allowed ENRE to
37impose sanctions on firms for not complying with their obligations .
Complementing the provisions discussed above, the Law 24.065 also provided 
regulators with the managerial flexibility to carry out their duties as well as to foster 
and retain technical expertise. ENRE was given the power to contract external 
consultants, design its own organisational structure, decentralise/delegate tasks, etc. 
Additionally, regulators were also granted an important degree of flexibility to 
recruit and remove their own staff. To this end, ENRE’s authorities were
• • • 38unambiguously exempted from civil service rules, including salary restrictions .
The Law 24.065 also established a set of institutional arrangements to ensure that 
ENRE did not stray from its mandate and would remain accountable for its actions. 
First, it provided that regulators’ decisions could be appealed not only to courts but 
also to the Secretary of Energy39. It was stipulated, moreover, that the latter would 
have the power to modify those decisions40. Second, it was established that
35 The levy imposed on each operator would be proportional to the their income and the method for 
setting it was specified in article 67 o f the law 24.065.
36 Article 56 (n) o f the Law 24.065.
37 Article 56 (o) o f  the Law 24.065.
38 Article 64 o f  the law 24.065.
39 The appeal arrangements for ENRE’s decisions were provided in articles 75 and 76 o f  the law 
24.065.
40 This has been claimed to imply that in conflicts between a regulator’s decision and the government, 
the regulator is likely to be defeated (Estache, 1997). In a similar vein, Rodriguez Pardina (1998) 
argued that, since most regulators do no want their decisions to be challenged, these arrangements are 
likely to limit regulators’ independence and produce a bias in their decisions towards the preferences o f
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regulators would have the obligation to publicise their decisions and, in addition, to 
make explicit the reasons for them.41. Regulators were also required to produce an 
annual report and submit it both to Congress and to the Executive Office42. Third, 
regulators were mandated to publish all the information demanded by third parties 
and to provide them with relevant advice43. In addition, it was also established that 
once ENRE’s budget proposal was published and comments by all interested parties 
were allowed, it would have to be incorporated in the national budget in order to be 
approved by Congress44. Fourth, the Law 24.065 posed an obligation on regulators to 
carry out public hearings before making important decisions45. This was to ensure 
that ENRE made open decisions and that all concerned parties had the chance to be 
heard through the decision-making process. It is important to note, in this regard, that 
although the legislation did not provide a clear definition of “important decisions”, it 
did offer a tentative list of the matters that would require the adoption of such a 
consultation mechanism. Among others, this list included: mergers, tariffs, and 
investment authorisations. In addition, and in order to secure that consumer interests 
were adequately represented, the regulator was required to establish a mechanism for 
ensuring consumers’ representation in all those public hearings carried out to discuss
the political authorities. He also points out that since the government was formally allowed to modify 
almost any decision taken by the regulator, these appeal arrangements ended up undermining 
regulators’ authority in whole regulatory process, and hence their accountability.
41 Article 56 (p) o f  the Law 24.065.
42 Article 56 (q) o f  the Law 24.065 established that the annual report should not only cover the 
activities carried out during the year but also suggestions o f  measures to be adopted in the public 
interest.
43 Article 56 (n) o f  the Law 24.065.
44 Commenting on these arrangements, Urbiztondo et al. (1998: 14) contend that linking the agency 
funding with the income o f  the regulated firms often creates a serious incentive problem, since 
regulators may increase tariffs as a means o f  augmenting their budget. Nevertheless, they also point out 
that the requirement to authorise third parties to comment on regulators’ project as well as its inclusion 
in the national budget -  in order to allow its discussion in Congress -  ameliorated this problem. 
According to them, a similar effect was obtained by requiring the levy imposed on operators to be a 
fixed sum -  and not a percentage o f their income.
45 Article 74 o f  the Law 24.065.
168
regulatory decisions likely to affect their interests46. Last, Law 24.065 provided that 
the regulators’ accounts and performance would be scrutinised internally by 
Sindicatura General de Empresas Publicas and, externally by the Auditoria General 
de la Nacidn -  an auditing body under the jurisdiction of Congress.
5. The implementation of the reforms and their outcomes.
As argued by Gomez-lbanez and Rodriguez Pardina (2003:304), the government 
acted quickly once it put in place the legal framework of the reforms. The power 
sector under the control of the national government was first divided into “Business 
Units”, consisting of one or more power plants for future generation companies, and 
areas to be covered by future distribution companies. It was decided that each 
Business Unit would then be privatised through sealed bids and that minimum base 
prices would not be set. In some cases, nevertheless, the valuation would be used to 
set a minimum cash price. It was also determined that most of the payment would 
have to be made in terms of titles of Argentina’s external debt, the highest value 
offered determining the winning bid. As noted by Dutt et al. (1997:37), the guiding 
principle was that power plants would be sold outright and hydro plants would be 
sold as concessions of thirty years. This was in order to retain long-term control of 
the associated water rights. The distribution and transmission companies, would be 
privatised as a single entity -  for reasons of scale -  and they would be sold as ninety- 
five years concessions.
46 Article 56 (j) o f  the Decree 1398/92.
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SEGBA was the first company to be privatised within this framework. In 1992 it was 
broken into five generation firms and 3 distribution companies. The distribution 
companies created were EDENOR S.A., EDESUR S.A. and EDELAP S.A. The first 
two were the largest and represented more than one-third of all electricity customers 
in the country. Their privatisation raised one-third of the total privatisation proceeds 
from the sector. The privatisation of AyE, meanwhile, began in early 1993 as its 
power stations were separated and sold off. Most o f HIDRONOR’s assets, finally, 
were privatised in mid 1993, when the concessions to operate one national 
transmission grid and five regional grids were granted47. The national government 
retained only two nuclear plants and two dams, which collectively supplied about 
one-third of the power to the wholesale market. For dispatching and other purposes, 
nevertheless, they were treated the same as private generators.
Meanwhile the provincial governments sold most of their electricity distribution and 
transmission facilities under similar terms. The provinces of San Luis, La Rioja, 
Tucuman, and Formosa were the first to grant concessions for the distribution of 
electricity. In 1996, the province of Buenos Aires privatised ESEBA, the second 
biggest company after SEGBA. Before transferring it, the province divided ESEBA 
into three firms: EDEA, EDEN and EDES. The provinces of San Juan, Jujuy, Entre 
Rios, Salta, Catamarca, and Mendoza later replicated the process. By 2001, thus, 
more than 80% of the generation, all of the transmission, and 60% of the distribution 
sector in Argentina were transferred into private ownership. The result was that 
around 70% of the population was served by private companies (Pollit, 2004).
47 The brake up and privatisation o f  AyE and HIDRONOR resulted in the creation o f  22 new 
generators (Galiani et al., 2005).
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The privatisations raised $3.1 bn for the central government and associated 
privatisations by the provinces raised a further $2.1bn. As noted by Pollitt (2004), 
the initial privatisations attracted a large amount of foreign interest with many of the 
firms passing into foreign ownership soon after the initial offering. AES of the U.S., 
ENDESA of Spain and TOTAL FINA ELF o f France, for example, became major 
players in the generation sector. The operation of the national transmission grid was 
granted to TRANSENER, which was a consortium led by the British Company 
NATIONAL GRID. In distribution, EDESUR was taken over initially by ENERSIS 
of Chile and then ENDESA of Spain. EDENOR and EDELAP were taken over by 
EDF of France and AES, respectively.
In 1991, generation was initially in the hands o f four major state-owned companies 
with a combined market share of 77.3%, with the largest company (SEGBA) having 
a market share of 23.3%. By 2002 there were more than 40 generation companies 
operating in Argentina, and the share of the largest four private companies was 
40.5%. The largest private firm had a share of 12.3 % (Pollitt, 2004:7)48. By 2002, 
moreover, the principal buyers of electricity were around 35 distribution companies 
that had exclusive concessions to retail the electricity to households and other small 
users in the areas they served. In addition, over two thousand industrial firms were 
allowed to buy power directly on the wholesale market, bypassing their local 
distribution companies.
48 Pollitt (2004:10) notes that although the market shares o f  the leading firms have increased since 
1992, in 2002 the market remained less concentrated than in most European and North American 
countries.
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5.1. The performance of the Argentine Electricity Sector following the 1992 reforms: 
lights.
Several indicators show that the performance of the Argentine electric industry 
improved enormously between the 1992 and the end of 2001. One of these indicators 
is, unquestionably, investment (notably in generation and distribution). Between the 
beginning of 1992 and the end of 2001, investments in the industry totalled around 
US$ 7.5bn in fixed assets (Pollitt, 2004:13). In generation, a good deal of these 
investments had two aims. One was to replace or upgrade old thermal equipment. 
This, in turn, not only resulted in improved efficiency, but also in the reduction of 
breakdowns. Between 1992 and 2001, the average availability of these plants 
increased from 48% to 80%. Second, investments also contributed to the 
improvement in the system’s overall installed capacity. During the period under 
analysis, this increased from 13,267 MW to 22,831 MW, mostly in the form of 
thermal (combined-cycle) plants49. As a result of these advances, the number o f units 
delivered by generation companies increased from 45.800GWh in 1992 to 
81.300GWh in 2001 (Romero and Petrecolla, 2003:28).
In distribution, the investments resulted in an increase in the total number of 
electricity customers to 9.835m in 2001 - SEGBA’s descendants (EDENOR and 
EDESUR) had almost half of that number (4.34m). This represented an increase of 
11% from 1993 and, among other things, was the result of an ambitious plan to
49 Quoting a work by Romero (1999), Murillo and Finchelstein (2004) point out, however, that 
although the increase in installed capacity was significant, it did not reach the levels o f  the 1970s and 
1980s. The authors also contend that a big share o f  the increase in installed capacity during the 1990s 
was a result o f  the investments made by only a few firms. According to their figures, the investments 
made by just eight business units account for 93% o f  the increase in installed capacity between 1995 
and 2002.
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connect 650,000 shanty town households to the electricity network between 1994 
and 1998 via collective meters (Pollitt, 2004:13).
The high rates of investment in the industry were accompanied by a relatively good 
financial performance of most of the companies involved50. In distribution, although 
SEGBA descendants experienced losses during the first couple of years of their 
concessions, after this the average post-tax rate of return on assets was not only 
positive but also reasonably high: EDENOR and EDESUR’s average post tax rate of 
returns on equity, for example, was around 9%  between 1995 and 200151. Something 
similar could be said about the profitability of operators in transmission. Indeed, 
between 1994 and 2001 TRANSENER’s average post-tax rate of return on assets
52was almost 7% . In generation, meanwhile, although operators were doing much 
better than before privatisation, the profitability of their investments were more 
modest than in transmission and distribution. In 2000, for example, the average post-
53tax rates of return on shareholders’ funds in the sector was 4.6% (Pollit, 2004:14) .
To a certain extent, the companies’ strong financial performance reflected the large 
efficiency improvements in the industry. These improvements could be seen in both 
the sharp decrease in generation plant unavailability discussed above, and in the 
important progresses achieved in labour productivity54. Benitez et al. (2003), report 
that, in generation, GWh per employee rose by 17.4% between 1992 and 1999. In
50 See Estache (2004).
51 See Uniren (2004:268-291).
52 Ibid.
53 This number, despite being respectable by international standards, could be considered low if  the risk 
associated at that time with investment in Argentina is taken into account. In this respect, in 
TRANSENER’s price review in 1998 the country risk premium was estimated to be 4.89% p.a. in real 
terms (Pollit 2004:14).
54 As noted by Estache (2002: 11) a good share o f  the efficiency increases came from reductions in 
employment. In this sense, Ennis and Pinto (2002:50) show that employment in SEGBA and its 
successor companies fell from 21,535 in 1987/90 to 7,945 in 1 9 9 7 -  a fall o f  63%.
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distribution, according to these authors, that figure reached 31.5%. Pollitt (2004:15), 
meanwhile, claims that the labour productivity of ENDESA (the second largest 
generator by the end of 2001) improved from 13 to 35GWh generated per employee 
between 1995 and 2000. He also shows that sales per employee in the two largest 
distribution companies (EDESUR and EDENOR) improved from less than 2GWh 
per employee in 1993 to 5.7GWh in 200155. In a similar vein, Romero and Petrecolla 
(2003:29) show that, in those companies, the number of connections (clients) per 
employee increased more than 100% between 1993 and 200256.
The most quoted achievement of the 1992 reforms, however, was their impact on 
electricity tariffs. There seems to be an agreement that the new rules resulted in the 
elimination o f the large fluctuations in the real value of tariffs seen in the 1980s 
(Pollitt 2004:13), and also in a sharp reduction of electricity prices, notably on the 
wholesale market. In that market -  despite a sharp increase in electricity demand57 -  
the nominal US dollar price of energy fell almost 70% between 1992 and the last 
months of 2001 (Pollitt, 2004; Mateos, 1999). As a result of this fall, which, in the 
view of most analysts, resulted from the intense competition in the generation 
market58, large industrial consumers who purchased directly from that market 
enjoyed important price reductions, which in certain cases reached 50%59.
55 Following the findings in Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and Pollitt (2001), Pollitt
(2004:15) claims that these numbers compare very favourably with experience in the UK, where labour 
productivity was less over a longer period.
56 The number o f  connections per employee in 1993 and 2002 was 417 and 932, respectively 
(Petrecolla and Romero, 2003:29).
57 Electricity demand grew at an average annual rate o f  6.14% between 1992 and 2001 (Cammesa, 
2002), compared with 2.5% in the previous decade (Gomez-lbanez and Rodriguez Pardina, 2003).
58 Pistonesi (2001:61-64), however, argues that although competition in the generation contributed to 
the reductions experienced in the spot market, in particular after 1995, another cause was the entrance 
to the market o f a couple o f  hydroelectric units planned before the reforms and built with public funds 
(Piedra del Aguila and Yacyreta).
59 As noted by Bour (1999), the reductions were generally not as large as those in the spot market 
because many o f  the large customers bought part o f  their electricity on long-term contracts.
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Consumers who got their power from the distribution companies, meanwhile, also 
enjoyed savings, though not as large as those experienced by large customers. 
According to ENRE’s 2001 annual report, between 1992 and 2000 the nominal 
average tariff of EDENOR, EDESUR, and EDELAP -  the three distribution 
companies that had succeeded SEGBA -  fell 17.7%, 13.7%, and 13%, respectively. 
According to the same source, these drop amounted 24.0%, 24.1% and 22.8% in real 
terms.
Last, but not least, quality of supply also improved significantly between 1992 and 
2001. In distribution, both technical and non technical losses in Greater Buenos 
Aires fell from above 22% in 1992 to almost 10% in 2001. In that area of the 
country, and reflecting significant improvements in metering and bill collection to 
reduce non-technical losses (i.e. theft), the number of hours of supply lost per year 
was 21 in 1988, 16.8 in 1993/94 and dropped to 5 in 200160. Blackouts, in addition, 
had become the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, between 1992 and 1997, the 
annual amount of energy not supplied because of blackouts fell from 125 GW-hour 
to 8 GW-hour61. In the transmission system, meanwhile, power outages also 
experienced a sharp reduction. In the TRANSENER’s transmission system, for 
instance, the rate of own failures per year was 1.48 in July 1994 and 0.57 in 2002 -  
well below the limit of 2.50 set in the concession contract62.
60 See Pollitt (2004:16).
61 See Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez Pardina (2003:307).
62 See Pollitt (2004:16)
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5.2. The performance of the Argentine electricity sector following the 1992 reforms: 
shadows.
From the discussion above, the reader could get the impression that the reforms put 
in place in 1992 were designed following the best international practice and also that 
they managed to deliver the benefits predicted by its advocates. Although that picture 
is quite accurate, it is not complete. The system also presented some weaknesses and 
failures.
One of the most criticised aspects o f the reforms put in place in 1992 was its impact 
on rural and low income consumers. In this respect, it should be noted that despite 
the increase in the total number of electricity connections, this increase materialised 
mostly in urban areas, and notably in the greater Buenos Aires area. In rural areas, in 
contrast, private carriers saw little or no profit in connecting the most isolated 
settlements. This, combined with the fact that there was a legal ban on the 
establishment of cross-subsidies, made it difficult to expand or maintain basic access 
to electricity for these settlements (Ruchansky and Bouille, 2003). By the end of 
2002, and despite the fact that in 1995 the Secretary of Energy launched a scheme to 
serve these areas63, only 70% of the rural population in Argentina had access to 
electricity -  compared to 98% in urban areas64.
Regarding the issue of the impact of the reforms on low income consumers, there is a 
strong consensus that the new system led to a sharp increase in the number of poor
63 The aim o f  that scheme was to connect 314,000 rural users. By the end o f  2001, however, only a 
fraction o f  those connections were actually in place. As noted by Pollit (2004:24) and Bouille et al.
(2002), the main problem for the implementation o f  the scheme was the unwillingness o f  provincial 
governments to contribute with subsidy payments.
64 See Bouille et al. (2002)
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households with electricity supply (Bouille et al., 2002; Ruchansky and Bouille, 
2003). In the Greater Buenos Aires area, the percentage of households within the 
poorest income deciles with access to electricity rose sharply in comparison with that 
observed in the 80s65. Ennis and Pinto (2002:30) show that within the first decile (the 
poorest) only 65% of the population had access to electricity services in 1985/86. 
According to these authors, in 1996/97 that number had climbed to 99%66. As the 
authors note, this increase is likely to have had a positive impact on the social 
welfare of these households as they often need electricity for both heating and 
pumping water.
The consensus ends, however, when the discussion focuses on the social impact of 
electricity tariffs. In this sense, some authors have pointed out that although reforms 
resulted in important efficiency improvements and, consequently, lower tariffs in the 
wholesale market, captive customers only received a small cut of the efficiency gains 
and the tariff reductions achieved in that market67. Tariff reductions for residential 
consumers, hence, were far behind those experienced by large industrial customers. 
Moreover, not all groups among residential customers benefited proportionally from 
the savings achieved: customers with the highest incomes enjoyed greater tariff cuts 
than the poor.
65 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, much o f  this increase in service coverage resulted from the plan 
put in place by SEGBA’s successors between 1994 and 1998 to connect shanty town households to the 
electricity network. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Haselip et al. (2005:6-8).
66 Households within the second and third deciles also benefited from the increase in the number o f  
connections to the service. According to data reported by Ennis and Pinto (2003:30), in 1985/86 only 
80.49% and 87.45% o f the households within this these deciles had access to the service. In 1996/97, 
99.60% and 99.79% o f the households belonging to the second and third decile were connected to the 
service.
67 See Flacso (1999), Arza (2002), Gerchunoff et. al. (2003), Pistonesi (2001:68), Ruchansky and 
Bouille (2003)
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Three factors are said to have accounted for this. First, when SEGBA was split into 
generation and distribution companies, the new distribution companies were 
committed to purchase a significant amount of electric power -  almost 50% of their 
consumption -  at a flat price (40 US$/MWh) that soon significantly exceeded the 
price in the spot market68. Second, and as discussed previously in this chapter, the 
regulatory framework provided that electricity distribution tariffs would be adjusted, 
among other things, following a weighted average of the consumer and producer 
price indexes in the US. Contrary to what many expected, between 1995 and 2001 
inflation in the US had been greater than in Argentina. Last, and as noted by Estache 
(2002:14), the new rules of the game provided that -  in order to reflect economies of 
scale and to promote allocative efficiency -  distribution costs would decline with 
increases in the quantity and voltage of the supply. As a result, low electricity 
consumers, who generally happen also to be the poorest, only benefited from a 
fraction o f the price declines experienced by high demand consumers, who generally 
happen also to be those with the highest income69.
6. Regulatory stability in the electricity sector
In spite of the problems discussed above, there is some degree of agreement that 
almost a decade after the introduction of the reforms in the electricity sector, its 
outcomes have showed more lights than shadows. In the view o f most experts, this 
outcome could be attributed not only to privatisation but also to the design of the 
regulatory regime put in place by reformers in early 90s.
68 This measure, which was in place for 8 years, was intended to attract private investors by reducing 
the risk o f  energy price fluctuations (Haselip et. al., 2005:5; Pistonesi, 2001:51-52; and Dutt et al., 
1997:44).
69 Pistonesi (2001:75), in addition, argues that these pricing arrangements in distribution did not 
promote a rational and environmental-friendly use o f  electricity, since they fostered consumption.
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Although I do not deny the possibility that the relatively good performance o f the 
electricity industry in the decade that followed the reforms of the sector in 1992 can 
be attributed to those reforms, I believe that it would be unfair to attribute them the 
sole responsibility. It is important to note, in this sense, that between 1992 and 
December 2001 not a single change was introduced to the legislation originally used 
by reformers to define the key features of the electricity regulatory regime. The 
implications of this were far from irrelevant. Indeed, when President De la Rua left 
office, the sector’s regulatory governance was exactly the same as specified in the 
1992 Electricity Act. Regulators, as a result, were not only key actors in the sector’s 
regulation but also they still enjoyed most of the powers and responsibilities 
originally granted to them. The institutional arrangements originally put in place to 
safeguard their independence, autonomy and accountability, moreover, were exactly 
the same as those established in the early 90s.
Adding to this, the structure of regulatory incentives governing the organisation and 
functioning of the electricity industry looked pretty much the same as the structure of 
regulatory incentives put in place at the time the sector was transferred into private 
hands. In December 2002, thus, the electricity productive chain in Argentina was 
both vertically and horizontally unbundled and the regulatory principle of 
incompatibility between functions still applied. The same was true of third party 
access to transmission and distribution networks as well as entry into power 
generation. Like in the early 1990s, moreover, distribution and transmission were 
classified as public services and remained regulated activities. They were operated as 
concessions and these were awarded in open bidding processes.
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Generation, meanwhile, was considered to be a service of general interest and 
remained essentially unregulated. Also as envisaged by reformers in 1992, 
competition among generators occurred in the wholesale market. The latter was still 
managed by CAMMESA, which planned the operation of the interconnected system 
for six-month seasonal periods, so as to meet the expected demand with a reserve 
agreed between the parties (economic load dispatching). The wholesale market was 
still divided in two segments, namely a spot and a contract market. In the latter, 
distributors and large consumers could enter into supply agreements with producers 
and brokers, at prices freely settled in the respective contracts. In the spot market, 
meanwhile, electricity demand and supply were matched with an hourly and seasonal 
price.
The retail market remained divided into a regulated segment and another open to 
competition among suppliers, which included large consumers. The regulated 
segment guaranteed monopoly to the distributor that had been granted the concession 
and who had the obligation to supply any required demand under the terms of the 
concession contract. Like in the early 1990s, finally, the pricing of distribution and 
transmission in the last days of 2001 were set in US dollars and the regulation set 
maximum prices with total pass through of costs of energy and with an indexation to 
the US’ price index.
6.1. Are regulatory regimes defined in statutes more stable?
The evidence above clearly shows that the regulation of the electricity sector 
between 1992 and December 2001 exhibited a degree of policy stability
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unquestionably higher than that observed in the telecommunications sector. But can 
this be taken as conclusive evidence that, in Argentina, regulatory regimes defined in 
statutes are more stable than regulatory regimes defined in other legal instruments?
In order to answer this question, it is important to recall that, following the research 
design adopted in this thesis, for establishing valid causal inferences using one or a 
small number of cases, one not only needs to show how highly correlated the 
ultimate explanatory and the dependent variables are, but also that the process 
specified by the theory -  whereby the independent variable operates so as to conduce 
ultimately to the outcomes -  is also present. Thus, for establishing the validity of the 
hypotheses in this thesis, one needs to prove both that the electricity regulatory 
regime in place in the last days of 2001 closely resembled that established at the time 
of the reform of the sector, and also that this occurred despite the executive 
sometimes favoured changing its original policy commitments. That is, one also 
needs to present evidence showing that if the electricity regulatory regime remained 
stable, this was despite the presence of pressures in the opposite direction.
The best way to show this is to present evidence confirming that there were episodes 
where policy-makers attempted to introduce changes to the status quo but failed. The 
reader should be aware, however, that this sort of evidence is probably scarce. 
Indeed, if the propositions in this thesis are valid, policies defined in a statute should 
not only be stable because changing them was costly but also because policy-makers
70strategically anticipate this and, thus, rarely attempt to change them .
70 For a more in depth discussion on how strategic anticipation affects the observation o f  expected 
behaviour, see Ferejohn, Rosenbluth and Shipan (2004:18) and references therein.
181
The second way is to present episodes where one can legitimately claim that, since 
the location of the status quo was very distant from policy-makers’ preferences, the 
latter probably felt tempted to change the location o f the status quo but finally 
refrained due to the high costs that this alternative involved.
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, analyses three incidents which clearly 
demonstrate that the electricity regulatory regime remained stable despite pressures 
for change. The first two of these episodes clearly fits into the second category of 
evidence discussed above. That is, they were occasions where one can legitimately 
assume that the executive most likely considered -  and favoured -  the option of 
introducing changes to the status quo but finally refrained. The remaining episode, 
meanwhile, is a clear example of an incident where the executive unsuccessfully 
tried to enact changes.
6.2. Episode 1: The 1999 Buenos Aires Blackout
During the early morning of February 15, a fire broke out at the recently opened 
Azopardo 2 Substation, owned by EDESUR, the power distribution company for the 
southern half of Capital Federal and Greater Buenos Aires. This was in the course of 
works intended to connect it to the existing 132 kV grid. The fire resulted in 156,540 
customers in Buenos Aires being left without power and a huge infrastructural and 
social chaos71. Although by that night almost 100,000 customers were reconnected, it 
was not until February 24 that the incident was finally resolved.
71 People with disabilities and the elderly were trapped in powerless high-rise apartments, and traffic 
snarled. While temperatures averaged between 30 and 35 degrees, almost 600,000 inhabitants were 
without refrigeration for food, without air conditioning or fans, and even without water and plumbing -  
because electric pumps could not operate.
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The incident -  the worst in the history of Argentina and comparable to the Auckland 
crisis o f February 1998 -  triggered a generalised mood against EDESUR. 
Contributing to this was the finding that the power cut was not the result o f an ‘act of 
God’, but of faulty facilities in EDESUR’s distribution system. In addition, the 
company handled the situation poorly. First, it never provided adequate information 
about the causes or nature of the problem. Second, its repeated promises about when 
service would be re-established were not met (Ullberg, 2002).
The distribution company, however, was not the only one blamed for the incident. 
The failure also raised questions about the efficacy o f privatisation of the electricity 
industry and the regulatory arrangements introduced by the government in the early 
90s. In this sense, there was a group that claimed that the incident was a clear 
demonstration of the failure of privatisation and more generally, of the market 
oriented model adopted by the Menem administration. Less radical, there was a 
second group -  which included most opposition parties, many legislators, and 
consumer groups - ,  that argued that the problem were the institutional arrangements 
originally put in place to safeguard ENRE’s independence and autonomy. In their 
view, these arrangements had resulted in a regulatory agency that was a mere 
extension of the privatised companies and looked out for their interests before those 
of consumers. They claimed that the government needed to introduce important 
changes in the industry’s regulatory governance to prevent similar events from 
happening again. For many in this group, these changes included increasing 
Congress’ influence on utility regulation issues and more precisely, the creation of a 
“Super Ente”. This was conceived as a supra regulatory agency within the orbit of
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Congress with ample authority to formulate, interpret and enforce regulatory norms 
across all the utilities72. There was a third group, finally, that placed its critiques not 
on the governance aspects of the industry but on its regulatory incentives. Among 
other things, this group called for the abandonment of regulation based on “results” 
or “performance”, and its replacement for another more based on “instruments”.
In this context, and given the proximity of the October 1999 presidential elections, 
the government probably also believed that some changes to the status quo were 
needed in order to ease the public’s discontent. Needless to say, the changes that the 
government probably considered did not include the reversal o f privatisations or 
other of the more radical measures discussed above. Following the experience in the 
telecommunications sector, however, one cannot reject the possibility that, as the 
crisis developed, government officials seriously considered the alternative of 
“punishing” ENRE, for example, curtailing its independence or taking over many of 
the agency’s roles and responsibilities.
However, the problem with this alternative was that since it required amending the
• 73Electricity Act, it would necessarily entail giving Congress a say in this process . 
And for several reasons, the executive most likely wanted to avoid this. First, in the 
legislative elections of October 1997, the Justicialista Party had lost the majority of 
votes in the lower chamber of the Legislature. Since then, therefore, the executive’s
72 As noted by Abdala (2001), the proposal to create a Super Ente was introduced long before these 
events. The occurrence o f  the blackout, however, revived the discussion on the issue as well as the bills 
that contemplated it.
73 In the light o f  the hostility the courts had been showing since it became apparent that the government 
party would loose the next presidential elections, the alternative o f  passing a DNU was probably not 
even considered.
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capacity to pass legislation had been seriously compromised74. Second, the executive 
clearly acknowledged that for Congress to provide its consent to changes they would 
have to include granting Congress a greater role in the day-to-day regulation of the 
sector. And this was something that the executive was not ready to accept. Third, 
even in the unlikely event that both parties managed to come to an agreement, 
implementing it would have probably taken more time than the urgency of the 
problem allowed.
The government, however, did not remain inactive. In the light of the difficulties of 
introducing changes to the status quo compatible with its preferences, it opted for 
putting pressure on the regulators to act tough on EDESUR. Regrettably for the 
latter, this was an effective move. Indeed, with its room for manoeuvre severely 
constrained, and knowing that its own survival was at stake, ENRE had no choice 
but accede to this pressure75. On February 22, the agency resolved (Resolution 
292/99) that in compensation for the power cuts, the company would have to pay 
fines and indemnities much higher than those established in the concession contract: 
$90 to those residential users who had been left with less than 24 hours without 
service, and $100 per day plus $3.75 per hour to those which service was cut for 
more than 24 hours76.
74 As noted in the previous chapter, in February 1999 Menem was still flirting with the idea o f  running 
for re-election. That was a major source o f  conflict within the ruling party and greatly contributed to 
limiting the government’s capacity to pass legislation in Congress.
75 Previously, on February 17, ENRE had passed resolution 222/99, which charged EDESUR for the 
outage and instructed the company to pay indemnities to the affected customers. A couple o f  days later, 
it had also dictated another resolution (291/99) in which it directed EDESUR to re-establish service 
within 24 hours.
76 The argument used by the regulator to justify these huge penalties was that the penalties for power 
cuts provided in the concession contract were meant to apply to “normal” outages, and that the outage 
in question had several features that made it exceptional.
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EDESUR’s reaction to this resolution was quite negative. In the opinion o f the 
company, ENRE’s decision was not only an overreaction aimed to ease the pressure 
from the public, the mass media, and the government, but also it was clearly illegal. 
The company noted, in this sense, that according to the concession contract, the 
compensation it was obliged to pay should be approximately $6 per day for the 
average residential customer, irrespective o f numbers o f days the customer had been 
left without service. In line with the opinion of some experts, moreover, it criticised 
that the scheme of penalties imposed by ENRE explicitly violated the regulatory 
framework because, among other things: a) it maximised the number of users who 
would be compensated instead o f adjusting compensation to real costs; b) it included 
compensation to users affected for less than 10 hours; it was discontinuous at 24 
hours (jumping from $90 to $193.75); and it was independent of historic use -  
resulting in a situation in which users with low and high rates of usage were equally 
compensated. Based on these critiques, and after a failed attempt to offer its own 
compensation scheme77, EDESUR’s major shareholder, the Chilean ENERSIS, 
declared that the company would appeal ENRE’s resolution and that it would not pay 
the penalties the regulator had imposed on the company.
For the government, the company’s refusal to pay the penalties was not necessarily 
bad news. Indeed, when the president of ENERSIS declared that EDESUR would 
not pay any fines or indemnities that were not considered in the concession contract, 
the debate gradually shifted from the efficacy of privatisation or the performance of 
the regulator to whether the government should cancel EDESUR’s concession 
(Ullberg, 2002:61).
77 The compensation scheme offered by the company was somewhere in between the penalties 
provided in the contract and the penalties imposed by ENRE.
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By the end of March -  that is, almost a month after the blackout -  everything 
indicated that the fate of EDESUR had already been decided. It became public 
knowledge that although the government was aware of some of the legal flaws in 
ENRE’s decision, it had decided to support the position adopted by the regulatory 
agency -  which, as discussed above, the government itself promoted when it realised 
the institutional costs of introducing significant changes to the status quo. It also 
became known that the Secretariat of Energy had drafted a presidential decree 
annulling EDESUR’s concession and that, if the firm insisted on refusing to pay the 
fine assigned by ENRE, President Menem was ready to sign it.
But, as Urbiztondo (2003) notes, luck was on the government’s side. During the first 
days of April, the majority of shares in ENERSIS were bough by the Spanish 
ENDESA. The latter not only proceeded to change the management of EDESUR but 
also realised that the fastest road to reconciliation with the Argentine government 
and public was to accept a more flexible standard regarding ENRE’s resolution. On 
April 20, thus, the company notified the regulatory agency that it had decided to 
renounce its appeals and that it would accept paying all fines, ordinary and 
extraordinary. With this decision, and more importantly, with the rules that defined 
the regulatory framework intact, the crisis concerning the Buenos Aires blackout 
seemed to be over.
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6.3. Episode 2: The ENDESA case
Although the acquisition of ENERSIS by the Spanish electric company ENDESA 
marked the culmination of the crisis that followed the Buenos Aires’ blackout, the 
deal was not free of problems. In what follows it is shown that that these problems 
were at the origin of another episode where, although politicians felt tempted to 
introduce significant changes to the electricity statutory framework -  and even took 
some steps in that direction -  the fact that this framework was defined in a law 
passed by Congress prevented those changes to materialise.
To understand this second episode, it is important to note that in, April 1999, before 
gaining control of ENERSIS, the Spanish ENDESA was already a major shareholder 
in one of the distribution companies operating in Buenos Aires. In partnership with 
the French EDF and ASTRA, it had a major share of EDENOR, the concessionaire 
with the exclusive franchise to distribute electricity in the northern areas of the city. 
After acquiring 60% of the Chilean firm -  which, as previously discussed, had a 
majority share in EDESUR -  the company both helped to terminate the crisis that 
resulted from the Buenos Aires’ blackout in February 1999, and also turned into a 
major shareholder in the company with the exclusive franchise to perform electricity 
distribution in the southern areas of the city.
The existence of a single group controlling both EDENOR and EDESUR, however, 
was in clear violation of provisions of the electricity regulatory framework. Indeed, 
with the aim of preventing the concentration in the supply of electricity distribution 
services, the rules governing the privatization process of these companies had
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explicitly established that: 1) bidders could not participate in more than one bid for 
each concession contract; 2) a bidder could bid for both concession contracts but 
only when participating with the same affiliates in each offer; 3) the owners of class 
“A” shares in one of the concessions could not own those shares in the other. To 
preserve these limitations, moreover, Article 6 o f EDESUR and EDENOR’s 
concession contracts stipulated that at the end of each management period, the rules 
governing the call for bids should be organised under similar arrangements. Article 
32 of the Electricity Act, meanwhile, established that only with the express 
authorisation of the ENRE could two or more distributors merge or consolidate into 
one group, or a distributor could acquire shares o f another distributor. It also 
stipulated that before making any decision, ENRE would have to allow third parties 
to express their view on the issue at stake in public hearings, and determine that the 
transaction in question would not negatively affect the service or the public interest, 
or to infringe other provisions of the law. It should be noted that among the 
responsibilities the Electricity Act granted ENRE was to prevent firms in the 
industry from engaging in anticompetitive or discriminatory conducts as well as 
promoting competition in the electricity market.
ENRE, however, did not seem to be very concerned about these provisions. Indeed, 
although a proceeding was started to determine whether the acquisition of ENERSIS 
by ENDESA affected the public interest or infringed the provisions of regulatory 
framework78, no further action was taken in this regard. It was pretty clear, in this 
respect, that ENRE wanted to avoid making a decision at all costs. And the reason
78 Originally, that proceeding (4409/97) had been started in October 1997 when ENDESA Desarrollo 
S.A. (a subsidiary o f  ENDESA) acquired 2,96% o f  ENERSIS’ capital, and ELESUR S. A. (a subsidiary 
o f ENDESA Desarrollo) acquired 86.19% o f  the shares o f  CHISPAS (which owned 29,04% o f  
ENERSIS).
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for this was no mystery: any challenge to the transaction would probably revive the 
crisis that had followed the Buenos Aires blackout and, with it, the voices
70questioning the efficacy of the regulatory agency . With the presidential elections 
getting closer and political pressures growing, regulators knew that this time it would 
be very difficult for the government to stand by their side.
In September 1999, Congress passed the Competition Act, which, in addition to 
creating the Competition Tribunal and instituting the control of merger and 
acquisitions, established that “all attribution o f  competition issues related to the 
purpose o f  this law and given to other organisms or state entities shall be repealedp\  
For ENRE, the passage of this law was a good opportunity for trying to get rid of the 
obligation to continue the proceeding it had started and, ultimately, for making a 
decision on the issue at stake. In November, therefore, the agency declared itself 
incompetent to resolve on the case and referred it to the Competition Commission.
However, regulators’ strategy to wash their hands was unsuccessful. On 7 December 
-  three days before the change of government -, the Competition Commission also 
declared itself incompetent and referred the case back to ENRE. The argument the 
Commission used for doing so seemed reasonable: the acquisition of ENERSIS by
ENDESA had taken place several months before the passage of the Competition Act
80and, therefore, it was ENRE’s responsibility to make a decision .
79 Recall that ENDESA had agreed to pay all the fines that had been imposed on EDESUR following  
the Buenos Aires blackout in February 1999.
80The Competition Commission also argued that at the time the transaction had taken place the existing 
legislation -  notably, the Electricity Act -  clearly established that it was ENRE’s duty to prevent 
anticompetitive, monopolist or discriminatory behaviour in the electricity industry.
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The Competition Commission’s decision to refer the case back to ENRE was very 
welcomed by the new government, and particularly, by the incoming economic 
authorities. Like many in the industry, the latter believed that ENRE’s reluctance to 
make a decision on the ENDESA case not only put its independence from the 
outgoing government into question, but also showed that the interaction between 
utility and competition regulators needed to be redefined. Soon after taking office, 
therefore, Minister Jose Luis Machinea announced that addressing this problem 
would be one of the government’s first priorities and that some important changes to 
the status quo would probably be introduced.
And it seems that he really meant it. In February, the newly created Secretariat of 
Competition and Consumer Affairs of the Ministry of Economy had already drafted 
a bill that clearly revealed the preferences o f the new economic team in this 
respect81. On the one hand, the bill advanced a set of provisions aimed at reinforcing 
the independence, autonomy, and accountability of all the utility regulatory agencies 
created during the previous government. On the other hand, it stipulated that before 
deciding on issues that could have an impact on competition, utility regulators would 
need to involve the Competition and Consumer Affairs’ Secretariat, and the latter 
would be entitled to give a non-binding opinion. The bill also contemplated that
appeals from those decisions would no longer be heard by sectoral authorities, but by
82the economy-wide competition regulator, the Competition Tribunal .
81 A s an advisor to the Secretary o f  Competition, the author o f  this thesis participated in the drafting o f  
this bill.
82 Following the Competition Act, the Competition Tribunal was supposed to replace the Competition 
Commission.
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The bill, however, never reached Congress. And accounting for this were two 
reasons. First, a group within the executive opposed limiting the government’s 
discretion on regulatory decisions and, more important, resigning that discretion in 
favour of the competition regulator. In the opinion of this group, which was led by 
the Minister of Infrastructure and Public Works, the bill was a covert attempt by the 
economic team to meddle in the regulatory affairs of sectors that, in December 1999,
83had been deliberately left out o f its jurisdiction . The second factor concerned the 
chance o f the bill being passed by Congress. As the economic officials soon realized, 
these were rather weak. And this weakness not only lay in the fact that the opposition 
party controlled a comfortable majority in the Senate. It also resulted from the fact 
that most legislators -  including many that belonged to the ruling coalition -  were 
still convinced of the need to expand Congress’ participation in regulatory decisions. 
The reform proposal of the Secretary of Competition, they believed, did not
84contemplate any significant advance in this respect .
The fact that the bill in question never progressed beyond the executive branch, 
however, did not mean that the ENDESA case was left unresolved. On April 11, 
Minister Machinea passed a resolution (M.E. 266/00) that confirmed what only the 
electricity regulators seemed to ignore: that it was ENRE’s responsibility to decide 
on the participation of ENDESA in both EDENOR and EDESUR. Two months later, 
moreover, the Competition and Consumer Affairs Secretariat made public a report 
containing its opinion on the case85. It argued that having one company controlling
83 These sectors included, among others, telecommunications, water, transport, and ports.
84 The only role that the bill contemplated for Congress was in the appointment and removal o f  
regulators. More specifically, it stipulated that legislators would be entitled to issue a non-binding 
opinion on the executive’s appointment and removal decisions.
85 Resolution 266/00 had explicitly required the Secretary o f  Competition to issue its opinion on the 
case.
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both electricity distribution concessions in Buenos Aires could open the door to three 
different but interrelated problems. First, the report claimed, it could jeopardize 
electricity regulators’ use o f the yardstick competition mechanism86. Second, it could 
negatively affect competition in the generation market87. Finally, it could also 
endanger the prospects o f developing a competitive electricity commercialization
oo
market, in case the government decided to fully liberalize it in the future . In the 
light of these problems, the report concluded, ENRE should require ENDESA to 
divest its assets in one of the distribution companies, and should leave it to the firm 
to decide in which company it would keep its participation and in which company it 
would sell89.
Although resolution 266/00 had explicitly established that the opinion and 
recommendations of the Competition Secretariat would have a non-binding character 
on ENRE’s decision, it seems that the latter did not dare to challenge them90. On 
August 10, ENRE passed a resolution (480/00) concluding that the acquisition of 
ENERSIS by ENDESA had resulted in a situation clearly incompatible with the 
provisions of the electricity statutory framework. It also ordered ENDESA to 
disinvest all its shares in either of the two distribution companies. The regulator,
86 The report claimed that both theory and international experience showed that this mechanism could 
provide regulators with comparable information on the efficiency and productivity levels o f  similar 
firms, and therefore it could be an important tool to set prices and determine productivity improvement 
requirements at the time o f  tariff reviews.
87 It was argued that given the magnitude o f  the electricity distribution market in Buenos Aires, the 
main risk associated with having one company controlling it was that this the company could use its 
market power to benefit those companies in the generation sector in which it had some sort o f  interest.
88 For an in depth review o f  the case and o f  the Competition Secretariat’s report, see Petrecolla and 
Romero (2002).
89 The participation o f  the Competition and Consumer Affairs’ Secretariat in this case and in other 
competition advocacy initiatives is discussed in detail in Winograd, Celani, and Kim (2004).
90 The Competition Secretariat’s report reflected the view o f  most electricity experts and industry 
stakeholders. However, the main reason why ENRE probably preferred to follow the report’s 
recommendations was that these reproduced the preferences o f  some o f  the most influential figures 
within the government. Indeed, a few days after the report became public, the country’s Vice-President 
and the Minister o f  Economy openly announced their support for the conclusions and recommendations 
that the report advanced. See Clarin 17/06/00.
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however, was not alone in bowing its head down. In March 2001, and following 
several months of negotiations, ENDESA announced the divestiture of its 
participation and interest in EDENOR, and the transfer of all its shares in this 
company to the French EDF. This announcement, naturally, marked the conclusion 
of the episode91. Once more, and despite the pressures in the opposite direction, the 
rules of the game defining the electricity regulatory framework remained intact.
6.4. Episode 3: The decree 804/01
Other events were making the news in Argentina by the time ENDESA announced 
its divestiture in EDENOR. As discussed earlier, at this point the country’s financial 
and political situation was worsening day after day. On March 20, moreover, amid a 
wave of cabinet resignations and national protests that were threatening to force the 
president’s resignation and a call for early elections, President De la Rua appointed 
Domingo Cavallo as his third minister of economy in three weeks. A few days later, 
Congress enacted the newly appointed minister’s “competitiveness law”. This law, 
on the one hand, allowed the government to introduce a set of measures aimed at 
cutting costs for Argentine businesses, such as raising tariffs on consumer goods to 
protect the local industry and lowering tariffs on capital goods to encourage 
investments. On the other hand, the law also granted the president the power to rule 
by decree for a one year period on a broad series of matters relating to the economy, 
including reforming the tax system and restructuring state agencies.
91 Formally, the case ended four months later, when the competition authorities passed a resolution 
(Res. 70/01) that gave the green light to the deal.
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In most business and political circles, there was the belief that the appointment of 
Cavallo and the passage of the Competitiveness Act was likely to result in the 
introduction of important changes to the status quo. In the electricity industry, 
however, this suspicion was almost a certainty. The main reason for this was simple: 
the same day De la Rua invited Cavallo to return to the ministry of economy, cabinet 
ministries were reorganised and Carlos Bastos was named Minister of Infrastructure 
and Housing, which included the Secretary o f Energy and Mining. As everybody in 
the industry acknowledged, Bastos was not only the chief architect of the reform and 
privatisation of the electricity industry in the early 1990s but also -  and particularly 
since he’d left office in 1996 -  a strong advocate of advancing several steps forward
09in the deregulation of the industry . For most people in the electricity business, 
therefore, the question was not if the government was going to introduce changes in 
the rules of the game but when it would do so and how far it would try to go.
The answer to this question came pretty soon. On June 16th, less than three months 
after the new economic authorities took office, the government issued presidential 
decree 804/01. Although this decree, which was followed shortly by Resolution 
135/01, comprised just fifteen articles, the changes to the status quo it introduced
g o
were substantial and had effects on most of the industry’s activities . Among other 
things, it established that self-generators and co-generators would be re-categorized 
as MEM agents, and traders would be recognised as new participants in the MEM, 
with no restriction as to their marketing scope94. It also changed the methodology for
92 See Bastos (1999).
93 For a detailed review o f  the reforms provided in the decree 804/01 see Cont and Urbiztondo (2001).
94 The decree established, moreover, that an actor would be considered a trader “i f  he or she sells or 
buys energy in the wholesale electricity market on behalf o f  third parties, carrying out commercial 
activities according to the conditions.” Note that in 1995 traders had already been admitted to MEM. 
The rules that had made this possible (Decree N° 186/95), however, established that their transactions
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spot price calculation from variable production costs and seasonal declarations of 
costs to an energy price calculated hourly and based on the free bidding o f generators 
and traders. Finally, it completely redefined the existing arrangements for deciding, 
building, and financing transmission expansions.
With the exceptions of some electricity experts who, like Bastos, believed that the 
best way to consolidate and deepen the achievements of the original reforms in the 
electricity sector was to further reduce the interference of the public sector in the 
industry’s affairs, very few supported the new regulations. Within the industry, the 
main opposition was from generators and distributors. The resistance of the first 
group stemmed from the fact that the new rules ruled out one of the sector’s 
strongest demands: relating capacity payments to capacity availability. Distributors, 
meanwhile, contended that by allowing traders to fully participate in the wholesale 
market, the government was raising the uncertainty facing the revenue of distribution 
companies and the likelihood of mis-pricing, as well as encouraging large customers 
to inefficiently by-pass the distribution network. This, the argument followed, would 
probably result in compensatingly higher prices for regulated customers95.
The fiercest resistance to the decree, however, came from the Federal Electricity 
Council and the provinces, including those under the control o f governors who 
belonged to the ruling coalition. This was for two reasons. The new transmission 
expansion rules introduced in the decree 804/01 substantially modified some of the
needed to have the form o f  commercialization in block (“en bloque”)- Following the decree 804/01, 
this was no longer required.
95 These arguments were not new. Indeed, they had already been raised by distributors every time the 
government expanded the definition o f  large users. Note in this respect that in 1992 the energy market 
had been liberalised only for customers with demands greater than 5MW. By the time decree 804/01 
was passed, this threshold had already been reduced to 30KW. For a detailed analysis o f  this topic, see 
Urbiztondo et al. (1999) and Pollit (2002:23).
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regulations that Bastos himself had established in the early 90s, which the Council 
and the provinces had always criticised. However, they also involved the repealing 
of most of the regulations that had been passed to replace them96. In contrast to the 
regulations originally put in place, these regulations had granted the Federal 
Electricity Council and, hence, the provinces, vital powers in the identification, 
proposal, and financing of new transmission lines. By revoking them, thus, the 
decree seriously compromised the Council’s influence in the sector.
Second, the government introduced these changes by using a presidential decree 
based on the special emergency powers given to Minister Domingo Cavallo for 
managing the economic crisis. The law that created those powers, however, provided 
for the delegation of certain legislative competencies to the executive branch. And 
since none of the faculties referred explicitly to the capacity to legislate on the 
electricity regulatory framework, this created a fear among most provinces that -  at 
instance of Cavallo and Bastos -  the government might next use those powers to 
abolish the Federal Council itself (Littlechild and Skerk, 2004b:46).
By the time the government passed the new regulations, Bastos probably 
acknowledged that the Federal Electricity Council and provinces would strongly 
oppose the provisions of decree 804/01 and that, since the Council mirrored the 
political complexion of Congress, the latter would try to have a say in the process. 
He probably even anticipated that the Senate, where the opposition party controlled a 
comfortable majority, would vote in favour of revoking the decree, as it did on July 
25th. What most likely he never expected, however, was that most of the legislators
96 For a detailed review and analysis o f  the rules governing transmission expansion in Argentina -  
including those instituted by decree 804/01 -  see Littlechild and Skerk (2004a, 2004b).
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belonging to the ruling coalition not only disliked the executive’s new policy but 
were also seriously considering the possibility of voting against it.
In this challenging context, and with the clear intention of showing that he was ready 
to introduce some amendments to his proposed policy, Bastos passed a resolution 
(MIV 259/01) postponing the implementation of the reforms introduced in decree 
804/01 and resolution MIV 535/01 for five months. It soon became clear, however, 
that legislators’ plans did not contemplate the possibility of negotiating with the 
minister. On September 12, and with the overwhelming support of deputies from 
government and opposition parties, the lower chamber voted the bill passed by the
07Senate a couple of months earlier . Although there were discussions between Bastos 
and the Federal Council to consider a way forward -  that did not contemplate re­
establishing the provisions of the decree 804/01 - ,  the resignation on December 19th 
of De la Rua, Cavallo, and Bastos marked the end of those discussions. As in the two 
episodes previously discussed in this chapter, the status quo once more had 
prevailed.
7. Conclusion
The theory presented in the second chapter offers a clear prediction about the 
stability of regulatory regimes defined in statutes in Argentina. In short, this 
prediction is that, in contrast to regulatory regimes defined in legal instruments that 
can be changed unilaterally by the executive following ordinary policymaking 
procedures, regulatory regimes defined in statutes are considerably more costly
97 Law 25.468.
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changed and, hence, more stable. Put differently, in sectors where the key features of 
a regulatory regime are defined in a statute, policy-makers have more incentives to 
maintain its original policy commitments.
This chapter supports this prediction. The evidence here presented shows that, in 
contrast to what happened in the telecommunications sector, in the last days o f 2001 
the electricity regulatory regime still had the same regulatory governance than that 
originally put in place in 1992, and also a pretty similar structure o f regulatory 
incentives to that established by the sector’s reformers during the early years of 
Carlos Menem’s first presidency. It shows, moreover, that this outcome was 
explained by the simple fact that, during the period under analysis, no change was 
introduced to 1992 Electricity Act -  the piece o f legislation where the key features of 
the electricity regulatory regime had been established.
Equally important, the empirical information in this chapter demonstrates that the 
relative stability of the electricity regulatory regime cannot be attributed to the lack 
of pressures in the opposite direction. That is, although the location of the status quo 
was generally relatively close to the preferences of the executive, there were several 
episodes where the latter clearly wanted to introduce changes. The evidence in this 
chapter shows, however, that even when this happened, the status quo prevailed. As 
predicted, this outcome occurred either because the executive finally opted not to 
advance with the changes given the high costs this alternative entailed, or because 
when it tried to introduce these changes other veto players - whose consent was 
required - stepped in and prevented them from materialising.
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Chapter VI
The political economy of utility regulation in the days of crisis (January 2002 -
April 2003).
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1. Introduction
The theory in this thesis uses predictions about the stability of the regulatory regimes 
put in place in Argentina in the early 90s as particular instances of the stability of 
regulatory policy in general. Indeed, based on the same assumptions and rationale 
used to derive the hypotheses about the stability of regulatory regimes, in chapter two 
I have also hypothesised that, given Argentina’s institutional endowment, regulatory 
policies in that country are likely to be more stable when they are defined in statutes 
than when they are defined in legal instruments that, following ordinary policymaking 
procedures, can be changed unilaterally by the executive -  i.e. regulatory decrees, 
administrative decrees and resolutions.
To test the validity of this hypothesis, this chapter analyses the case of utility 
regulatory policy during Eduardo Duahlde’s administration (January 2002 to April 
2003). More precisely, it analyses the stability of two regulatory policies introduced in 
the so-called Economic Emergency Law, which was passed by Congress in the first 
days of January 2002. As discussed in detail below, the law in question established 
that utilities’ tariffs would be frozen and, in addition, they would not be pegged 
anymore to the dollar but would be switched to pesos at par. Second, it stipulated that, 
in order to adjust them to the country’s new economic situation, and in particular to 
the devaluation of the national currency, the contracts o f all the utilities and 
infrastructure operators in the country would be renegotiated. In this last respect, the 
Economic Emergency Law provided that the rules governing this process would be 
exclusively defined by executive branch. Implicitly, this meant that the legal 
instrument defining these rules would be either presidential decrees or resolutions.
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Although few noticed it at the time, from the moment the Economic Emergency Law 
was passed, and since it was quite explicit on the new rules o f the game governing 
utilities’ tariffs, it became clear any change to these rules would need the introduction 
of changes to the Economic Emergency law itself. It became clear, moreover, that this 
would not be the case for introducing changes to the rules governing the contract 
renegotiation process. Accounting for this, there were two reasons. First, the 
Economic Emergency Law avoided any definition about these rules. Second, since the 
law implicitly established that these rules would be defined in presidential decrees or 
resolutions, any change to these rules would simply require the passage o f new 
decrees or resolutions.
In the light of the discussion above, in subsequent pages I examine if, as predicted by 
the hypothesis in this thesis, there was an important difference in the stability of the 
rules governing the tariffs utilities charged and those governing the contract 
renegotiation process. More precisely, I will examine whether it was far more difficult 
for the executive to change the freezing and pesoification of tariffs than changing the 
rules governing the renegotiation of contracts.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the background to appointment 
of Eduardo Duhalde as president and to the passage of the Economic Emergency Law. 
Section 3 analyses the establishment of the rules governing the contract renegotiation 
process. Section 4, the longest o f this chapter, reviews the issue of the stability o f the 
new rules of the game. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2. Duhalde’s arrival to power and the passage of the Economic Emergency Law.
2.1. The appointment of Eduardo Duhalde
In the past, it would have taken a lot less than the events o f December 2001 to 
interrupt the constitutional order. Indeed, the eruption of a major political and 
economic crisis would have been a signal for members o f Congress to stay at home. 
This time, however, legislators stayed at their desks and met in a special session to fill 
the power vacuum left by De la Rua and reach a settlement of the crisis. What were 
the processes and mechanisms that explain this behaviour? What made the 2001 crisis 
different?
As argued out by Schamis (2002), the first key difference was that, despite the looting 
and the unrest, the army showed no desire to step in. So bleak had the economic 
outlook became and so bloody had the last experiment with military rule been that 
generals had no choice but to remain in their barracks. The second key difference was 
the new Constitution, especially the quasi-parliamentary innovations in it. Under the 
old Constitution of 1853, the order of succession was fixed, extending downward 
from the president through the vice-president, the head of the Senate, the leader of the 
Chamber of Deputies, and finally the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The electoral 
calendar was fixed as well. Political parties and Congress had no say in the process. In 
contrast, the 1994 Constitution allows Congress to deal with the incumbent 
president’s resignation by calling an election or naming a new chief executive. In 
other words, in the context of a serious political crisis, the new constitution 
immediately delegates power to Congress.
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For a brief moment, thus, Argentina turned into a quasi-parliamentary regime 
(Corrales, 2002:38). As claimed by Schamis (2002:91), therefore, what happened 
immediately after De la Rua’s resignation was the kind of high-level bargaining that 
is typical of parliamentary systems after an election has been held or a prime minister 
steps down after a vote of no confidence.
Congress initially chose Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, the governor of San Luis province. 
His eight days in office, however, were a brief but grotesque caricature. The Peronists 
chose Rodriguez Saa as a stopgap; many of them wanted fresh presidential election in 
March. Rodriguez Saa, moreover, lost the support of his party by showing signs of 
wanting to stay longer, and that of the public, by appointing officials tarred by 
corruption allegations. His fate was sealed by citizens of Buenos Aires who, for the 
second time in two weeks, unseated a president by taking to the streets to bang pots 
and pans in protest. At this point, two things seemed obvious. First, that no 
arrangement would be stable unless all the camps within the Peronist party came 
together to support it. Second, that the country needed time before it should be asked 
to face another electoral campaign.
The resignation of Radriguez Saa forced the Peronists to rethink. Parliamentary 
negotiations followed and legislators finally chose Senator Eduardo Duhalde, an 
experienced politician who was the main leader of the largest faction in the Partido 
Justicialista, as the new interim president. In contrast to Rodriguez Saa, Duhalde won 
the support not only of Peronist legislators but also o f those who belonged to the 
alliance that had brought De la Rua to power a couple of years before. The new
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president was elected by 262 votes, with only 21 against. Moreover, he was appointed 
not for two weeks but for two years.
2.2. The Economic Emergency Law
Upon taking office in January 2002, the main problem that the new administration 
confronted was containing the country’s economic crisis and, along with it, quelling 
the tide of popular unrest. The most pressing decision that the new president had to 
take in this respect was what to do with the currency board that had pegged the peso 
to the dollar.
As the PJ candidate for president in 1999, Duhalde had embraced an anti-market 
rhetoric and ran on a populist platform. Almost two years later, his language and ideas 
did not seem to have changed. He surprised no-one when in his acceptance speech he 
told Congress that he would reverse the economic model in place during the 90s with 
another in which the state would adopt a more interventionist and protectionist 
approach. In Duhlade’s view, this not only included confirming that Argentina would 
formally default on its foreign debt -  as declared on December 23 by the then 
president Adolfo Rodriguez Saa -  but also scrapping the currency peg.
Therefore, a few days after taking office, Duhalde sent Congress the Public 
Emergency and Exchange Regulations Reform Bill, which Congress transformed into 
law (25.561) almost immediately. The new legislation, henceforth known as the 
Economic Emergency Law, introduced a dramatic delegation of legislative powers to
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the national executive and also established a radical modification o f the Argentine 
economic policy and institutions in place for nearly 11 years.
Among other things, the law declared a state of social, economic, administrative, 
financial, and foreign exchange public emergency, delegating (for 180 days) to the 
executive branch the necessary powers to: a) revamp the financial and banking 
systems, as well as the foreign exchange market; b) reactivate the economy, increase 
employment and improve income distribution; c) create the economic conditions for 
sustainable economic growth consistent with public debt restructuring; and d) regulate 
negotiation of a new repayment schedule o f outstanding obligations liabilities affected 
by the new foreign exchange system that would replace the currency board1. Within 
this framework, moreover, the law explicitly empowered the executive to establish the 
system that was to determine the new peso to foreign currency exchange ratio, and to 
issue foreign exchange regulations. It also gave way to the possibility of issuing 
currency in excess of the reserves held .
In line with these modifications, the law also compelled the executive branch to adopt 
such measures as might be necessary to soften the effects of devaluation. The law 
specified that all debts under US$100,000 would be shifted into pesos, at the one-to- 
one exchange rate3. In order to compensate financial institutions for potential losses
1 Even though these powers might be described as political and programmatic goals, their broad nature 
enabled the executive to adopt comprehensive rules and measures.
2 Indeed, it stipulated that the Central bank could now purchase foreign currency with its own resources 
or by issuing the necessary pesos, and sell it at the prices established according to the system defined 
by the National Executive Branch.
3 This provision applied, provided that such debts were the result o f  (a) purchase-money-loans, (b) 
loans for home construction, repair and/or expansion,(c) personal loans, (d)loans for purchasing 
automobiles secured by a pledge, and (e) loans granted to those individuals or legal entities that qualify 
as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Financial liabilities not meeting the aforementioned 
requirements were kept in their original denomination, even though the Executive branch was 
empowered to alter any such rules in order to adapt such liabilities to the new economic conditions.
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suffered as a result o f this measure, the executive was empowered to adopt 
compensatory measures, including the issue o f guaranteed foreign currency- 
denominated government securities.
Also with the aim of cushioning the impact of devaluation, the contractual relation 
between private parties as regards the agreed-upon consideration was also radically 
altered. Under the law, all money payments due and payable as from the day of the 
enactment and arising from those contracts that were denominated (or that provided 
for adjustment) in US dollars or any other foreign currency were to be settled in pesos 
at the one to one exchange rate4. Complementing these provisions, all forms of price 
indexation, inflation adjustment, cost variation, and any other form of automatic 
adjustment of debts, taxes, prices and rates for goods, works and services were to be 
banned.
Finally, and particularly relevant for the purpose o f this chapter, the Economic 
Emergency Law also established that utilities’ tariffs in Argentina would not be 
pegged to the dollar anymore, or partly indexed to the United States inflation, but 
would be switched to pesos at par, and frozen. In addition, the executive was to be 
authorised to renegotiate the contracts of all utilities. In order to do so, the law 
stipulated, government officials had to consider: (1) the impact of tariffs over the 
competitiveness of the economy and the distribution of income; (2) the quality of the 
services and the investment plans, provided they were contemplated in the pertinent
4 Those payments were to be considered as a sum to be debited with a value established through 
negotiation within 180 days. During this term, the contracting parties were to restructure their 
obligations, so as to equitably share the effects o f  devaluation. Any differences between the amounts 
prepaid and such amounts would be settled once the terms were agreed upon. In case no agreement 
could be reached, the parties were authorized to resort to mediation and, eventually, to the appropriate 
courts.
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contract; (3) users’ interests and service access conditions; (4) the safety of the 
involved systems; and (5) the profitability of the companies.
3. The establishment of the rules governing the contract renegotiation process
3.1. Utilities’ first reactions to the new rules of the game
The pesoification and freezing of tariffs introduced in the Economic Emergency Law, 
of course, was strongly opposed by utility operators. They were aware that as a result 
o f these measures, their revenue base would be denominated in pesos and, since the 
latter was likely to experience a sharp devaluation, it would become increasingly 
difficult or even impossible for them to finance their imports and service their debts -  
which in most cases were denominated in foreign currencies. Equally difficult, they 
noted, would be to raise capital abroad to cover their investments commitments, 
which according to the law could not be altered. They also predicted a drop in demand 
for their services, because devaluation was likely to result in inflation. This in turn 
would lead to a fall in consumer welfare5.
However, operators’ reactions to the new rules of the game were far from being 
homogeneous. More precisely, although they all loudly opposed the unilateral 
pesoification and freezing of tariffs6, and demanded the prompt establishment of 
arrangements to compensate them for the negative impact of these measures on their
5 Chisari and Ferro (2005) and Urbiztondo (2003) analyse in more detail the technical aspects o f  these 
challenges.
6 See Ambito Financiero 04/01/02.
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finances7, there was a first group that immediately threatened to initiate legal actions
Q
and, if necessary, to leave the county . A second group, meanwhile, adopted a less 
confrontational approach and called for an immediate and comprehensive 
renegotiation of contracts. In the view of this second group, the country’s economic 
conditions demanded, among other things, the prompt establishment of new (and 
more relaxed) investment requirements and quality standards, as well as extensions in 
licenses and concessions9.
The government did not seem to be touched by operators’ demands and threats. In a 
clear intent to delay the starting of negotiations, all the top positions in the relevant 
Secretariats (i.e., communications, energy, and transport) were left vacant, and it was 
not even clear which would be the location of these secretariats within the 
government structure10. Adding to this, and despite the growing pressures from the 
firms and foreign governments11, important officials made public their view that 
allowing any type of tariff increases in the short term would almost certainly trigger 
an inflationary spiral in all the prices of the economy. This, they claimed, was the last 
thing that they were willing to tolerate12. Finally, and to make things even worse, 
some government officials began to spread the rumour that part of the establishment,
7 In this respect, the alternatives most heard during those days included: the launching o f  an exchange- 
rate insurance to allow them to get the dollars (at the one-to-one exchange rate) they needed to send 
abroad, and the set up o f  a new tariff scheme adjusted to local inflation. See Ambito Financiero 
03/01/02 and 07/01/02, and Clarin 04/01/02 and 05/01/02.
8 See Ambito Financiero 03/01/02 and 07/01/02, and Clarin 05/01/02.
9 See La Nacion 06/01/02 and 07/01/02, and Ambito Financiero 07/01/02
10 See Clarin 16/01/02.
11 The Spanish Minister o f  Economy, Rodrigo Rato, in a clear reference to the freezing and peso­
ification o f  utilities’ tariffs, had claimed before a commission o f  the European Parliament that “i f  the 
Argentine government wanted to regain the confidence o f  the investment community, it should have 
changed the rules o f  the game with the consent o f  all relevant stakeholders”. In a similar vein, the 
French Minister o f Foreign Relations, Huber Vedrine, formally demanded his Argentine counterpart an 
effort to secure “that French companies have the opportunity to continue investing in Argentina”. See 
Ambito Financiero 07/01/03 and La Nacion 08/01/02.
12 See Clarin 05/01/02.
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and particularly banks and utilities, were plotting against the executive’s economic 
plan in order to force it to institute the complete dollarisation of the economy13.
The government’s initial inflexibility towards the demands of utilities did not last 
long, though. Press information revealed that Argentina’s access to international aid 
would be denied if the government refused to commit itself to secure an adequate 
treatment to the foreign investments in privatised firms14. Needless to say, even if the 
anti-utilities rhetoric and measures proved to be very popular in the public opinion15, 
declining fresh money from abroad was something that the new authorities could not 
afford. By mid January, the government announced that within the next few days, a 
commission would be created within the Ministry of Economy charged with 
renegotiating contracts with utilities.
This news, however, brought little comfort to utilities. On the one hand, they were too 
vague. Indeed, the government did not specify how the commission would be 
composed, what would be its powers, with which procedures and deadlines it would 
work, etc. On the other hand, government officials kept on insisting that under no 
circumstance would the renegotiation process result in a reverse of the measures most 
questioned by utilities: the pesoification and freezing of tariffs16.
13 See Clarin 11/01/02.
14 See Ambito Financiero 09/01/02.
15 According to an opinion poll carried out in those days by Julio Aurelio & Asoc., 52% o f the public 
agreed with the prohibition to increase the tariffs o f  utilities. See La Nacion 06/01/02.
16 On January 24th, the government stopped the seasonal increase in electricity tariffs, which was 
contemplated in the 1992 Electricity Act and which should have been implemented from February Is'.
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3.2. The setting up of the contract renegotiation process’ legal framework
As Duhalde’s first month in office ended, the country’s economic outlook continued 
to worsen. His government then had no choice but to back away from flirting with 
unorthodox measures and to move closer towards adopting a “coherent” plan urged 
upon it by the IMF and sundry outsiders, including the US government. On February 
3, Jorge Remes Lenicov, the Minister of Economy, announced an important shift in 
the government strategy. The new economic plan involved not only floating the peso 
but also transforming a largely dollarised economy into one that would work in
17pesos . In this sense, it was decreed that all dollar loans -  and not only those of less 
than 100,000, as provided in the Economic Emergency Law -  would be turned into 
pesos at par. Moreover, breaking the president’s original promise to repay dollar 
savings in dollars, it was established they would be paid back in pesos, converted at 
an exchange rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar and indexed to inflation. To cover the 
mismatch in the treatment of deposits and loans (around US$ 20 billion), the 
government announced that the banks would be compensated with government bonds.
The official hopes were that the plan would stop the country’s economic and political 
implosion and lay the foundation for recovery. Critics, however, were far less 
optimistic. In their view, the new measures were too generous to debtors at the 
expense of creditors and tax-payers. They also argued that their success required both 
a monetary discipline and a fiscal austerity that the new government could hardly 
deliver for several reasons. First, government officials had already rejected the 
possibility of introducing much needed reforms in the central government’s and the
17 Following the passage o f  the Economic Emergency Law the government had instituted an officially  
manipulated dual exchange rate.
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provinces’ finances. Second, the Central Bank lacked both genuine independence and 
an inflation target. Third, the predictions in the new budget bill that the executive
I Rsubmitted to Congress looked too optimistic . In short, their prediction was that the 
peso would continue to depreciate and, as a result, inflation would take off.
The pessimism of some observers regarding the prospects of the government’s plan 
was also grounded on political considerations. In their view, although the new 
president could count on the support in Congress of most of his party and much of the 
opposition, this situation was not likely to last long. Opposition legislators, and in 
particular those who belonged to the Alianza, had already announced that, despite the 
fact they would assist the new government in finding a way out of the convertibility 
regime, their support would not be unconditional. To a certain extent this was 
understandable: it was not their government but that o f their traditional rivals.
Things did not look much better in the Peronist camp. It was no mystery that the 
arrival of Duhalde to the presidency had intensified the internal conflicts within this 
party. Because Duhalde was a declared enemy of former President Carlos Menem, 
nobody expected the latter to encourage his followers in Congress -  around fifteen in 
both chambers -  to make things easy for the new authorities. There was also a group 
o f Peronist provincial governors with presidential ambitions who would hardly see the 
point of associating their political prospects with that o f an administration with pretty 
low chances of succeeding19.
18 It forecasted inflation o f  15% in 2002, a 5% fall in GDP and a fiscal deficit o f  3 billion pesos.
19 The governors o f the provinces o f  Cordoba and Santa Cruz -  Jose Manuel de la Sota and Nestor 
Kirchner, respectively -  were the most salient figures o f  this group.
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To complicate things even further, President Duhalde still faced the noisy hostility of 
much of the middle class, which had helped to bring down two of his predecessors,
and he had been embroiled in a political battle against the Supreme Court, which had
20declared the freezing of deposits unconstitutional .
O f course, the utilities were among those who distrusted the new economic plan. Like 
most analysts, they believed that inflation was likely to burst and, with their tariffs 
frozen, the problems in their finances would worsen to a point of no return. Therefore, 
they increased their demands on the government to speed up the renegotiation 
process.
Faced with these pressures, by the end of the first week of February the president 
finally received the top representatives of several foreign firms21. A week later, he 
went one step further and signed a presidential decree (293/02), in which he instituted 
the key features of the framework within which the renegotiation process would 
finally take place. Among other things, the decree established that, in the following 
120 days, the Minister o f Economy would have to submit a proposal to the president 
that was to comprise the renegotiated contracts and licenses of all the utilities and 
infrastructure operators under the national government purview. Also, a Contract 
Renegotiation Commission would be created in order to assist and advice the minister 
on the preparation of the proposal. In this regard, the decree provided that the 
commission’s composition would be decided by the president within the following 30 
days, that it would be presided by the Minister of Economy, and that it would be the 
latter’s responsibility to institute the commission’s organizational and operative rules.
20 That prompted Duhalde’s Congressional allies to start impeachment proceedings against the court.
21 See La Nacion 07/02/02.
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Finally, it established that both the special committee created in Congress to follow up 
the implementation o f Economic Emergency Law and the Comision Bicameral de 
Reforma del Estado y  Seguimiento de las Privatizaciones would have to be informed 
about the renegotiation proceedings and they would be allowed to issue non binding 
opinions.
Adding to this, on February 26, president Duhalde signed another decree (370/02) in 
which it was established that, in addition to the Minister of Economy, the Contract 
Renegotiation Commission would be composed by: a coordinator general and a 
cabinet of four advisors (who could be removed discretionally by the minister); the 
Secretary of Legal and Administrative Affairs of the Ministry of Economy; the 
Secretaries of Energy, Transport, Public Works, Communications, and Competition 
Affairs; a representative of the national Ombudsman; and a representative of the 
consumer associations.
During the first days of March, finally, the Minister of Economy passed a resolution 
that set the starting date of the negotiations (March 18th), and also demanded each of 
the firms that would take part in those negotiations to submit a report to the 
Renegotiation Commission with a detailed description of the effects that the
Economic Emergency Law had on their finances and a proposal for adapting their
22contracts and licenses to the new economic scenario .
22 Resolution ME 20/2002.
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4. Utility regulation under the new rules o f the game
4.1. In the beginning all was confusion
The setting up of the rules that would govern the contract renegotiation was, in 
principle, good news for the companies. In fact, since the day after the Economic 
Emergency Law had been passed, they had been demanding the establishment of 
those rules. The truth, however, is that when the contract renegotiation process 
started, utilities had other, more important concerns.
The country’s economic prospects looked darker than ever. On March 21st, during a 
presidential summit in Mexico, President Duhalde was notified that Argentina should 
not expect to get any sort of external aid for at least the following three months23. 
Following this warning, and despite the fierce intervention of the monetary 
authorities, the peso was soon trading close to 3 to the dollar.
In addition, and as the economic crisis worsened, the honeymoon between the 
executive and its supporters in the Legislature was coming to an end. Good evidence 
of this was that in the first days of March, the executive decided to veto some of the 
provisions o f the budget bill voted by Congress, and the increasing difficulties of the 
executive in convincing legislators to pass the reforms demanded by the financial 
community and, in particular, by the International Monetary Fund. These reforms 
included, among other things, the repeal o f two populist anti-bank laws and watertight
23 See Cronista 22/03/02.
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measures to cut public spending - particularly by provinces24. Adding to this, the same 
day the contract renegotiation process started, legislators from the ruling party 
announced that, despite the executive’s opposition, they were considering the 
introduction of a bill that established that the decisions o f the Comision Bicamenral 
de Seguimiento y  Control de las Privatizaciones on the renegotiation of contracts
25would be binding .
thTo make things even worse, on March 24 , Metrogas (the largest gas distribution 
company in the country) announced the default on its US$ 420 million debt26. 
Although the government’s first reaction was to claim that this was an isolated case,
”27and, most likely, part of the firm’s strategy in the contract renegotiation process , in 
the following days it became clear that this was a rather optimistic expectation. In 
fact, the steps of the gas distributor were soon followed, among others, by CTI (an 
operator of mobile telephony), Central Puerto (an electricity generator), Telecom 
Argentina (one of the two operators of basic telephony), and Aguas Argentinas (the 
water and sewerage provider in the Capital Federal and most of the greater Buenos 
Aires).
In all these cases, the justification provided by the firms was fairly similar. Briefly, 
they argued that they were not only highly indebted but also that their debts had not 
been modified by the pesoification of debts introduced earlier in 200228. Defaulting,
24 See Cronista 22/03/02.
25 See Cronista 19/03/02.
26 Metrogas’ most important shareholders were British Gas and Repsol-YPF. According to its 
representatives, only 10% o f the company’s debt had been contracted with local creditors and, thus, 
was converted to pesos. The remaining 90% had been contracted abroad and, consequently, was 
nominated in foreign currencies. See La Nacion 26/03/02, and Clarin 27/03/02.
27 See La Nacion 26/03/02.
28 With liabilities close to US$ 3.2 billion, Telecom (controlled by France Telecom and Telecom Italia) 
was the biggest corporate debtor in Argentina. In 2002 its financial obligations amounted US$ 1.2
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they claimed, was then the only alternative left to them in order to preserve the cash 
flow required for securing the provision of services. What very few admitted in 
public, nevertheless, was that another critical element in the decision to renege on 
their financial obligations was the belief that, contrary to the government’s 
expectations, the economy would continue to decline and that, despite the advances 
made in the contract renegotiation process, the government had no real intention of 
introducing significant changes to the status quo.
Several events contributed to this scepticism. In the telecommunications sector, for 
instance, the newly appointed secretary -  the fourth since the beginning of the year -  
was someone with no prior experience in regulatory matters29. During the first days of 
April, moreover, the economic authorities passed a resolution (38/2002) regulating the 
provisions of the Economic Emergency Law. Among other things, this resolution 
established the suspension of all tariff revision processes and placed an order on all 
bodies and agencies of the public administration to refrain from adopting decisions 
that could affect prices charged by utilities in any way. It was pretty obvious that the 
objective of these measures was interrupting the seasonal reviews o f electricity and 
gas tariffs which, according to the legislation introduced at the time of privatization, 
had to be carried out every three months in the electricity sector and twice a year in 
gas. Although some days later, in response to operators’ fierce opposition, the 
Ministry of Economy passed another resolution (53/2002) allowing those reviews, 
few believed that this policy reversal reflected a sincere change o f preferences.
billion. In the case o f  CTI, its debt amounted almost US$ 1 billion. Aguas Argentinas (owned by Suez- 
Lyonaise des Aux y Aguas de Barcelona) and Central Puerto’s financial obligations, meanwhile, were 
close to US$ 670 and 306 million, respectively. See Cronista 19/03/02, 22/03/02, 01/04/02, 02/04/02, 
and 03/04/02; and La 03/04/02, and 10/04/02.
29 See Cronista 09/05/02.
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4.2. A new start?
Confirming the worst fears of the utilities, in the last week of April, once again, the 
country was staring at an economic and political abyss. As shown by an opinion poll 
published those days, there was an increasingly popular belief that president Duhalde 
would be unable to finish his mandate and, furthermore, that another episode of 
popular unrest, similar to the one that preceded De la Rua’s fall, was around the 
comer30. On April the 23rd, by jibbing at a plan to convert frozen bank savings into 
ten-year government bonds, Congress sealed the resignation of the Minister of 
Economy, who a week earlier had returned empty-handed from meetings with IMF 
officials and G8 finance ministers.
In the light of these events, the president showed signs of wanting to abandon the 
search for an IMF deal31. Before that happened, however, the provincial governors of 
Duhalde’s own party stepped in and forced him to agree a 14-point plan, which
32included most of the measures demanded by the Fund . The governors, moreover, 
forced the president to agree with them on a new economic minister. After turning 
down the president’s first choice, the man finally appointed, on April 26th, was the 
ambassador before the European Union, Roberto Lavagna.
The appointment of the new minister and the promises comprised in the governors’ 
plan seemed to bring fresh air to a government whose mishandling of devaluation did
30 The opinion poll was carried out among businessmen, diplomats, academics, and analysts by the 
Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria. According to its results, 62% o f respondents believed that 
president Duhalde would end his days in office before the expiration o f  his term, while around 78% 
responded that another episode o f  social unrest was likely to happen in the near future. See Cronista 
15/04/02.
31 See Cronista 24/04/02.
32 See Cronista 25/04/02.
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much to increase its costs. In fact, a few days later the IMF agreed to roll-over a $130 
million payment due, and the Inter-American Development Bank revamped loans to 
the country totalling US$ 690 millions. Congress, meanwhile, began to take steps to 
put in place some of the preconditions demanded by the Fund to sign a new deal. In 
addition, most provincial governors ratified their promise to cut their deficits by 60% 
and to cease printing their own quasi-currencies to pay their workers and meet other 
obligations.
33Despite the fact that during those days another couple of firms had defaulted , and 
that the new economic plan made no reference to utilities problems, operators agreed 
with the plan’s spirit and most o f the policy initiatives that it comprised. Also 
contributing to their enthusiasm was the appointment as Secretary of Economic Policy 
of someone highly familiar with their problems34. For some operators, this choice was 
not accidental. In their view, it was a good indicator that, thanks to the pressure of 
international financial institutions and foreign governments, something was about to 
change in the government’s strategy towards them.
Lavagna’s first decisions in office seemed to confirm those optimistic expectations. 
Indeed, a week after his appointment, the Secretariat of Energy authorized a 50% 
seasonal increase in electricity wholesale prices, establishing that part o f this increase 
would be financed through a 15% increase in residential electricity bills. More 
precisely, it was established that in the period between May 1st and July 31st, the
33 These companies were Transener (an electricity transporter controlled by the local PeCom and the 
British National Grid) and Ciesa (which, together with Enron, controlled the gas transporter
Transportadora Gas del Sur). Their debts were U$ 470 and 220 millions, respectively. See Cronista 
24/04/02.
34 The man chosen was Enrique Devoto, who had been in the ENRE’s board o f  directors since its 
creation in 1993.
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wholesale price of one MW/h would increase from $20,74, the price in place since 
November 2001, to $30.
Although in US dollars the new wholesale electricity price was less than one-third of 
the price before devaluation -  and considerably less than the price in place in other 
countries -  the decision to adjust electricity prices triggered strong critiques. In the 
view o f consumer associations, for instance, not only it was illegal because it 
contradicted the freezing of tariffs established in the Economic Emergency Law but 
also because it represented a clear breach of the government’s promise to maintain the 
new status quo. Equally negative was the opinion of a vast majority of legislators, 
who struck back on May 9th and voted a bill in the lower chamber which stipulated 
that, for as long as their contracts were renegotiated, utilities would not be allowed to 
disconnect those customers who could prove their inability to pay35.
The critiques and reprisals, however, did not seem to change the new economic 
authorities’ plans. On May 14th, Lavagna met with most o f the utility operators. In 
that meeting, the first between a Minister of Economy and the companies since the 
change of the monetary regime, the firms were told that although the government’s 
top priority was clinching an agreement with the IMF, finding a solution to the 
utilities’ problems was also in the new economic team’s agenda. The minister assured 
operators that if the bill recently approved in the lower chamber passed the filter of 
the Senate, he would suggest the president vetoing it36. Moreover, he guaranteed them
37that, despite some recent changes in its composition , he had no intentions to
35 See La Nacion 10/05/02.
36 See Cronista and La Nacion 15/05/02.
37 One o f  Lavagna’s first decisions was to change the coordinator o f  the Renegotiating Commission. In 
the place o f  Jose Barbero he appointed Alfredo Biagosch.
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interfere with the work of the Renegotiation Commission, which by that time was 
already at the stage of analysing the information provided by operators as well as their 
proposals38. On the contrary, he promised, in order to foster the commission’s
39capacities he would now allow sectoral regulators to participate in its proceedings . 
Last, but not least, the minister ensured electricity generators that the seasonal 
increases recently introduced would not be reversed, and announced that by the end of 
May a similar adjustment would take place in wholesale gas prices40.
4.3. Not all that shines is gold
After the meeting with the minister, and despite the fact their problems were as 
serious as before, utilities thought that they had a reason to be less pessimistic about 
their future. As discussed in the subsequent pages, however, they soon realised that 
one swallow does not make a summer.
On May 15th, the Secretary of Economic Policy revealed that the government would 
propose the utilities a two months extension of the deadline originally established for 
the completion of the renegotiation process41. For operators this announcement was 
like a bucket of cold water. Indeed, it not only involved a major change in the rules o f 
the game of the contract renegotiation process but also it seriously challenged the 
credibility of the promises made to them by the minister just a couple of days before —
38 There was a rumour that the new economic team was considering extending the Commissions 
deadlines by three months.
39 Several days before, it was announced that the Secretariat o f  Energy had opened an open contest for 
filling the vacant positions in the board o f  directors o f  the gas and electricity regulatory agencies. By 
that time, there were 3 o f  those positions in ENRE and 4  in ENARGAS. See La Nacion 09/05/02.
40 It should be noted that the same day he took office, Lavagna instructed the gas regulator to reject the 
adjustment proposals made by gas generators. See La Nacion 26/04/03.
41 See Cronista 16/05/02.
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recall that one of these promises was to respect the schedule originally set up. 
Moreover, they were aware of the fact that postponing the deadline would almost 
certainly involve two more months without significant changes to the status quo.
Utilities acknowledged, nevertheless, that they did not have much room to impede the 
postponement. Indeed, since the Commission’s original schedule had been established 
in a presidential decree, if  the government wanted to introduce amendments to that 
schedule it could do it by simply signing another decree.
For some companies, however, this did not imply that they should wait for things to 
happen. Before doing so, they believed, it was worth trying to negotiate and obtain 
something in exchange. On May 15th, thus, they proposed the government to allow a 
general increase in tariffs on account of the increases that would necessarily result 
from the contract renegotiations42.
As it has already been discussed in this chapter, this was not the first time that utilities 
proposed an adjustment of their tariffs. For some government officials, however, there 
was something new in the proposal in question: for the first time the companies were 
trying to install the belief that the natural outcome of the contract renegotiation 
process would be an increase of tariffs. And this, they judged, was something that the 
government should not allow to happen. Following their reasoning, therefore, the 
government’s response to the proposal should be much more categorical than a 
routine announcement confirming that no decision regarding the adjustment o f tariffs 
would be made before the conclusion of the contract renegotiation process.
42 See La Nacion 18/05/02
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The herald chosen in this occasion to pass the message was the Renegotiation 
Commission. On May 22nd, the body made public a provisional report on the case of 
one o f the companies, whose concession contract was subject to renegotiation: Aguas 
Argentinas43. In it, and among other things, the commission contended that its 
analysis o f the case suggested that, contrary to what the company had been 
demanding, an increase in tariffs was not needed in order to continue with a normal 
provision of the service. The commission stated that, despite its problems, the 
company should not experience major difficulties in covering its operational costs 
and, therefore, the government should not allow it to suspend any of its contractual 
obligations (notably, investments)44.
As soon as they took notice of the commission’s report, many analysts suspected that 
the government’s message to the companies was not simply that the outcome of the 
renegotiation process was still open. In their view, the report also indicated that it was 
not in the government’s plans to compensate them for the effects of the measures 
introduced in the Economic Emergency Law. Utilities, of course, shared this 
impression and acted accordingly.
As May ended, at least five companies had already presented lawsuits against the 
Argentine government before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitrage tribunal linked to the World 
Bank45. Following the publication of the Renegotiation Commission’s report, it
43 The firm was the water and sewerage provider in Capital Federal and greater Buenos Aires.
44 See Clarin 23/05/02 and 24/05/02
45 These companies were: CMS Energy, LG&E, Metrogas (British Gas), Camuzzi Gas del Sur and 
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana (Camuzzi International), and Sempra Energy International. According to
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became known that there were many others seriously considering taking the same 
course o f action46. Adding to this, on the last week of May the body that grouped 
electricity generators, Ageera, initiated legal action against the Secretariat of Energy 
before a local court demanding the annulment of the pesofication of their incomes47. It 
was the first time since the adoption of the Economic Emergency Law that operators 
implemented their threat to judicialise the conflict.
Whether because of these pressures or simply because the government realized that 
the companies had misunderstood its true intentions, on May 28th the Vice Minister of 
Economy revealed that the government had decided that, starting form June, gas, 
electricity, and international calls’ tariffs would be increased and that these increases 
would be on account of the increases that would necessarily result from the contract 
renegotiation process. He also announced that the increases in question would not 
need the approval of Congress and that the government was also contemplating 
adopting other measures, such as the cancellation of the debts that some utilities had 
acquired to the Argentine state48.He warned, nevertheless, that the conclusion of the 
renegotiation process would probably have to wait until an agreement with the IMF 
was clinched.
Utilities, naturally, were delighted with the Vice Minister’s words. Indeed, although 
they confirmed their suspicion that the deadline for the conclusion of the renegotiation 
process would be postponed -  the government was calculating that it would not be
ICSID’s procedures, once a company presents a lawsuit against a country, a six-month negotiation 
period between the parties follows. If no agreement is reached during that period, the company can 
demand an international arbitrage.
46 See Cronista 24/05/02.
47 The pesoification o f  generators’ income had been introduced by means o f  two resolutions (Re. SE 
2/2002 and Re. SE 8/2002) in the second week o f  March.
48 See La Nacion, Clarin, and Cronista, 29/05/02.
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able to come to an agreement with the IMF before October or November -  they 
seemed to dispel the fear that the government had no serious intentions to introduce 
changes to the status quo. The question that naturally arose among the companies, 
nevertheless, was whether this was another of those announcements that would be 
reversed a few days later or, on the contrary, the government had finally committed 
itself to address utilities’ problems.
Unfortunately for the companies, it would not take much time until they knew the 
answer to this question. On May 29, following the instructions o f President Duhalde, 
Mr. Lavagna publicly rejected the possibility of any imminent change in utilities’ 
tariffs49. The only justification he provided for this was that it was impossible to make 
a decision on this issue before sealing an agreement with the international financial 
institutions and, in particular, with the IMF.
Yet, this was not the only bad news for the companies. On May 29 Alfredo Biagosch 
the coordinator of the Renegotiation Commission, resigned. Although Biagosch was 
among those who strongly opposed the introduction of tariff adjustments, utilities 
regretted his departure because they feared that it would be used by the government as 
a justification for introducing further delays in the renegotiation process. In the light 
of future events, these suspicions were justified. The government waited three long 
weeks to appoint a new coordinator50.
Furthermore, on June 12, the lower chamber passed a bill establishing that utilities 
would not be allowed to interrupt the provision of services to institutions involved in
49 See La Nacion, Clarin, and Cronista, 30/05/02.
50 Decree 1040/02. The person chosen was Miguel Sanguinetti.
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security, education, or social assistance activities, even if these defaulted in 
payment51. In the eyes o f the companies, this equalled to obliging them to provide 
their services to those institutions for free.
Finally, on June 26, four days after the deadline for the completion of the 
renegotiation process had expired, the president signed a decree which, amending the 
provisions of the decree 293/02, established that all operators who presented claims 
before another body beside the Renegotiation Commission would be excluded for the 
renegotiation process52. The government’s implicit objective with this new legislation 
was pretty clear: putting an end to the waterfall o f claims presented before the Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
4.4. The firsts attempts to authorize tariff increases
On July 2nd, unexpectedly, Duhalde announced that the presidential elections would 
take place six month earlier than the date originally scheduled, and that the new 
president would be taking office in May 2003. Although his officials denied 
suggestions that the IMF had demanded this as a condition for clinching an 
agreement, the fact was that a few days after the announcement was made, the IMF let 
the country delay a nearly $1 billion debt repayment due that month.
51 On that same date, the chamber o f  deputies also voted a bill establishing a much more flexible 
scheme for refinancing the debts o f  utility consumers. The bill, moreover, stipulated that those 
consumers whose service had been cut due to lack o f  payment would have to be reconnected free o f  
charge. Finally, it obliged utilities to accept all the bonds and certificates issued by the national state 
and the provinces -  which in som e cases were trading at half o f  their nominal value. See La Nation, 
13/06/02 yClarin 13/06/02.
52 Decree 1090/02.
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Duhalde’s decisions to advance the date o f the presidential elections and to shorten 
his term in office were well received among utilities. In their view, these decisions 
revealed that the government was desperate to clinch an agreement with the IMF and, 
therefore, that it would have to accept some of the latter’s demands. However, few 
dared to predict if the adjustment o f tariffs would be on the list of demands that the 
government was ready to look at.
It did not take much time for the companies to find out that the issue of tariffs was 
indeed on that list. On May 6th, and at the instance of the Minister of Economy, the 
president signed a decree vetoing the law in which legislators had established that 
utilities would not be allowed to interrupt the provision of services to institutions 
involved in security, education, or social assistance activities53. Two days later, 
moreover, Mr. Lavagna announced that, starting in August, the executive would allow 
utilities to introduce a staggered adjustment in tariffs54.
The news about an imminent increase in utilities’ tariffs triggered strong reactions. 
Indeed, the same day the minister announced this, the national ombudsman resigned 
from the Renegotiation Commission, blaming the government o f giving up to the 
pressures of the companies, foreign governments, and international financial 
institutions55. Similar allegations, meanwhile, were raised by consumer associations, 
who threatened to challenge the increases in the courts -  on the grounds that they
53 Decree 1172/02. Surprisingly, one o f  the arguments used by the executive to justify the veto was that 
the bill voted in Congress violated the provisions o f  the concession contracts. According to the 
executive, in those contracts consumers were not categorized according to the activities they were 
involved but according to their consumption characteristics. Accompanying the veto, however, the 
president signed another decree (1174/02) in which it was established that utilities could interrupt the 
provision o f  services to institutions involved in security, education, or social assistance activities but 
only after giving them a 30-days-notice.
54 See Clarin and La Nacion, 09/07/02.
55 See Clarin 09/07/02.
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violated the provisions of the Economic Emergency Law and that no public hearings 
had been carried out to discuss them and a great number of legislators and a great 
number o f legislators, who insisted that any change to the status quo had to be 
discussed in Congress56.
These critiques did not seem to affect the minister’s plans. On July 18th, Lavagna 
confirmed that the decision to adjust utilities’ tariffs had already been taken. He 
stated, moreover, that maintaining the freeze on tariffs would equal to “hiding the dirt 
under the carpet” and that it would force a future administration to increase tariffs all 
of a sudden. In addition, he also pointed out that the adjustments that the government 
was about to authorize were the only way to avoid a rapid degradation of utilities’ 
services57.
The discussion soon turned on to how the increases would be introduced. In this 
respect, the economic team had already made it clear that, given the unpopularity of 
the measure and the increasing lack of support that the executive was facing in the 
Legislature, the adjustment would have to be implemented by means of a presidential 
decree. In their view, moreover, it would also be necessary to minimize the 
politisation of the debate that would probably follow the presentation of their 
adjustment proposal. They thus supported carrying out the discussion on the issue at 
stake by means of a consultation document rather than through public hearings.
Not surprisingly, consumer organizations and most legislators strongly opposed these 
plans. They insisted that any change to the status quo would need to be discussed with
56 See Clarin and La Nacion, 13/07/02.
57 See Clarin and La Nacion, 19/07/02.
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all interested parties in public hearings and that the government should not by-pass 
Congress. What few expected, however, was that immediately after the economic 
team revealed how they would introduce the changes, some important government 
officials -  who had reluctantly agreed to the plan of uplifting the freeze on tariffs -
CO
also raised similar claims . By the first week of August, and as the disagreements 
within the executive seemed to increase, the general impression among observers was 
that the likelihood of an adjustment of utilities’ tariffs before the presidential elections 
was getting more and more remote59.
On August 9th, however, Mr. Lavagna decided to grasp the nettle and, unexpectedly, 
he sent a letter to all the companies involved in the contract renegotiation process. 
Somehow changing the rules of the game in place, this letter notified all the 
participants in the contract renegotiation process that, within the next five days, each 
of them would have to inform the Renegotiation Commission the precise tariff 
“emergency adjustment” they were demanding. It specified, moreover, that once those 
demands were analyzed by the Commission and before any decision in this respect, 
utilities’ demands would be discussed with all interested parties in public hearings. 
No reference was made to the role of Congress in that process.
These seemed to be good news for the companies but forced them to face a difficult 
dilemma. As they publicly admitted, if they presented a realistic demand, the 
government would probably consider it exaggerated. In such scenario, the companies 
evaluated, the government might use the general public discontent against them -  
which would probably increase in the light of these demands -  and once more freeze
58 The most prominent figure among these officials was the Cabinet Chief, Alfredo Atanasof.
59 See La Nacion 07/08/02.
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all negotiations60. If, on the other hand, they opted for cooperating with the 
government and requested what they believed that the government wanted them to 
demand, the prospects did not look much better61. First, both their shareholders and 
creditors would certainly consider that request insufficient. Second, even if the 
government granted them such an increase, their leverage in future negotiations with 
the authorities would most likely be damaged. Indeed, it would probably be very 
difficult for them to convince the government about the need of further adjustments or 
o f advancing in the contract renegotiation process62.
The economic team took notice o f the dilemma that utilities were facing and, at the 
last minute, decided to do something to “persuade” the companies to choose the 
cooperative alternative. On August 16th, thus, Lavagna signed the resolution ME 
308/02 that, among other things, softened the provisions of the presidential decree 
1090/02. As discussed above, this decree had established that those operators who 
presented claims before another body but the Renegotiation Commission would be 
automatically excluded from the renegotiation process. Furthermore, the resolution 
308/02 established that the government would not present claims or impose fines 
against those operators that could prove that, due to the impact of the measures 
provided in the Economic Emergency Law, they could not comply with the non­
60 The results o f an opinion poll carried out during the first week o f  August by IBOPE supported this 
hypothesis. According to it, and despite the fact that most respondents declared they were satisfied with 
the quality o f  the service provided by utilities, 51% o f them supported their re-nationalisation. During 
the 90s, those who favoured that alternative never went beyond 25%. See La Nacion 15/08/02.
61 Government officials had already revealed that the increase they would authorise would not exceed  
10%.
62 See Clarin 14/08/02 and 17/08/02, and La Nacion 15/08/02.
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essential investments or the quality standards specified in their licenses or concession 
contracts63.
The minister’s gesture, despite being another change in the rules of the game 
governing the contract renegotiation process, was appreciated by utilities. It soon 
became evident, however, that this would not be enough to convince them to submit 
adjustment demands in line with the government’s preferences. Proof of this was that 
half of the companies decided to shift the responsibility of quantifying the adjustment 
to the government and, instead of demanding a precise adjustment figure, they only 
submitted a general assessment of the losses that, in their view, the Economic 
Emergency Law and the crisis had caused on their finances64. The other half, 
meanwhile, did present a precise tariff adjustment request. Their demands, however, 
were far beyond the figure that, in the view of observers, the government was 
expecting the companies to ask. In fact, according to press information, none o f the 
companies within this second group requested an adjustment o f less than 24%. In 
some extreme cases, the figure demanded reached 173%65. The majority of operators, 
however, demanded an increase similar to the inflation in retail prices, which at that 
time, and according to the figures generated by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses (Indec), was close to 35%66.
63 Other provisions o f  the resolution ME 308/2002 further regulated the rules governing the contract 
renegotiation process and, in particular, they expanded the powers that the Renegotiation Commission 
would have vis-a-vis sectoral regulators in that process.
64 See Clarin 18/08/02.
65 See Clarin 17/08/02 and 24/08/02.
66 A good number o f  them also demanded a cut in the taxes that consumers paid with every utility bill. 
As noted by the companies, this demand was aimed at cushioning the impact o f  the proposed 
adjustments. See La Nacion, 21/08/03.
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These demands from the utilities were not well received by the government. President 
Duhalde, for example, claimed that expecting tariff increases of 60% or 70% was 
completely “absurd” and “foolish” 67. In a more diplomatic fashion, Minister Lavagna 
stated that operators’ demands were “excessive” and that the government would only 
authorise increases below 10%. In contrast to what would have happened in previous 
months, however, the companies’ requests did not trigger a reprisal by the 
government. On the contrary, given its need to clinch an agreement with the IMF, the 
government had no option but to ignore the companies’ rebuff and reaffirm its 
commitment to address utilities’ problems.
Within this context, on August 14th, the Ministry of Economy passed a resolution 
comprising a measure that had been demanded by operators almost since the date the 
contract renegotiation process started: the authorization to request the confidentiality 
of all the commercially sensitive information and documentation that they submitted 
to the Renegotiating Commission68. Two weeks later, moreover, the economic 
authorities set up a schedule for the public hearings in which they intended to discuss 
the announced adjustments69. These hearings were to begin on September 25th and 
would continue until the first week of October. It was also decided that, once the 
consultations ended, the Ministry would have eight working days to come out with a 
decision70.
67 See Clarin 18/08/02.
68 Resolution M.E. 317/2000.
69 According to that schedule, the first public hearings would be carried out to discuss the introduction 
o f emergency tariff adjustments in the electricity sector. The introduction o f  adjustments in the 
telecommunications sector, meanwhile, would be the object o f  the last hearing. See La Nacion  
27/08/02.
70 This announcement triggered the resignation o f  Sanguinetti as Coordinator o f  the Renegotiating 
Commission and his replacement by Gustavo Simeonoff. The later was the fourth coordinator since the 
creation o f the Commission. According to press information, the resignation o f  Sanguinetti was a direct 
consequence o f  the refusal o f  the sectoral regulators to chair the hearings. And that refusal, also 
according to the press, was because regulators were unhappy with the secondary role that the
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Complementing these measures, on September 16th, the president signed the decrees 
1834/02 and 1839/02. Reversing what had been established at the time of 
privatization in the early 90s, the first stipulated that the contracts of those operators 
that had entered the process of reorganization (concurso preventivo de acreedores) or 
had filed a liquidation petition would not be cancelled, provided that they continued
71fulfilling the service obligations stipulated in the contract . The decree 1839/02, 
moreover, further regulated the provisions governing the contract renegotiation 
process. As utilities had been demanding, it introduced more precision on matters 
such as the information that the companies should include in their renegotiation 
proposals and the steps that would follow in the case they could not reach an 
agreement with the government in the first instance. Finally, the decree also extended 
the deadline originally set up for concluding the renegotiation of contracts -  which 
had already expired more than two moths before -  to 120 days, and granted the 
Minister of Economy the power to extend it for another 60 days.
Utilities did not make a big deal out of these last changes, although they clearly
72represented more amendments to the rules of the contract renegotiation process . And 
there were two reasons for this. On the one hand, operators were aware that, as a 
result of the constant changes in its composition, the Contract Renegotiation 
Commission was a long way from having completed the analysis of the 59 contracts 
under review. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, utilities realised that 
postponing the conclusion of the contract renegotiation was probably the only way to
authorities had given them in the contract renegotiation process. See Ambito Financiero and Clarin 
11/09/02.
71 Another reason why operators greatly appreciated the provisions o f  this decree was that, according to 
the Argentine legislation, when a company enters the process o f  reorganisation it can interrupt 
servicing its debt.
72 See Clarin 18/08/02 and La Nacion 18/09/02.
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prevent Congress from entering into the discussions. It is important to note that in the 
last two weeks of August the upper chamber had made three attempts to vote a bill 
that stipulated that Congress would have the final say on the outcome of the 
renegotiation process73.
4.5. The judiciary steps in.
By mid September, the prospects for utilities looked better -  or more accurately, less 
bad -  than at any previous time in 2002. Not only had the government become more 
receptive to operators’ demands but also the economy seemed to stop shrinking. 
Indeed, since June the peso had hovered close to 3.60 to the dollar, central bank 
reserves had been rising, and inflation remained restrained74. Starting in July, 
moreover, the government’s budget had begun experiencing small surpluses. In this 
scenario -  referred by several observers as an economic veranito, or Indian summer -  
there may even have been hopes that the government was going to get its own way 
with the adjustments of utilities’ tariffs. But, as it soon became evident, changing the 
status quo would not be that easy.
On September 24th, in response to a joint presentation made by the consumer 
organizations and the ombudsman of the Capital Federal75, a judge ordered the 
suspension of the public hearings called to discuss changes in utility tariffs and 
prohibited the government from authorizing any adjustment in utilities tariffs outside 
the contract renegotiation process provided in the Economic Emergency Law. In her
73 See La Nacion 19/08/02 and Clarin 30/08/02.
74 Although in nominal terms the peso had already fallen by 260% since January 2002, consumer prices 
had increased by only 40%.
75 See La Nacion 23/09/02.
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ruling, the judge also questioned the legality of the procedure that the government had 
adopted to call to the public hearings -  such as not publishing it in the Official 
Bulletin. Moreover, she stated that following the Economic Emergency Law, the 
hearings should have been the corollary of the contract renegotiating process and not 
the starting point. Finally, she argued that taking into account that the Minister of 
Economy had already announced the measures that would follow the hearings -  i.e., 
an increase in utility tariffs —, carrying them out appeared to be a mere formality76.
The same day the ruling became public, of course, the economic authorities 
announced that they would appeal against it and that they would do it on the grounds 
that the introduction of a tariff emergency adjustment and the renegotiation of 
contracts were two different issues that, precisely because of this, could be addressed 
separately. They also revealed that in its appeal the government would argue that, in 
an emergency situation, the introduction of a tariff adjustment could not be subject to
77the same requisites and procedures than those in force during normal times . In the 
minister’s team, however, they were aware that this announcement would not bring 
much comfort to operators and international financial institutions. They all knew, in 
this sense, that the case would probably end up in the hands of the Supreme Court 
and, given the functioning of the judiciary in Argentina, it could take several months, 
or even years, before the Court reached a final decision.
On October 11th, thus, Lavagna signed resolution M.E. 487/02. As some expected, 
this resolution insisted on the introduction of emergency tariff adjustments. 
Surprisingly, however, the resolution did not authorise these adjustments in all the
76 See La Nacion, Clarin and Ambito Financiero, 25/09/02.
77 See La Nacion 25/09/02.
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utilities under the national government purview -  as in the original plan -  but only in 
the electricity and gas sectors. According to officials in the Ministry of Economy, the 
reason for limiting the tariff adjustment only to these sectors was twofold. On the one 
hand, the rules defining the key features of the regulatory framework in those sectors 
-  defined in the Laws 24.065 and 24.076 -  explicitly contemplated the possibility of
7 0
allowing changes in tariffs in case of exceptional or unforeseen events . In the view 
of economic officials, the freezing of tariffs and the devaluation of the national 
currency clearly fitted into that type of event. On the other hand, those rules had been 
established in laws which, they argued, the Economic Emergency Law had not 
revoked. In their view, then, an emergency adjustment in gas and electricity tariffs 
could be authorised within the framework of those laws. That is, there was no legal 
obligation to do it within the framework of the contract renegotiation process.
Consumer organizations and their allies, obviously, strongly opposed the 
government’s new plan and the inclusion in Resolution 487/02 of a provision 
establishing that any tariff increase would exclude low income consumers did not 
seem to help to neutralise their anger79. Neither did it seem to help the decision taken 
by the electricity and gas regulators to discuss operators’ adjustment proposals in
o n
public hearings . This was because, in the view of consumer organizations, the issue 
at stake was simple: any change in tariffs adopted outside the framework of the
78 Article 46 in both laws.
79 Resolution M.E. 487/02 defined as low-consumers those who had a bi-monthly consumption below  
300kW o f electricity and 500 cubic metres o f  gas. According to the economic authorities, these 
thresholds would exempt almost 42% and 32% o f electricity and gas residential consumers, 
respectively, from the increases.
80 On October 22, ENRE set the date for the hearings to discuss electricity operators’ emergency 
adjustment proposals for the third week o f  November. On the same day, ENARGAS called for a 
hearing to discuss gas operators’ proposals on November 18th. See La Nacion 22/10/02.
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contract renegotiation process openly violated the provisions of the Economic 
Emergency Law and, consequently, it was illegal.
At the time of signing Resolution 487/02, Lavagna almost certainly expected that 
consumer organizations would resist the government’s new plan for adjusting tariffs. 
What he probably never anticipated, however, was that operators did not seem to like 
it much either. By the first week of November, only one of the electricity distributors 
-  EDESUR - had submitted a tariff adjustment proposal. According to press 
information, the main reason for this was that most firms were reluctant to participate 
in a process in which, in the best case, they could only get a 10% increase in tariffs. 
They believed that such an increase would not only be insufficient to repair their 
much damaged finances but also, if they accepted it, the strength o f their claims 
before the international tribunals could be jeopardised81.
Lavagna’s new plan, moreover, did not seem to have the approval of the IMF. Indeed, 
a few days after it became public, the latter issued a press release in which it stated 
that, among other things, the Argentine government needed to reaffirm its political 
commitment to address the problems o f utilities. According to press information, 
moreover, fund officials were convinced that the government should authorize a tariff
increase well beyond 10% and, furthermore, that it should not be limited to the energy
*  82 sector .
It was in this rather hostile environment that the government decided to raise the bet. 
On the last days of October, it announced that the adjustment of tariffs would not only
81 See Clarin 06/11/02 and 07/11/02, and Ambito Financiero 07/11/02
82 According to that information, the adjustment o f  tariffs demanded by IMF was around 30%. See La 
Nacion and Clarin, 29/10/02.
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be introduced in gas and electricity but also in water. It was revealed, moreover, that 
since in that sector the regulatory framework did not contemplate the possibility of 
authorizing emergency tariff adjustments, the latter would be introduced by December 
within the framework of the contract renegotiation process . Adding to this, on the 
first week of November, the Secretary of Energy announced that the gas and 
electricity seasonal adjustments would not take place and, therefore, tariffs in both 
sectors would remain the same as in the winter . This was good news for energy 
operators and, more precisely, for generators. Indeed, generation prices during the 
summer had normally been between 5 and 10% lower than in winter. The decision to 
suspend the seasonal adjustment, thus, was nothing but a masked increase in those 
prices (Haselip, 2005).
The government, however, would not be the only one to raise the stakes. Consumer 
organizations and the Buenos Aires’ ombudsman decided that, given the fact that the 
government would not listen to their arguments, the only way to make it desist from 
its plans was to bring the Judiciary into the discussions. On November the 7th, 
therefore, they requested the latter to suspend the public hearings called to discuss
or
operators’ adjustment proposals .
Although in the following week President Duhalde stated the hope that the Judiciary 
would not put more obstacles in the way of executive’s plans and would therefore
O/T
allow the regulatory agencies in the energy sector to hold the public hearings , his 
pleas did not seem to be very effective. On November 15th, a judge presented an
83 See Clarin 24/10/02.
84 See Ambito Financiero 31/10/02 and Clarin 06/11/02.
85 See Clarin 08/11/02.
86 See Clarin 17/11/02.
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injunction suspending them. The argument used to justify this decision was not new: 
following the provisions of the Economic Emergency Law, an adjustment in tariffs 
could not be introduced outside the framework of the contract renegotiation process.
4.6. Trying with DNUs.
It soon became clear that the ruling suspending the hearings would not be enough to 
make the government give up its plans. Indeed, on November 20th, the Contract 
Renegotiation Commission sent a letter to all electricity and gas operators requesting 
them to submit all the information required to conclude the second phase of the 
renegotiating process87. According to that letter, once the companies complied with 
this request, the commission would promptly launch the third phase of the process 
during which, as provided in the Resolution M.E. 20/02, their renegotiating proposals 
would be discussed.
This did not make much sense for gas and electricity operators. The activity of the 
Renegotiation Commission had been very limited in the last months and, therefore, its 
members were far from ready to make any significant progress in the renegotiation 
process. In the light of this, many o f them began to wonder whether by means of the 
letter, the government was subtly letting them know that it had decided not to insist 
anymore on the introduction of emergency tariff adjustments.
They soon realized that that was not the case. Indeed, a few days after the letter, 
economic officials announced that the government would soon insist on the
87 Recall that according to Resolution M.E. 20/02 this phase should have concluded in May.
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introduction of emergency tariff adjustment in those sectors and that, in order to 
increase its chances of success, this time it would defined them in a decree of urgency 
and need. It also became public that, during a meeting with provincial governors of 
the government party, president Duhalde had obtained the promise that, although PJ 
legislators would not vote for a law ratifying such a decree, they would at least refrain 
from vetoing it.
When everything suggested that the signature of the decree was imminent, on 
November 24th, almost four million people -  mostly in Capital Federal and greater
0 0
Buenos Aires -  were left without electricity service for four hours . Although it was 
soon determined that the origin of the blackout had been a failure in an electricity sub­
station operated by TRANSENER (the electricity transporter, which was controlled 
by the British National Grid and the local Pecom), few believed that explanation. 
There was the suspicion -  particularly among the general public -  that the electricity
O Q
companies were blackmailing the government . Press information revealed that the 
government was seriously considering the possibility of postponing the signing of the 
decree introducing the tariff adjustment90.
The rumour, understandably, caused concern among the companies. This concern, 
however, would not last long. On November 30th, Duhalde signed the decree of 
urgency and need 2437/02. As expected before the blackout, it authorized an average 
increase of 9% and 7% in electricity and gas tariffs, respectively. Moreover, it 
established that low residential consumers would not be affected by these transitory 
adjustments.
88 See La Nacion y Ambito Financiero 25/11/02
89 See La Nacion 25/11/02.
90 See Clarin 26/11/02.
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To certain extent, the reactions to the decree were predictable. Utilities -  and, in 
particular, those operating in the energy sector -  claimed that, although the tariff 
increases indicated that the government understood their problems, the adjustments 
authorised were clearly insufficient compensation for the effects of the change in the 
rules of the game introduced by the Economic Emergency Law as well as to secure 
the continuity and quality of the services91.
Consumer organizations and their allies, meanwhile, strongly opposed the 
introduction of changes in gas and electricity tariffs and anticipated that they would 
challenge them in the courts92. As they had already done in reaction to the executive’s 
previous attempts to increase tariffs, they claimed that the decree openly violated the 
provisions of the Economic Emergency Law. They also claimed that, if the 
adjustments were as urgent as to justify the use of a decree of urgency and need, the 
executive would have devoted much more effort and resources to conclude the 
contract renegotiations process. Instead, they argued, the government had constantly 
changed the rules of that process and, partly because of this, the advances made in 
that respect were almost null.
In addition, consumer organizations and their allies claimed that, since no public 
hearings had been called to discuss the adjustments, the decree 2437 also violated 
both article 42 of the Constitution as well as the procedures established in the 
electricity and gas regulatory frameworks. Finally, they contended that by introducing 
the tariff adjustment by decree, the government had the clear intention o f bypassing 
Congress, where the opposition to the tariff increases was obvious. Proof of this, they
91 See La Nacion 04/12/02.
92 See La Nacion, Clarin, and Ambito Financiero, 01/12/02
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pointed out, was the fact that the decree was signed by the president the same day the 
Legislature began its extraordinary sessions93.
The arguments discussed above were pretty strong. In fact, by the end of the first 
week of December, the question most observers were asking was not if  the judiciary 
would challenge the decree 2437 but when it would do it. And the answer to this 
question came out pretty soon. On December 10th, the same day gas and electricity 
operators started to send bills incorporating the increases, a judge ordered to suspend 
the adjustments in Capital Federal. Two days later, another judged decided to extend 
the suspension to the rest of the country.
The reasons on which the judges based their decision were in line with the arguments 
discussed above. According to them, the decree violated consumers’ right to 
participate in the adoption of important regulatory decisions. Second, it also violated 
the provisions of the Economic Emergency Law that compelled the government to 
discuss utilities tariffs within the framework o f the contract renegotiation process. 
Third, it presented invalid arguments to justify the need and urgency to authorize the 
adjustments. The judges stated, in this sense, that the circumstances invoked by the 
government to justify the supposed urgency and need were nothing but a result of the 
latter’s inability to conclude the renegotiation process in time. In their opinion, thus, 
the use of a decree of urgency and need usurped the sphere of responsibility of the 
Legislature, and was also intending to turn that legal instrument into one o f mere 
convenience.
93 The constitution in Argentina establishes that, during extraordinary sessions, legislators can only 
discuss and vote on bills submitted by the executive branch. Among other things, that means that 
during this period legislators cannot veto a presidential decree.
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4.7. Insisting on DNUs
The decision to suspend the tariff increases provided in the decree of urgency and 
need 2.437 was a hard blow for the government’s plans. By then, however, officials 
had other more important concerns. In November, the government had decided to play 
a game of chicken and announced that it would stop paying its obligations to 
multilateral institutions94. According to Argentine officials, failure to reach an 
agreement with the IMF after ten months of negotiations was the main reason for this 
decision.
As many analysts pointed out, this was certainly a high-risk strategy for a country still 
reeling from a catastrophic economic collapse. By defaulting on its debt to financial 
institutions, Argentina risked, in effect, cutting itself off from its last resource of 
outside financing. But it was not just the Argentineans who had much at stake. The 
deadlock with Argentina was uncomfortable even for an organisation like the IMF. 
Indeed, given the size of the country’s payments95, letting it go further along the road 
to full-scale default with the multilateral institutions would seriously dent the IMF’s 
credibility because its own financial structure meant it could not afford to see a big 
borrower halt all repayments. Perhaps it could even affect the World Bank’s credit 
capacity.
On January 17th, following a couple of weeks of feverish negotiations, the Fund 
announced that it had come to a transitory agreement -  until after the presidential
94 While in default to its private creditors since December 2001, the country had continued to service its 
debts to international financial institutions (which owed almost a third o f  the total public debt).
95 Argentina was the World Bank’s fourth biggest debtor, with around 7% o f its loans. At the Inter- 
American development bank, the concentration o f  loans to Argentina was even bigger.
243
elections -  with the Argentine government96. Although there would be no new 
money, the Fund would lend enough (6.6 billion) to ensure that the country would not 
default on its debts to the international financial institutions.
Initially, it was claimed that the agreement did not comprise any “meaningful 
obligation” on the Argentine government. It soon became evident, however, that this 
was not entirely true. Indeed, a few days after the agreement was clinched, press 
information revealed that both in the Letter o f Intention and in the Memorandum of 
Understanding the government had committed itself to, among other things, insisting
07on the introduction of emergency tariff adjustments .
Utilities received this news with scepticism. In their opinion, with the agreement 
already signed and a presidential election less than three months away, the 
government would have little incentive to bind itself98. Consumer organizations, 
paradoxically, shared this view. In their opinion, however, the main reason why the 
government would refrain from fulfilling the commitment was that it simply had no 
legal power to do so99.
It soon became evident that the predictions of both groups were wide of the mark. On 
January 23rd, Duhalde signed the decree of urgency and need 120/2003. In it, it was 
established that, for as long as the contract renegotiation process lasted, the executive 
would be allowed to introduce provisional tariff adjustments in order to secure the 
continuity, quality and security of services. The decree also provided that these
96 On January 17th, Argentina was due to repay the IMF $1 billion, a payment that the government had 
threatened not to make.
97 See Clarin 18/01/03, 19/01/03, and 20/01/03.
98 See La Nacion and Ambito Financiero 20/01/02.
" S eeC lar in  22/01/03.
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adjustments would be comprised within the contract renegotiation process and that 
they would be taken into consideration in future agreements between the government 
and the companies. Moreover, it was established that the exercise of this prerogative 
by the executive would not be limited or conditioned by the provisions o f any existing 
norm governing concession contracts. Although the decree did not mention it 
explicitly, it was pretty evident that by “any existing norm governing concession 
contracts” it was referring, on the one hand, to articles 8 and 9 of the Economic 
Emergency Law and, on the other hand, to those provisions of the gas and electricity 
regulatory framework that required carrying out public hearings prior to the adoption 
of changes in tariffs. The decree 120/2003, however, did not introduce any tariff 
adjustments. Those were established three days later in the decree o f urgency and 
need 146/2003, which reinstated the tariffs increases stipulated in the decree 2437.
As expected, the publication of the decrees 120/03 and 146/03 triggered the filing of 
several injunctions against them and a fierce debate on whether the courts should 
allow the government to implement them. It was in that heated scenario that the 
executive seized the opportunity to introduce some more changes. On February 3rd, 
Lavagna issued a resolution establishing that the term for the Ministry of Economy to 
submit to the president the proposals for the renegotiation of contracts would be 
extended for another 60 business days100.
In practical terms, this meant that the renegotiation process would hardly be 
concluded during Duhalde’s term in office. Although this new change in the rules of 
the game was not good news for utilities, they decided to accept it because they had
100 Resolution M.E. 62/2003.
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already discounted that possibility. Contributing to this was that, following the letter 
announcing the launching of the third phase of the contract renegotiation process, they 
had not had further news form the commission. In addition, most operators believed 
that in the last months the government had been more open to their demands than ever 
before. In the telecommunications sector, for instance, the government had already 
allowed operators to increase the cost of calls made from fixed lines to mobiles by 
8%101. Moreover, on the same day the contract renegotiation process was extended, 
the Ministry of Economy passed two resolutions that authorised operators to pass on 
to consumers the tax increases introduced by Cavallo in 2001. This last measure, it 
should be noted, opened the door for the end of the freeze in long distance and 
international call tariffs102.
By the second week of February the issue of the tariff increases in gas and electricity 
filled the cover pages of most newspapers. Consumers began to receive gas and 
electricity bills that included the tariff increases introduced in decree 146/03. 
Furthermore, Lavagna announced that it was very likely that, after the presidential
1 03 rplelections, further increases in gas and electricity tariffs would be introduced . The 
Secretary of Communications meanwhile revealed that, depending on the fate of the 
tariff increases in gas and electricity, a 10% adjustment in telecommunications tariffs 
would probably follow104.
In the light of these events and announcements, consumer organizations urged the 
courts not to delay the decision on the legality of latest adjustments. And it seems that
101 Resolution S.C. 48/2003. Note that in October 2002, The Secretary o f  Communications (Res. S.C. 
205/2002) had denied operators to introduce a similar change in the cost o f  those calls.
102 Resolutions M.E. 72/2003 and 75/2003.
103 See La Nacion 08/02/03.
104 See La Nacion 10/02/03.
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their demand was listened. Indeed, on February 17th, a judge presented the first 
relevant injunction105. However, contrary to what those who opposed the adjustment 
were expecting, he did not order the suspension of the tariff increases nor did he 
declare them illegal. In fact, the judge only ordered the government to present a 
monthly report on the progress of the contract renegotiation process as well as on the 
level of fulfilment of contractual obligations by the companies106.
Both for the government and the companies, by omitting any reference to the validity 
of the decree 120/3 and of the tariff increases, the magistrate was implicitly endorsing 
them107. They did not have much time to celebrate, though. On February 25th, another 
judge ordered the government to suspend the tariff increases. Adding to this, on 
March 4th, a third judge presented an injunction that not only declared the adjustments 
invalid but also revoked the decree of urgency and need that had authorized the 
executive to introduce them.
In these two rulings, the arguments raised by the judges were very similar to those 
advanced less than two months before to dictate the invalidity of the decree 2437/02. 
That is, they also claimed that tariff adjustments could only be authorized following 
the provisions of the Economic Emergency Law and, consequently, within the 
contract renegotiation process. The judges also considered that the Constitution 
clearly provided that only in exceptional circumstances could a law passed by 
Congress -  like the Economic Emergency Law -be  changed by the executive by 
means of a decree of urgency and need. According to them, the needs and demands of 
the companies could not be used to invoke those circumstances. Moreover, they
105 The judge in question was Guillermo Rossi.
106 See La Nacion 19/02/03.
107 See Clarin and Ambito Financiero, 19/02/03.
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contended, the executive had never been denied the possibility o f changing the 
provisions of the Economic Emergency Law following the regular legislative 
procedures -  that is, with another statute. In their view, the establishment of the tariff 
adjustments by means of the decree of urgency and need 146/03 was thus an 
unjustified invasion of Congress’ powers by the executive.
In the months that followed the judges’ rulings, and as the electoral campaign 
advanced, the issue o f utilities progressively vanished from the public agenda. O f 
course, as they had been doing since the early days of 2002, utilities continued 
complaining about the negative effects that the combination of the economic crisis 
and the Economic Emergency Law had had on their finances as well as about the
10Rminimum progress made by the government in the contract renegotiation process . 
International financial institutions, meanwhile, continued demanding a solution to 
utilities’ problems from the Argentine authorities. Neither utilities nor international 
financial institutions believed, however, that their complaints and demands would 
result in immediate changes to the status quo. In this sense, and as the government 
finally announced by mid April, those changes would have to wait until a new
109government came to power .
5. Conclusion
In the introduction of this chapter it was argued that, if as predicted by the hypotheses 
posited in the second chapter of this thesis, regulatory policies defined in statutes are 
more difficult to change -  and, hence, less volatile -  than policies defined in legal
108 By the end o f  April, at least thirty-eight companies had already initiated actions against the country 
before the ICSID.
109 See Cronista 18/04/03.
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instruments that the executive can change unilaterally by ordinary policymaking 
procedures, then the pesoification and freezing of tariffs, which was explicitly 
established in the Economic Emergency Law, should have been more stable than the 
rules o f governing the contract renegotiation process, which were defined in 
presidential decrees and resolutions.
The narrative in this chapter strongly supports the validity of this prediction. It shows 
that once the rules governing the contract renegotiation process were defined, it did 
not take much time before the executive started to change them. The changes 
involved, first, the composition of the Contract Renegotiation Commission. As a 
result, the Commission had 4 different coordinators during the time period under 
study. Second, the provisions establishing which operators were allowed to participate 
in the renegotiation process, and third, the information requirements that operators 
were required to submit were also modified in this way. The most critical changes, 
however, concerned the deadlines under which the Contract Renegotiation 
Commission had to work. As it has been shown, in March 2002 it was established that 
the Commission would have 120 days to submit to the Minister of Economy a 
proposal comprising the renegotiated contracts and licenses o f all the utilities and 
infrastructure operators participating in the contract renegotiation process. In 
September 2002 -  more than two months after the original deadline had expired -  and 
in February 2003, however, that deadline was extended 120 and 60 days, respectively. 
As a result of these changes in the rules of the game, by the time president Duhalde 
left office in May 2003, no single utility contract had been renegotiated.
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On the other hand, the narrative in this chapter shows that, although in the first 
months following the passage of the Economic Emergency Law the executive 
strongly rejected the possibility of introducing tariff increases, the need to clinch an 
agreement with international financial institutions -  notably, the IMF -  forced it to 
change its mind. As predicted, however, this change in the executive’s preferences 
did not lead to policy changes similar to those governing the contract renegotiation 
process. Indeed, although the executive made several attempts to lift the freezing and 
authorise tariffs increases, the last two of these attempts by means of decrees of 
urgency and need, none of them materialised. The reason for this was the same in all 
the cases: a hostile judiciary stepped in and ruled that if  the executive wanted to 
allow tariff increases it would first need to conclude the contract renegotiation 
process, or alternatively, persuade Congress to change the provisions of the 
Economic Emergency Law -  in particular, the provision that instituted the freezing 
of tariffs.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions
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1. The main arguments and findings in this thesis
This work started with a simple observation: in the beginning of the nineties, and in 
order to develop regulatory commitment, policy-makers in Argentina decided to 
follow the prescriptions of the “development consensus” and they privatized all the 
utilities under the national government’s purview. Like Ulysses pinning himself to the 
mast of his ship to avoid the call of the sirens, they also gave up their regulatory 
powers and delegated them to independent experts. New regulatory agencies were 
created in each of the sectors where these reforms were introduced and, in line with 
the best international practice, institutional arrangements were put in place to secure 
that these agencies operated at arm’s length from political authorities and other 
interests, and also to secure their autonomy and accountability. At the time these 
reforms were introduced, many believed that, like in other countries that followed the 
same policy recipe, the shift in the locus of regulatory power would result, among 
other things, in a drastic improvement in the stability -  and hence credibility -  of 
utility regulatory policy in Argentina.
In this thesis, however, I have argued that these expectations were not realistic. Using 
deductive reasoning, I have theorised that while for sustaining intertemporal 
commitments and developing stable utility regulatory policies delegation to 
independent experts is an important and perhaps even necessary condition, it is not by 
itself sufficient. Indeed, since there are many circumstances that might make it 
tempting for governments to reverse this policy, equally important, is to ensure that 
policy-makers cannot easily undo delegation or manipulate its terms.
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I have contended, moreover, that the organisation o f a country’s institutions plays a 
key role in this last respect because it can make the introduction of policy change 
more feasible or, on the contrary, it can hinder it. In line with recent developments 
within new institutionalism, I have argued that this is because the organisation of a 
country’s institutions not only determines the number of veto players whose 
agreement is necessary to introduce changes to a given policy, but also the divergence 
of preferences among these players. Both elements, in turn, determine how costly is to 
introduce, change or amend policy. Indeed, as the number of veto players increases, 
and the more their preferences diverge, the harder it is to enact a change in legislation.
In the case of Argentina, I have noticed, a simple analysis of the structure and 
organisation of the country’s institutions would suggest that policies there should 
enjoy a relatively high degree of stability: at first sight, ordinary policymaking 
procedures require political leaders to gain the consent of numerous veto players 
whose preferences are rarely homogeneous.
However, a closer look at the rules of the game in that country reveals, first, that not 
all policy changes are introduced by ordinary policymaking procedures. That is, 
statutes can sometimes be changed without the involvement of both the executive and 
legislative branches o f government. Second, statutes are not the sole legal instrument 
to define policy. Put differently, statutes can also be changed unilaterally by the 
executive using extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative (i.e. DNUs), and 
they only represent a small portion o f the policies in place in that country.
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Both elements, I have claimed, do pose a threat to policy stability in Argentina. And 
the reason for this is similar. When the president introduces changes to the policy 
status quo with a DNU -  in cases where the status quo was defined in a statute - ,  or 
with a legal instrument that is not a statute -  where the status quo was defined using a 
a regulatory decree, and administrative decree or a resolution - ,  it can act without the 
Assembly having the opportunity to discuss ex-ante the merit o f the proposal. In these 
cases, therefore, the executive becomes the only veto player in the policymaking 
game. And this, as it has been discussed, not only means that it can initiate policy 
changes whenever its preferences dictate so but also that it can select any point within 
its indifference curve.
In addition, I have argued that, despite this similarity, these elements pose threats of 
varying severity to policy stability. When changing the statutory status quo with a 
DNU -  the easiest way - ,  the executive is normally intervening in policies on which 
Congress has voted and, thus, with policies on which the latter has defined 
preferences. Moreover, it is quite likely that the policy preferences the executive is 
trying to impose are contrary to, or at least divergent from, those of the majority in 
Congress. In contrast, when the executive introduces policy changes through a non- 
statutory device (a regulatory decree, an administrative decree or a resolution), it 
modifies policy that either the constitution defines as the exclusive competence of the 
executive or, alternatively, that Congress previously delegated to it. To a certain 
extent, then, the use of these alternative legal instruments is unlikely to be a source of 
conflict with the Legislature. As a result, the chances o f the latter tolerating the new 
status quo are probably higher than when a DNU is used to change a statute.
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I have noted, moreover, that the courts are also more likely to avoid stepping in when 
policy changes are introduced using these legal instruments than when the executive 
introduces changes to the statutory status quo using a DNU. Accounting for this is the 
fact that when dealing with controversies involving policy changes introduced using 
DNUs, the courts are less exposed to the risk of reprisals by the executive than when 
dealing with controversies involving policy changes introduced in regulatory decrees, 
administrative decrees and resolutions.
Based on these arguments 1 have posited two hypotheses. The first is that, given 
Argentina’s institutional endowment, the stability and credibility of a policy in that 
country is, ceteris paribus, governed by the choice of the legal instrument used to 
define it. More precisely, since it is relatively easier or less costly for the executive to 
change the policy status quo when this is defined in a non statutory device than when 
it is defined in a statute -  even if the changes to the statute were introduced in a DNU 
- ,  policy defined in the latter is likely to be more stable than policy defined in the 
former. That is, policies defined in statutes are less prone to be changed than policies 
defined in other legal instruments that can be passed unilaterally by the executive.
Closely related, the second hypothesis I have put forward in this thesis is that policy­
makers’ original expectation that delegation of important regulatory powers to 
independent agencies was a policy that had arrived to stay and that it would result in 
more stable and credible regulatory policy was not legitimate for all the industries 
where this institutional arrangement was established but only for the industries where 
the key features of the regulatory regime were defined in a statute. In those industries
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where the legal instrument used to define the key features of the newly created 
regulatory regimes was a regulatory decree, an administrative decree or a resolution, 
meanwhile, politicians probably faced little constraints to renege on their previous 
policy commitments. In these industries, therefore, the institutional arrangements set 
up at the time of privatisation - including the delegation of important regulatory 
powers to independent experts - were likely to be only temporary. Regulatory policy 
in these sectors, then, was likely to continue being a domain where policy-makers 
introduced policy changes whenever their preferences dictated it.
To test these hypotheses, 1 have presented an in-depth investigation of three case 
studies. As noted in the introductory chapter, these cases were not selected on the 
value of the dependent variable but on the value of the variable that the theory 
identifies as the ultimate independent variable. Thus, it is only during the presentation 
of each of the cases that I have discovered whether the dependent variable takes the 
values predicted by my theory. Also as discussed in the introductory chapter, the 
empirical information in the three cases analysed has been presented in the form of 
narratives. This not only has allowed me to present correlations at every step of the 
causal process but also, and equally importantly, to contextualise these steps in ways 
that make the entire process visible rather than fragmented into analytical stages.
The first o f the three cases covered in this work comprises the study of the 
telecommunications industry between its privatisation in 1990 and the last days of 
Fernando de la Rua’s government in December 2001. Its analysis shows that during 
the first presidency of Carlos Menem, and only a few years after the sector was 
privatised and a new regulatory framework was put in place, the sector’s regulatory
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agency was intervened, its authorities were replaced (twice), its financial autonomy 
was severely limited, and many of its key powers were curtailed and transferred to the 
Under-Secretariat o f Communications. These changes, however, were just the first of 
many more to come. Indeed, the analysis of the case also shows that during Menem’s 
second term in office -  and mostly between 1995 and 1997 - the executive also 
adjusted the sector’s rules of the game to its changing preferences. Proof o f this is that 
during that period, the government established the second intervention of the 
regulatory agency and appointed new regulators, changed the jurisdiction of the 
regulatory body (from the Ministry of economy to the presidency) and, following a 
rather confusing and contradictory process, it further transferred regulatory powers in 
favour o f the sector’s political authority (by that time the secretary of 
Communication). In addition to these changes, the regulatory agency was merged 
with the postal regulator, its financial autonomy was even more restricted, and the 
institutional arrangements originally put in place to secure its autonomy and 
accountability were, again, substantially modified. Therefore, by the time Carlos 
Menem left government in December 1999, the rules of the game that governed 
telecommunications regulation in Argentina were only a pallid -  and rather distorted -  
image of those put in place almost a decade before.
What the analysis of the telecommunications experience reveals, moreover, is that it 
would be wrong to attribute all the blame for constantly changing the rules of the 
game just to President Menem’s style of government and his contempt for keeping his 
policy commitments. Indeed, the analysis of the case shows that despite being a 
strong critic of the sector’s poor stability, President De la Rua also gave in to the 
temptation to adjust the rules governing the regulation of the telecommunications
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industry. During his first days in office, his government not only established that the 
Secretary of Communications would keep all the regulatory powers that the previous 
government had already granted it, but also that all the regulatory decisions 
concerning the telecommunications industry would now be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of infrastructure and public works. As for 
the previous government, the new authorities also forced the resignation of most of 
the agency’s directors and appointed new ones more identified with its political and 
economic project. Less than a year later, moreover, and together with the introduction 
of a contentious liberalisation o f the telecommunications market, President de la Rua 
established that, in the future, any decision involving the application o f the regulations 
governing the aforementioned liberalisation would require the prior intervention of 
the Competition and Consumer’s Affairs Secretariat. In order to allow the latter to 
take on this task, a new redistribution rule of the funds originally assigned to the 
regulatory agency was adopted.
The analysis of the telecommunications sector between 1990 and the last days of 
2001, thus, leaves no room to doubt. It confirms that, in Argentina, defining a 
regulatory regime in a presidential decree was a poor arrangement to prevent the 
government from reneging from its original policy commitments and, thus, to develop 
a more stable and credible regulatory policy. Put differently, the analysis of this case 
corroborates that establishing the rules o f the game in this legal instrument not only 
allowed the executive to distort or undo most of the institutional arrangements put in 
place in the beginning of the 90s but also to play with the rules of the game governing 
telecommunications regulation almost at will.
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The second case studied in this thesis comprises the analysis of the electricity sector 
between its privatisation and regulatory reform in 1992 and the last days of 2001. 
Following the methodological approach adopted in this work, this case was chosen 
because the design of the regulatory regime in the electricity sector showed strong 
similarities with that originally put in place in the telecommunications sector -  
notably, in terms of regulatory governance -  but with the key exception that the legal 
instrument used to define it was a statute and not a decree. Thus, what I expected to 
confirm in the study of this case was that in this sector the key features of the 
regulatory regime were relatively costly to be changed and, consequently, the 
government was less able to renege on its original policy commitments than in the 
telecommunications sector. Put it differently, I was examining the hypothesis that, 
contrary to what happened in the telecommunications sector, in the electricity sector 
delegation of important regulatory powers to independent experts was a policy much 
more likely to become a permanent feature of the policy landscape.
Like in the analysis o f the telecommunications experience, the evidence from this 
case study also provides strong support for the hypotheses posited in this thesis. 
Indeed, it shows that almost a decade after the regulatory reforms in this sector had 
been introduced, the legislation used to define the key features of the regulatory 
regime was still in place and in its original form. By the end of 2001, as a result, the 
electricity market was not only organised under relatively the same structure as 
provided in the 1992 Electricity Act but it was also governed by the same institutional 
arrangements reformers put in place when the industry was privatised. Indeed, in 2001 
regulators in the electricity sector still had most of the powers and responsibilities
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originally granted to them1. Moreover, the institutional devices that had originally 
been established to safeguard their independence, autonomy and accountability 
remained untouched.
The analysis of the electricity case shows, in addition, that in this sector the stability 
in the rules of the game and the durability of the policies established in the early 90s 
could not be attributed to the lack of pressures in the opposite direction -  which 
would somehow jeopardise the strength of the hypotheses in this thesis. On the 
contrary, it reveals that there were at least three episodes where the status quo 
prevailed despite the fact that the government felt tempted to change it, or tried to do 
so but failed. As has been discussed, an incident where the government probably 
considered introducing changes but finally refrained -  given the high cost that this 
strategy involved -  occurred in the aftermath of the blackout that in 1999 affected 
more than a 150,000 customers of EDESUR in the city of Buenos Aires. The episodes 
triggered by the ENDESA case and, notably, by the decree 804/01, meanwhile, are 
clear examples of incidents where the government disliked the status quo and 
unsuccessfully tried to change to it.
Finally, in the last case analysed in this thesis, I sought to confirm that, in Argentina, 
regulatory policy established in a presidential decree is likely to be less stable than 
regulatory policy established in a statute. This, it is important to note, is distinct from 
the question of whether the legal instrument used to define a regulatory regime 
determines its durability.
1 The analysis shows that the few policies that were subject to change were those whose definition the 
Electricity Act had delegated to the executive. These policies — which, among others, included the 
regulatory incentives governing transmission expansion -, had been originally established in 
presidential decrees or in resolutions, and not in statutes.
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To test this hypothesis I analysed two critical policy measures introduced by the 
government in January 2002 in the so-called Economic Emergency Law. The first of 
them established that all utility tariffs would remain frozen for as long as the then 
current economic emergency lasted. The second provided that the executive would be 
allowed to renegotiate the contracts of all the utilities and infrastructure operators in 
the country in order to accommodate them to the new economic situation, and that the 
rules governing this process would be defined by the president in presidential decrees 
or, alternatively, in other legal instruments that could be unilaterally passed by the 
executive. My prior expectation when studying this case, which covers the period 
between the first days of 2002 and April 2003, was, then, quite simple: I expected to 
find that the freezing of tariffs, since it was defined in a statute, was a policy that 
enjoyed considerable more stability than the rules governing the contract 
renegotiation process.
The empirical evidence in this case once more provides strong support for my 
predictions. Regarding the contract renegotiation process, it confirms that allowing 
the executive to define the terms of the contract renegotiation process in a decree (or 
in any other non-statutory measure) did not help to promote the stability and 
credibility of the process but opened the door to constant, and often arbitrary, changes 
in the rules of the game. As a result, by the time President Duhalde left office in April 
2003, and even though none of the 59 contracts under review had been renegotiated, 
the rules governing the process were substantially different from those originally put 
in place. By that time, moreover, the high uncertainty that resulted from the instability 
of the whole process made it impossible to predict what would be the outcome o f the 
process or, even worse, when an outcome would be reached.
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The empirical evidence offered by this case also shows that as predicted, utility tariffs 
in April 2003 were the same as those in place during the last days of 2001. It shows, 
moreover, that this outcome could not be attributed to the lack o f pressures in the 
opposite direction. Indeed, the analysis o f the case reveals that the executive tried to 
lift the freezing of tariffs at least four times. Since it was pretty obvious that Congress 
would never provide its consent to such an unpopular measure -  the legislative 
support that President Duhalde enjoyed during his first days in office having vanished 
rapidly - ,  the four attempts were introduced in legal instruments that the executive 
could pass unilaterally. The last two o f these attempts, moreover, were introduced 
using extraordinary mechanisms of legislative initiative -  that is, decrees of urgency 
and need. All these efforts, however, invariably failed. As the study of the case 
reveals, every time the executive authorised a change in tariffs, or that passed 
legislation that opened the door to those changes, defiant judges stepped in and 
exercised the judiciary’s veto powers.
2. Final remarks
Before concluding, I would like to emphasise that the findings in this thesis should 
not be taken as a plea for eliminating discretion in the regulation of utilities and, 
hence, for defining all aspects of utility regulation in Argentina in highly specific 
statutes. And there are two reasons for this. First, I believe such alternative is 
unattainable. Contract theory is quite emphatic when it notes that regulatory rules
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represent, at best, incomplete contracts2. That is, no matter how precisely these rules 
are defined, there will always be questions o f interpretation as well as room for 
judgement on enforcement policy. Discretion, thus, cannot be eliminated entirely. 
Moreover, and even if this was not a problem, it is unrealistic to expect the Argentine 
Congress to write the highly-specific and technically complex rules required for 
eliminating discretion in utility regulation. As we have seen in this work, the 
combined result of incentives created by several features of the Argentine political 
institutions -  notably, the electoral institutions -  considerably limit legislators’ ability 
to specialise. As a result, they often lack the capacity or the expertise needed to design 
most of the policies that utility regulation nowadays requires.
The second reason why the findings of this thesis should not be seen as a plea for 
eliminating regulatory discretion and defining all aspects of utility regulation in 
Argentina in highly specific statutes stands from the fact that, in that country, this 
alternative can entail costs as severe -  although different in nature -  as those 
associated with defining all the components of a regulatory system in presidential 
decrees. It is important to bear in mind that in Argentina regulatory rules defined in 
statutes, especially when they contain a great deal of detail, are not easily changed. As 
a result, they can make it difficult to adjust to unforeseen developments, including 
changes in technology, information, and market conditions. Due to their rigidity, 
moreover, these sorts of rules can also make it difficult to provide incentives for 
efficiency. And this, in turn, can not only undermine the effectiveness of the rules in 
question but also its sustainability -  and, hence, its credibility.
2 On the issue o f  contract incompleteness see, among others, Collins (1999:160-72), Laffont and Tirole 
(1991), Williamson (1996), Stem (2003) and Spiller (1996a).
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When designing regulatory regimes in Argentina, consequently, it is important to 
recognise that there is not one legal instrument that both promotes the stability of 
those rules and allows the flexibility to change them when this change is justified. 
Therefore, Argentine policy-makers have to accept that while some of the components 
of regulatory regimes have to be defined in statutes, others have to be established in 
legal instruments which are less costly to change. The question, obviously is: which 
components of the regulatory regime need to be defined in statutes and which, on the 
contrary, need to be defined in alternative legal instruments such as regulatory 
decrees, administrative decrees or resolutions?
Although my intention here is not to offer recipes or magic potions, I believe that the 
findings in this thesis suggest that, in Argentina, presidential decrees or resolutions 
are probably the most adequate legal instruments to define those regulatory rules that 
demand some degree of discretion -  and, hence, flexibility -  in the hands of those in 
charge of implementing them. One could reasonably argue that these rules comprise 
those governing the implementation o f policies that require a high degree of 
adaptation to changing market conditions, or which are critical for providing 
incentives for efficient operation. In most utilities, these rules are likely to comprise 
what Levy and Spiller (1996) term “regulatory incentives” or the “detailed 
engineering” of a regulatory regime. According to these authors, this encompasses the 
rules governing pricing, subsidies, market entry, interconnection, and the like.
Statutes, meanwhile, are probably the most adequate instrument to define those 
components of the regulatory regime where some degree of policy stability is needed 
or, alternatively, where the lack of flexibility is likely to produce no harm. I believe,
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therefore, that policy-makers in Argentina should consider the option of using statutes 
when defining those components of the regulatory regime that have a key role in 
moulding how the regulatory discretion specified in the rules defined in presidential 
decrees or resolutions is managed. And one could argue that these components are, 
basically, what Levy and Spiller (1996) call the governance structure or basic 
engineering of a regulatory regime. As most of the literature on this topic 
recommends, the objective when designing them should be to minimise the misuse of 
regulatory discretion .
Statutes, then, are probably the best choice for clearly establishing the main objectives 
to be pursued by those individuals or agencies in charge of implementing -  or, when 
needed, adjusting -  the regulatory policies defined in presidential decrees or 
resolutions; for designating who will be those individuals or agencies; and for 
establishing their roles and responsibilities. They are probably also the best choice for 
establishing the institutional arrangements needed to secure that these individuals or 
agencies: a) are insulated from short-term political pressures and other improper 
influences -  that is, that they are independent; b) have the resources to foster the 
development and application of technical expertise- that is, that they are autonomous; 
and c) do not stray from their mandate, engage in corrupt practices, or become grossly 
inefficient -  that is, that they are accountable and transparent.
The more important advice that this thesis has to offer, however, goes far beyond the 
issue of which legal instrument should be used in Argentina when designing 
regulatory regimes or when instituting new regulatory policy. I believe, in this sense,
3 On this issue, see the literature review in Correa et al. (2006) and the references therein.
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that the findings in this work clearly show that there are no magic formulas for 
implementing successful policy reforms and that, as recently argued by some new 
institutionalist scholars, a policy’s chances of success can not be judged abstractly on 
its theoretical or technical attributes without considering the institutional context in 
which is applied (Tommasi, 2004; IADB 2006; and Spiller and Tommasi, 2007).
Now that Argentina’s enthusiasm for the so-called Washington consensus has waned 
and Argentine policy-makers seem to be searching for a new development paradigm, 
it is thus very important that they abandon the tendency to think of policies first and 
institutions later. They need to understand that policies and institutions are inseparable 
and that, for policy reforms to work, it is not sufficient to simply adopt what ex-ante 
appear to be technically correct policies. Neither it is to merely replicate policy 
solutions that have worked in other countries. Put differently, if policymakers in 
Argentina -  and probably elsewhere - want to avoid failed reforms and dashed 
expectations, they need to recognise that the success or failure of any policy reform 
will ultimately depend both on the specific content of the reform itself as well as on 
how well the new policies fit into the country’s institutions.
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